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Eurosceptic Protest Movements:

A Comparative Analysis between Ireland, the UK,
Estonia and Denmark

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JOHN FITZGIBBON
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

EUROSCEPTIC PROTEST MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN
IRELAND, THE UK, ESTONIA AND DENMARK

SUMMARY

The aim of this thesis is to add to the growing literature on Euroscepticism by providing an in-depth comparative study of groups in civil society that actively campaign against European integration in Denmark, Estonia, Ireland and the United Kingdom. This study labels these groups as 'Eurosceptic Protest Movements' (EPMs). Five explanatory factors drawn from the literature on Euroscepticism and social movements are used to ask the research question of why EPMs are formed. These are namely, Euroscepticism in the party system, the number of referendums in each case study, the availability of resources, the openness of the policy making process, and the perceived pro-EU bias of the media.

Empirically it proceeds on a case by case basis, providing an in-depth account of each state's relationship with the EU from party system, public opinion, referendums to case specific factors to allow for an appreciation of the environment in which EPMs are formed. Data is gathered primarily from interviews with the founders and both current and former members of EPMs, with additional information coming from EPM documents, referendum manifestos and posters. Contextual information is provided by interviews with academics, journalists and pro-European activists, and secondary literature in EU studies and social movements.

The thesis comes to two key conclusions. Firstly, in relation to the literature on social movements, EPMs conform strongly to the political opportunity structure paradigm in that body of work. More specifically is the importance of referendums to EPM formation, an element of the political opportunity structure that has not been researched in relation to social movements. Secondly, with regard to Euroscepticism the thesis concluded that EPMs emerge because of a lack of available space for contestation on the EU issue and the inability of political parties to act as an interlocutor between the electorate and the EU.

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“We are not Eurosceptic, we are pro-Europeans in that we believe that a different Europe to this one is possible”. (Declan Ganley former Chairperson of Libertas, interview 14th August, 2008)

Chapter One: Introduction

Taken together, the rejections of the Lisbon Treaty in the 2008 Irish referendum, the EU constitutional treaty in the 2005 Dutch and French ratification referendums, the earlier 2003 Swedish No to EMU membership, the 2001 Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty and the two Danish No votes in 2000 on EMU membership and in 1992 on the Maastricht Treaty have heightened awareness of public opposition to European integration. The social and political effects of these referendum votes have been compounded by a significant decline in positive public opinion towards the EU among the electorate of member states, with support falling from a high of 66% across the EU in 1990 to 51% across an enlarged EU in 2010.¹ In pursuit of understanding these developments an established body of literature has emerged that has largely focused on political parties and public opinion.² Yet, thus far no clear answers or wide ranging generalisable theories have emerged that explain the declining support for European integration. Research into Euroscepticism in party systems has focused on its origins being located within the party system itself, more specifically in either party competition or party family membership.³

¹ Leconte, Cécile (2010). *Understanding Euroscepticism*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 164.

² The body of research expands each year. A list of publications that are amongst the most important as they set the standard for the debate as a whole includes the following; on public opinion: McLaren, Laruen (2006). *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, Palgrave: Basingstoke; Franklin, Mark et. al. (1995). ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht’, *West European Politics*, 18: 3, pp. 101–17; Karp, Jeffrey et. al. (2003). ‘To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 36: 3, pp. 271–292; and on party based Euroscepticism: Taggart, Paul (1998). ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism’, in *European Journal of Political Research*, 33: 3, 363–88; Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2002). ‘The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate Countries’, *Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 51*. Szczerbiak Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2008) (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

³ Sitter, Nick (2002). ‘Opposing Europe: Euro-scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition’, *Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No 9*, Sussex European Institute; Kopécky, Peter and Mudde, Cas (2002). ‘The two sides of Euroscepticism. Party positions on European integration in East Central Europe’, *European Union Politics*, 3: 3, pp. 297–326.

Moreover, the literature on public opinion towards Europe has not come to a consensus on why individuals oppose European integration.⁴

It is the intention of this study to complement this body of research and the increasing attempts to understand opposition to the EU across the member states by examining a particular aspect of Euroscepticism that has largely been ignored in the literature: civil society based protest movements, which I label as Eurosceptic Protest Movements (EPMs). This study will qualitatively examine four case studies in detail to locate what factors caused Euroscepticism to emerge in these countries in the form of EPMs.

This study brings a new dynamic to the research of Euroscepticism by locating the reasons why opposition to European integration comes to be expressed through civil society based protest movements instead of in political parties, European Parliamentary elections or in EU referendums. In achieving these ends this study utilises four in-depth, case study analyses of EU member states – the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Estonia – to explore some of the issues which have thus far been under-analysed in the field of Euroscepticism. The fundamental question it seeks to answer is: *why does opposition towards European integration become articulated in the mobilising of protest movements and not through other means such as political parties?* Existing work has tended to be regionally specific (e.g. Scandinavia⁵, the Mediterranean states⁶), focused on larger states (e.g. France⁷ and the UK⁸) or as is most common, that of single case studies combined in special issues of journals or edited texts.⁹ This study brings together conclusions on Euroscepticism in four very different EU member states that allow for a wider set of patterns of Eurosceptic formation to be identified. These patterns

⁴ McLaren, Lauren (2007). 'Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests and Institutional Distrust', *Acta Politica*, 42: 2, pp. 233-5.

⁵ Sitter, Nick (2001). 'The politics of opposition to European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a government-opposition dynamic', *West European Politics*, 24:1, pp. 22-39.

⁶ Llamazares, Iván and Gramacho, Wladimir (2007). 'Eurosceptics amongst Euroenthusiasts: An Analysis of Southern European Public Opinions', *Acta Politica*, 42: 2, pp. 211-32.

⁷ Milner, Susan (2000). 'Euroscepticism in France and changing state-society relations', *Journal of European Integration*, 22: 1, pp. 35-58.

⁸ Gowland, David and Turner, Arthur (2002). *Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998*, London: Longman

⁹ See for example: Special issues of *Acta Politica* 'Understanding Euroscepticism', 2007 Volume 42, Numbers 2-3 edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks; Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*.

are articulated and contextualised in Chapter Six, the comparative chapter, and their implications for the literature on Euroscepticism are discussed in the conclusion.

The principal aim of this first chapter is to provide a road-map to the rest of the thesis by summarising the key issues to be explored and survey the existing literature on the topics covered. It begins by addressing the important distinction between the proposed study of EPMs and that body of work which has already been conducted on Euroscepticism. The second section completes the introductory framework of the thesis by conceptualising EPMs and providing a framework by which they may be classified. The third section provides justification for the choice of case studies listed above, before the fourth and final section articulates the findings of the study.

1.1 Why do we need to understand Eurosceptic Protest Movements?

There are four main reasons why it is necessary to understanding EPMs.

1. As stated earlier, voters have rejected referendums for European integration with increasing regularity and this study affords the opportunity to analyse the role of EPMs in these No votes and in the mobilisation of opposition to the EU in general.
2. Despite a long tradition of scholarship on protest movements in general, the literature has yet to focus to any significant degree on how they mobilise around the European issue specifically. Drawing upon the framework developed by Kitschelt¹⁰, my research represents an opportunity to test the assertion of Imig and Tarrow¹¹ that civil society protest would take an increasingly European dimension. More recently Kohler-Koch, in her overview of civil society and the EU, questions why there is so little evidence of grassroots civil society opposition

¹⁰ Kitschelt, Herbert (1986). 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 1, pp. 57-85.

¹¹ Imig, Doug, and Tarrow. Sidney (2000). "Political contention in a Europeanising polity." *West European Politics*, 23: 4, pp. 73-93.

to European integration.¹² This study plugs directly into the debate on the relationship between civil society and the EU by providing a new approach from the angle of Euroscepticism.

3. A systematic study of EPMs adds to the study of Euroscepticism in general. This study helps to clarify the reasons why Euroscepticism mobilises in civil society in addition to the presence of Eurosceptic political parties in each of the case studies. The difficulty of party systems in dealing with the EU permeates the case studies and the relationship between parties and the EU remains a theme throughout the thesis.
4. By drawing upon four representative country cases in its analysis of EPMs this research helps to understand two broader features of the European integration process. Firstly, just as studying the direction European integration takes can tell us about which EU policies work, so we will be able to learn about where it fails by examining around which EU policies opposition to European integration mobilises through protest movements. Secondly, the research engages directly with the important academic debate on whether the EU is a first or second order issue for the electorate. This can be achieved by understanding whether EPM formation is motivated by European concerns or simply reflects debates on the domestic politics of each country.¹³

1.2 Euroscepticism: Existing Approaches

The research question of this thesis is part of the growing literature on Euroscepticism. While Euroscepticism has emerged as one of the most dynamic fields of European political research, no clear consensus on a strict definition has been achieved

¹² Kohler-Koch, Beate (2010). 'Civil society and EU democracy: "astroturf" representation?', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17: 1, pp. 100-116.

¹³ See: Franklin, Mark (2003). 'Learning from the Danish case: A comment on Palle Svensson's critique of the Franklin thesis', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 6, pp. 751-7; and Svensson, Palle (2003). 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union: A Critical Assessment of the Franklin Thesis', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 6, pp. 733-50.

and it remains an “elusive concept”.¹⁴ This failure has been accounted for by the belief that “the scope and intensity of Euroscepticism came as a surprise” to academics with the result that a myriad of approaches towards understanding it have been developed.¹⁵ At this point it is important to clarify what actually constitutes Euroscepticism, specifically what makes an actor Eurosceptic or what are the requirements for an actor to be labelled Eurosceptic. This will allow for the findings of this research to be located in the literature on Euroscepticism.

The starting point for an understanding of the term Euroscepticism then must begin at the most general level. Szczerbiak and Taggart have sought to conceptualise Euroscepticism in the Political Science literature and took the approach of establishing a broad definition of Euroscepticism that could encompass the range of studies into the phenomenon of Euroscepticism from differing perspectives.¹⁶ They describe Euroscepticism as “encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration, as well as outright opposition”¹⁷. They break this concept down further into principled and contingent components of Euroscepticism. They present *hard Euroscepticism* as the principled rejection of the continuation of the EU itself; while *soft Euroscepticism* is the contingent scepticism towards specific aspects/policies contained within European integration.¹⁸

Hooghe and Marks in their ‘state of the art’ analysis of Euroscepticism, seek an understanding of the concept by disaggregating it by actors, principally public opinion and political parties. They do not make reference to social movements which they do not consider as a relevant Eurosceptic actor.¹⁹ This is typical of the literature on Euroscepticism which is dominated by the context of either public opinion or political parties. Approaches that seek to understand actors outside of these two are few and far

¹⁴ Flood, Christopher (2002). ‘Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept’, Paper presented at the *UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference*, Queen’s University Belfast, p.2.

¹⁵ Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (2007). ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, *Acta Politica*, 42:2, pp. 119-27.

¹⁶ Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Aleks (2004). ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43: 1, pp. 1-27.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 3.

¹⁸ Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2008). ‘Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe’, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-9.

¹⁹ Hooghe and Marks, ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, p. 119.

between, though more recently they have started to appear more in the literature.²⁰ This has been very much the case after analyses of the French No vote to the EU Constitutional Treaty showed that non-party actors were an important element in understanding the rejection.²¹ Szczerbiak and Taggart's wide definition of Euroscepticism is therefore taken as the working definition for this study as its broad scope allows for EPs to be included along with political parties and public opinion in understanding their opposition to European integration.

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism has come to be framed largely through the prism of party politics, more specifically on party positions towards European integration. Parties have the role of political representatives in the EU at the domestic level, in national parliaments and governments, and at the European level, in the European Parliament and European Council.²² As parties are intrinsic to the process of European integration, seeking to understand why Euroscepticism emerges or does not emerge in parties has become an important question for political scientists to answer. The early study of Euroscepticism was often associated with research on 'extreme' political parties and the reasons underlying the emergence of Euroscepticism within West European party systems was explained through issues of party competition or the ideology of the hard left and hard right.²³ More recently this approach appears to have been validated by the work of Ray and his analysis of the EU position of mainstream political parties. He found an almost universal pro-EU sentiment across the mainstream parties of member states, apart from the one glaring example of the Conservative Party in the UK.²⁴ This research was expanded by Kopécky and Mudde who sought to understand Euroscepticism in the party systems of the new member states.²⁵ They concluded that party ideology along with party strategy were the most important

²⁰ Usherwood, Simon (2002). 'Opposition to the European Union in the UK; The Dilemma of Public Opinion and Party Management', *Government and Opposition*, 37: 2, p. 21. See also: Usherwood, Simon (2004). *Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the UK, 1985-1999*, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics.

²¹ Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism*, pp. 219-45.

²² Szczerbiak and Taggart, 'Introduction', p. 2.

²³ Sitter, 'The politics of opposition to European integration in Scandinavia'; Kopécky and Mudde, 'The two sides of Euroscepticism'.

²⁴ Ray, Leonard (2007). 'Mainstream Euroscepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?', *Acta Politica*, 42: 2, pp. 153-172.

²⁵ Kopecky and Mudde, 'p. 321.

determinants of Euroscepticism. Seeking a more nuanced interpretation of the factors underlying contestation of the EU Hooghe and Marks suggest a two dimensional model.²⁶ The centre-left prefers 'regulated capitalism' and will become more pro-European as the European debate focuses more on market regulation. The centre-right however, favours economic and monetary integration but becomes less supportive of European integration once this is achieved. While this model was ostensibly created to explain political party positions on European integration its focus on core ideological values as opposed to more party system related structures, as the basis for support or rejection of the EU is an important consideration in EPM formation.

The second set of actors that Hooghe and Marks identify as intrinsic to understanding Euroscepticism is the public. Gabel and McLaren have been at the forefront of explaining declining public support for European integration.²⁷ Their findings have led them to conclude that concerns over the growth of EU competencies and opposition to Turkish membership of the EU are important factors. Using evidence from referendums on Europe and not wider public opinion, Franklin et. al. argue that the public is largely unconcerned over events at a European level and tend to vote according to 'second order' national issues in European referendums.²⁸ This approach is criticised by Svensson who argues that in some cases citizens do vote in European referendums on the basis of their attitudes towards European integration rather than simply using proxies derived from domestic politics.²⁹ Nevertheless a consensus of sorts has emerged that basic factors like "utilitarianism and national identities, attitudes to national and European institutions" play an important role in shaping attitudes toward European integration.³⁰ But to come to a deeper understanding of public opinion and European integration, the literature needs to disentangle "the various causal linkages" of "mass-level Euroscepticism".³¹

²⁶ Hooghe, Liesbet et. al. (2002). 'Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?', *Comparative European Politics*, 35: 8, pp. 965-89.

²⁷ Gabel, Matthew (1995). 'Public support for European integration: an empirical test of five theories', *The Journal of Politics*, 60: 2, pp. 333-54; McLaren, 'Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism', pp. 233-51.

²⁸ Franklin et. al. 'Referendum outcomes and trust in government'.

²⁹ Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union'.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 733.

³¹ Ibid, p. 749.

As with the literature on party based Euroscepticism, there is a degree of contention in the literature between the various approaches as to the cause of public opposition to European integration. Both sets of literature, without offering a conclusive definition of Euroscepticism do, however, offer a substantial set of approaches with which to investigate EPMs. Szczerbiak and Taggart provide a working definition of Euroscepticism for this thesis. The Hooghe-Marks model and the more recent literature on party based Euroscepticism argues that opposition to European integration can be motivated by values and ideology and not just strategic considerations. McLaren on the other hand emphasises that certain factors such as strength of national identity and sentiment toward European institutions need to be considered in any analysis of opposition to European integration. Studying the origin of EPMs thus expands the research of Euroscepticism to actors not considered by the majority of the literature. Such an expansion can only benefit the wider investigation into opposition to European integration that has been a process of continuing evolution.

Civil society based opposition to European integration has not gone entirely unnoticed. Usherwood has conducted an insightful analysis of civil society based Eurosceptic movements. He identifies developments at a European level, most notably the Maastricht treaty, as the key drivers for protest group formation. In his analysis of Euroscepticism in the UK and France he argues that civil society based opposition to European integration play a vital role in the respective countries' European debates. He concludes that policy outcomes emanate from the EU itself, and it is this fact that is of primary concern to those opposed to the EU, rather than the relative importance of national and supranational elements within the EU system. He also notes that those opposed to the EU would prefer an enhanced role for national institutions, and that there is a keen awareness of how those latter institutions have been affected by the integration process.³²

While Usherwood identifies non-party-based actors as significant to the national debates on Europe in France and the UK, his thesis is rooted firmly in an analysis of the party system and the related political institutions. This thesis expands upon Usherwood's

³² Usherwood, 'Opposition to the European Union in the UK', p. 21. See also: Usherwood, Simon (2004). *Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the UK, 1985-1999*, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics.

original findings on the link between social movement formation and events at the European level due. Though Usherwood makes a compelling and convincing case for the conclusion drawn, his findings need to be contextualised further by testing them against more explanatory factors across more case studies. This research pursues this end by examining EPMs across more case studies with greater variance on EPM formation. Adopting such an approach allows for more concrete conclusions as to whether the factors underlying EPM formation were a case specific occurrence or part of a wider pan-European phenomenon.

1.3 Exploring ‘European’ Phenomena at the National Level

Before articulating how this study engages with this collective body of work on Euroscepticism it is important to firstly address why this study engages with the EU issue by focusing on national level case studies.³³ It is a generally accepted view that many of the seemingly ‘European’ phenomena that are observed are actually best understood as expressions of national political arenas: European Parliament elections, European referendums, party-based Euroscepticism, all have been explored through use of Reif and Schmitt’s ‘second-order’ model. At the centre of this model is the idea that there is a dominant national political arena and that political events either occur within it (first-order) or are conducted elsewhere, but are shaped by it (second-order). Reif and Schmitt developed this model after consideration of the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 and suggested that such elections would be characterised by lower turnouts than for national elections (since less is at stake), poor performances by national government parties (since voters perceive an opportunity to make a low/zero-cost expression of disapproval of that government) and relatively strong performances by small parties (since there is no link to the formation of a government and voters can give full flight to their preferences, without a need for tactical voting).³⁴ Thus, voters in

³³ For the purposes of brevity and clarity the term EU will be used in the place of the various incarnations of the European project over the course of European integration such as European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Common Market, European Economic Community (EEC) and European Union (EU), unless a reference is being made to one of those bodies specifically where it will be referred to in inverted commas: e.g. Irish EPMs were strongly opposed to the concept of the European ‘Common Market’.

³⁴ Reif, Karl-Heinz and Schmitt, Hermann (1980). ‘Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 8: 1, pp. 3-44.

European Parliament elections might be ostensibly choosing MEPs on the basis of what they will do once elected, but practically make their decision primarily with reference to domestic politics. Likewise, referendums on European topics become votes on the sitting government, rather than the substantive topic of the question asked: opposition parties that might support a particular vote become disinclined to mobilise their supporters when there is a chance of embarrassing the governing parties.³⁵ Such a model both suggests and explains the poor turnout in such elections, the difficulties that government parties often face in such situations and the apparent mismatch between measured public opinion and voting outcomes.

Implicit in the second-order approach is the idea of levels of political action. While we are concerned with the national and European levels in these cases, it is important to recognise that these are fundamentally interlinked at a certain point, not least because “the European level is significantly the product of state interaction”³⁶. States operate simultaneously at a number of levels: in the EU, states are involved in decision-making in the European Council and the Council of Ministers; in confirming personnel in the Commission, Court of Justice and other institutions; in implementing most EU law; and in financing the EU’s budget. While this is not to deny the existence of essentially autonomous actors at the European level (most clearly the European Parliament), it must be emphasised that the output from the ‘European’ level is in no small part the result of developments at the national level.³⁷

“[T]he European level is not the place where formal decisions are taken on typical ‘European issues’, and in particular on such issues as the further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level, or further enlargement, and so on. These are European ‘polity’ issues, and hence are subject to the intergovernmental rather than the supranational level of European decision-making. In other words, they require the consent of national governments and, at least in principle, are subject to the control of national parliaments and national electorates. Insofar as parties fail to offer a meaningful choice to the voters on these issues, it is *therefore a problem of representation at the national rather than the European level.*”³⁸ [emphasis added]

³⁵ Franklin et. al. ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government’.

³⁶ Mair, Peter and Thomassen, Jacques (2010). ‘Political representation and government in the European Union’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17: 1, p.28, (pp. 20-35).

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 20-35.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 28.

How useful is such an approach in understanding the creation of EPMs? Taggart's original work suggested that political parties develop Eurosceptic stances when there is a coincidence of a peripheral position in a country's party system with an ideology that is not favourable towards European integration. In this view, such stances are largely tactical, designed to lever an advantage from that party's 'outsider' status by staking out a clear policy divergence from mainstream parties, and effectively dependent upon domestic political circumstances.³⁹ For example when a party moves into a position within the party system where it might potentially gain elected office, its Eurosceptic element becomes marginalised and comes to be represented by a party faction. Such movements have been highlighted by Sitter's work on government-opposition shifts towards the EU. Sitter views party-based Euroscepticism as driven by competition between cartel parties (which may or may not agree on policy towards the EU), which in turn stimulates policy orientation by more peripheral parties. For those parties hoping for power, especially if as part of a government coalition, strongly expressed opposition towards the EU is not seen as a palatable policy position, thus requiring a moderation of views.⁴⁰ While Taggart and Szczerbiak have subsequently recognised that the formation of parties can occasionally be driven by European factors, this is still seen as exceptional, especially in states that have only recently become members of the EU. Due to the ever-changing nature of European integration, it is relatively simple for parties to shift position as best suits their tactical needs.⁴¹ Applying this approach to EPMs, it might be expected that movements would form primarily as a response to national stimuli: be that the holding of referendums on European integration or a dramatic change in government EU policy. Central to this view is the notion that political space is organised solely on a national basis, thus privileging national concerns over European ones. Events at the European level are therefore, at least ostensibly, driven by national concerns and by combining these sets of approaches the utility of focusing on the national level in understanding the causes of Euroscepticism is a fruitful strategy.

³⁹ Taggart, 'A Touchstone of Dissent', pp. 385-6.

⁴⁰ Sitter, 'Opposing Europe'.

⁴¹ Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Aleks (2008) 'Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe', Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 1*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 358-61.

This focus on the national level in seeking to understand opposition to European integration has been given further impetus by Neunreither who examined the role of opposition in the EU.⁴² Starting from the position that dissenting opinions are considered vital in any functioning liberal democracy, he analysed the distinct lack of alternative voices concerning the processes of European integration. He concluded that opposition cannot be fully expressed at the European level, since there are limited opportunities for dissenting voices within the institutional system, so it has to move back into the existing national systems where the necessary institutional space does exist.⁴³ Thus the very structure of the EU pushes opposition down to a national level, even though it is generated by concerns about the trajectory of European integration.

Looking at the body of work into social movement contestation of international issues, a similar pattern of political contestation focused on the national level can be seen. Kitschelt found that even though each national anti-nuclear lobby group in his study had the same ultimate goal in mind, their actions were driven primarily by concerns about the effects of nuclear technology at a national level. While frequent reference was made to international events such as Chernobyl and nuclear weapons proliferation, the emphasis of each anti-nuclear group campaign was on the impact of these events on their own nation.⁴⁴ Similarly EPMs have focused their contestation on the national government as “intermediaries” in the European integration process and resisted the temptation to march on Brussels as Imig and Tarrow believed would be the inevitable conclusion of growing civil society protests against European integration.⁴⁵ The result of this preference for the national over the supranational is usually manifested in the programmes of oppositional groups, which more often than not are more concerned with changing their own country’s relationship with the EU than with changing the EU as a whole. The study of both Euroscepticism and social movements is therefore one that is primarily focused on the national level. Scholars of both party based Euroscepticism and interest group interaction

⁴² Neunreither, Klaus (1998). ‘Governance Without Opposition: The Case of the European Union’, *Government and Opposition*, 33: 4, pp. 419-441.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest’, p. 84.

⁴⁵ Imig and Tarrow, ‘Political contention in a Europeanising polity’, p. 90.

with the policy process, have repeatedly focused on the national as the arena of contestation that their research focuses on.

1.4 Conceptualising European Protest Movements

There are three constituent parts to the concept of ‘Euro sceptic Protest Movements’: Euroscepticism; protest; and movement. This section will operationalise each of these individual elements so as to clarify what exactly is the focus of this study, and perhaps just as importantly what is *not* being studied.

1.4.1 A concise understanding of Euroscepticism in EPMs

This study proposes that a distinction be made between those groups in civil society that are:

- a. solely or primarily focused on the question of opposing European integration (EPMs)
- b. those that have only a secondary focus on the subject (secondary focus interest groups).

For the purposes of this study secondary focus interest groups will not be considered for research. This is due to the main concern of this study being formation on the EU issue exclusively. The more general approach of the EU dimension of social movement formation has been well documented but such studies do not consider Euroscepticism much less opposition to European integration and are rigidly focused on the European level.⁴⁶

These primary focused groups can be further divided into two, based on the two types of Euroscepticism that different EPMs can express:

- a. those who oppose the entire project of European integration through the EU (which can often lead them to advocate their country’s withdrawal from EU)

⁴⁶ Greenwood, Justin (1997). *Representing Interests in the European Union*, London: McMillan; Trenz, Hans-Georg (2009). ‘European civil society: between participation, representation and discourse’, *Policy and Society*, 28: 1, pp.35–46; Kohler-Koch, ‘Civil society and EU democracy’.

- b. those who only oppose certain elements of the project or EU policies (who can foresee the resolution of their grievances while still remaining within the EU system)

On the basis of this, the following four-fold classification of EPMs in the four country case studies has been constructed (with some illustrative examples from my four case studies) in *Table 1.1*:

Table 1.1: Classification of EPMs

	Oppose EU system	Oppose elements/policies
Primary focus EPMs	People's Movement (Ireland) June Movement (Denmark) Movement No to EU (Estonia) Bruges Group (UK)	Business for Sterling (UK) Save British Fish (UK) <i>UKVE</i> : Research Centre Free Europe (Estonia)
Secondary focus EPMs (not considered for this study)	No to EU/RMT Union (UK)	AfrI: Action from Ireland (Ireland)

The classification of groups is based on the groups' own materials, but there is also use made of other sources, notably newspapers from the period and face-to-face interviews. This is for two reasons. Firstly, groups are often not explicit in saying why they have formed. Secondly, even when they do give reasons, groups may not be providing the whole picture, especially when the circumstances are of a delicate nature: inter-personal rivalries are in some ways a defining feature of anti-EU communities in both countries.

From *Table 1.1* it can be concluded that groups such as *No to EU/RMT Union* and *Action from Ireland* while both Eurosceptic and drawn from civil society are not considered for this study because both are primarily concerned with issues other than Europe. *No to EU/RMT Union* and *Action from Ireland* are concerned with trade union/workers' rights and global justice issues respectively, with opposition to the EU an ancillary issue to these positions.

This is not to deny that such groups are driven by a clear ideological opposition to European integration that stretches beyond simple interest representation. The French ATTAC movement protest against the processes of globalisation, in both its EU and WTO form. ATTAC put forward their alternative of a tax on financial transactions to

provide aid for the developing world.⁴⁷ This has a definite EU dimension but European integration is clearly not the sole focus of their efforts. Rather it is the inequities of the global financial system and the interests of the developing world that are the foundations of their movement. Such issues would be a cause for mobilization whether the EU existed or not. Similarly, nationalist groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), while strongly opposing European integration, focus more on campaigning against specific domestic issues such as immigration and Islamic extremism. They perceive the EU to be, along with these issues, a threat to English identity and so protest against European integration.⁴⁸ Again it is more than likely that a group similar to the EDL would exist with or without the EU.

The engagement of both these groups in Eurosceptic contestation can be labelled as multi-positionality. This is a process whereby civil society groups hold several, and possibly contradictory positions, on specific policies or events at any one time.⁴⁹ As will be discussed in the case studies, namely Denmark and Ireland, both secondary focus EPMs and their members sought to become involved, or align, with primary focus EPMs. While such developments are interesting, and are duly noted in the case studies where they occur, the thesis is concerned with primary focus EPMs as they are mobilized and contest solely on European integration. Taking a wider approach, that included multi-positionality based Euroscepticism, would have detracted from an analysis of the causal factors of mobilization specifically related to the processes of European integration.

From a different perspective it could be argued that groups that propose European federalism could be classified in this system as they are critical of the current trajectory of European integration for its failure to centralise power within the EU. These groups are not considered for this study as while they have been critical of Treaties for not advancing the cause of European federalism far enough, they still broadly welcome them as a step in the right direction and do not seek their reversal, as Eurosceptics do.

⁴⁷ Dufour, Pascale (2010). 'The Mobilization Against the 2005 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A French Mobilization for Another Europe', *Social Movement Studies*, 9: 4, pp. 426-8.

⁴⁸ Jackson, Paul (2011). 'The EDL: Britain's 'New Far Right' Social Movement', *The University of Northampton's Radicalism and New Media Research Group*, pp. 23-6.

⁴⁹ Dufour, 'The Mobilization Against the 2005 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', p. 433.

Other studies investigating civil society-based opposition to the EU by Usherwood and Gray⁵⁰ have used far more extensive typologies by which to categorise the groups and movements at the centre of their respective studies. This body of previous work sought to elaborate upon hypotheses that placed emphasis on a single causal factor in movement formation. This thesis, by bringing together the body of research dedicated to both Euroscepticism and movement formation, will provide a more nuanced evaluation of the phenomena of EPMs. The inclusive, yet tightly defined, framework that is outlined here equips this thesis with the tools required by which suitable examples of Euroscepticism can be identified.

1.4.2 Understanding ‘protest’

The term protest has been added to the working definition of the subject of this study, as using the word protest emphasises that the groups are engaged in active contestation of European integration and are not passive. This is an important distinction as Usherwood raised the issue of the sheer multitude of solely internet based “one man” Eurosceptic groups who did not operate beyond the virtual world.⁵¹ His research, and this study, discounts them, as to include them would be to give them an importance that their presence does not merit (other than to acknowledge their existence and multitude). The extensive work of Tarrow on social movement protest emphasises this point as his collective focus is not on groups that raise awareness of issues but on those that take action to contest and provoke conflict.⁵² Such movements come to represent a heightened and intense collective concern that has come to express itself outside of the institutionalised venues. Using the term, protest, therefore not only allows this study to further prioritise the subjects under its consideration but places greater emphasis on their reasons for formation and the wider conclusion of what these reasons mean for how European integration is being perceived by EU citizens.

⁵⁰ Gray, Emily (2003). ‘Waiting for the Starting Signal: the UK’s pro and anti-Euro campaigns’, *European Political Communication Working Paper Series*, 30: 3, Bristol: Centre for European Political Communication.

⁵¹ Usherwood, *Beyond Party Politics*, p. 106.

⁵² Tarrow, Sidney (1994). *Power in movement: Social movements, collective action, and politics*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 153.

Kriesi et. al. have sought to clarify the term in relation to the study of social movements and the policy process. They refer only to those actions that are “any kind of public action of a demonstration, confrontative or violent form”⁵³. They exclude legal actions, conventional political actions and conventional media-orientated actions and strikes. But they specifically include action such as petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, disturbances to violent attacks against persons and, crucially, direct-democratic forms of action (i.e. citizen initiatives and referendums). Their approach therefore is to classify a protest movement by the actions they take. Contrasting this to the empirical findings of this study it is quite clear that there are many similarities. In order to engage with groups that are Eurosceptic and utilise many of the criteria established by Kriesi et. al. this study expands the definition of protest to include legal and media actions. Such an action is clearly logical when considering European integration, given its basis in legal text, while taking media actions into consideration is necessary as given the lack of salience and elite level basis of European integration, the media is a vital arena for both the pro and anti European integrationist sides.

1.4.3 What is a ‘movement’?

There is a vast amount of literature on social movements, with the majority firmly based in the discipline of Sociology. The combination of protest and movement however, has incrementally increased the interest of Political Scientists who have sought to understand the origin and influence of protest movements in respect of the political system. Starting with Kitschelt and expanded by Tarrow and more latterly Kriesi et. al. the study of protest movements by Political Scientists has been an important subset of the study of social movements more generally.⁵⁴ A brief analysis of the study of social movements follows as it not only aids in the clarification of the subject of the research question it additionally provides the wider theoretical context of why formation occurs in the first place.

⁵³ Kriesi, Hans Peter et. al. (1992). ‘New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe’, *European Journal of Political Research*, 22: 2, p. 221.

⁵⁴ See: Tilly, Charles (1990). *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1992*, Oxford: Blackwell; Tarrow, *Power in Movement*; Kriesi, Hans-Peter et. al. (1995). *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, UCL Press: London.

Firstly, what is a movement? Meyer and Tarrow have spoken of contemporary society being a “movement society” given the proliferation of protest, demonstration and mass movement that has developed from the watershed era of the 1960s onwards.⁵⁵ Definitions of movements tend to be made with strong reference to the specific movement that that researcher has been focusing on. Seeking to decontextualise all of these definitions, Snow et. al. have synthesised the definitions into a ‘one size fits all’ conceptualisation. They articulate social movements as “collectivities acting with some degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional or organisational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organisation, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part”.⁵⁶ Putting it more succinctly and citing examples such as the 1989 pro-democracy movements in China, the anti-war protests in the UK in 2003 as well as local so-called ‘NIMBY’ movements; they cite the common thread between all of them as being their “challenge to institutional, organisational, or cultural authority or systems of authority”⁵⁷. Clearly then social movements are a means by which organised and sustained challenge can be made to authority outside of existing institutional channels. For the purposes of this thesis’s research question, this interpretation of what social movements are can be rephrased as: *a means by which an organised and sustained challenge can be made to authority outside of the existing political system.*

This concept of a movement as referred to in the political science literature is intimately associated with the processes of contestation and protest, specifically when they take place outside of existing channels of political participation. With such a definition there is an ostensible overlap between movements and civil society organisation. The fundamental difference between the two is that movements seek to directly challenge existing power structures through protest and contestation. Civil society organisations, on the other hand, seek to work within existing power structures to achieve their goals. In this respect, contestation is not central to civil society organisation mobilization, whereas contestation is the *raison d’être* of movements. Movements are

⁵⁵ Meyer, David S. and Tarrow, Sidney (eds.) (1998), *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.

⁵⁶ Snow, David A. et. al. (2007), ‘Mapping the Terrain’, Snow et. al. (eds.) *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell: Oxford, p. 11.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

formed almost singularly to contest, to challenge and to protest.⁵⁸ An example of this distinction would be the differences between the civil society organisation Oxfam, and the anti-globalization Occupy Movement. Both are concerned with questions of social justice in relation to the processes of globalization. Oxfam, as a civil society organization, seeks to work within existing political and economic structures to achieve social justice in the developing world. The Occupy Movement on the other hand wants to achieve its social justice goals by challenging existing political and economic structures.

While the literature on social movements has not had as problematic a time with definitions as that of the literature on Euroscepticism, it has instead focused on seeking the answer to two questions: 1.) What causes social movements to form in the first place? 2.) What causes them to mobilise around the issues that they do?

The conventional approach to social movements believes that mobilisation happens due to “intolerable circumstances, unbearable deprivations, and intense grievances”.⁵⁹ This has been labelled the “classical approach” to understanding social movement formation and it argues that such situations develop due to large scale social-structural changes.⁶⁰ Such an approach fell out of favour as it was viewed as too deterministic and failed to explain the discrepancy between social groups who mobilised and successfully affected policy change, and similar social groups who did not mobilise. A model based around resource mobilisation emerged to critique this approach with the argument that “there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organised and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established group”.⁶¹ The resource mobilisation model became the dominant paradigm as in-depth research on specific social movements came to the conclusion that what made them successful in terms of their longevity and policy

⁵⁸ Meyer, David S. and Tarrow, Sidney (1998), ‘A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century’, in Meyer, David S. and Tarrow, Sidney (eds.) *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁹ Koopmans, Ruud and Duyvendak, Jan Willem (1995), ‘The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe’, *Social Problems*, 42: 2, p. 235

⁶⁰ Kornhauser, William (1959). *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe: Free Press; Gurr, Ted Robert (1970). *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁶¹ McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer M. (1977). ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 82: 6, p. 1215

effectiveness was their organisational capacity to manage and effectively utilise the resources (both human and financial) at their disposal.

Seeing a strong degree of commonality between this focus on resources and their understanding of the political system, political scientists built on from resource mobilisation theory, to develop the political process model. This model emphasises external political opportunities rather than internal resources as central to the resource mobilisation approach. More recently the political process model has come to “dominate” the literature on social movement mobilisation.⁶² The social movement opportunities for the political process model are characterised very generally as levels of success and levels of repression and facilitation.⁶³ More specifically Tarrow describes social movement opportunities to access the political process as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”.⁶⁴

Similarly to social movement formation, two theories dominate the literature around the issues which social movements mobilise: 1.) the grievance model and 2.) the frame alignment model. The key difference between the two approaches is that the grievance model sees social problems as objective facts to which social movements react, whereas the frame alignment model emphasises the importance of social movements in defining and constructing social problems. Processes of definition and interpretation occupy a central place in the “framing” perspective on protest and social movement mobilisation.⁶⁵ This focus on ‘issue framing’ is a key tool of analysis for social movement scholars as “grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and the fact that variations in their interpretation across individuals, social movement organisations, and time can affect whether and how they are acted upon”.⁶⁶ The

⁶² Koopmans and Duyvendak, ‘The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe’, p. 235.

⁶³ Kreisi, et. al., ‘New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe’, p. 221.

⁶⁴ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p. 85.

⁶⁵ Snow, David A. and Benford, Robert D. (1992), ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 133-55.

⁶⁶ Snow, David A. et. al. (1986). ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, *American Sociological Review*, 51: 4, p. 465.

unresolved question in relation to this most important element of social movement analysis is “why framing processes succeed in some cases but fail in others?”.⁶⁷

Koopmans and Duyvendak have offered a highly practical working solution by distilling such problems down to a distinction between “the success of framing efforts depend[ing] on the argumentative power of the discourse as such or whether framing functions primarily as a mechanism that translates structural conditions, constraints, or opportunities into articulated discontent and dispositions toward collective action”.⁶⁸ The authors used public opinion data on nuclear power to measure the effect of issue framing by anti-nuclear groups, with the result that in France they failed and in Germany they succeeded decisively. They concluded that “social movements are sometimes victorious in their efforts to frame situations as problematic, but *only when they operate in a political context that offers them the opportunity to do so*”⁶⁹[emphasis added]. Their conclusions are highly relevant to this research project in that they focus on an issue that is broadly similar across the various case studies, European integration, but that has differing outcomes for the incidence of social movement formation and their influence in the policy making process. As such the Koopmans and Duyvendak model informs the approach of this research project in seeking to understand social movement formation in terms of their success/failure to frame European integration as ‘problematic’ due to the political opportunity context in which they operate.

Political scientists have therefore sought to understand social movements in terms of their interaction with the policy making process and their resultant effects on policy outcomes. To achieve this end with regard to EPMs this thesis develops an investigative structure based firmly on the literature discussed in this section. Firstly, from Koopmans and Duyvendak⁷⁰ it examines how EPMs use ‘issue framing’; more specifically how social movements both see the issue they contest and how they communicate the issue to the public in order to gain wider support. This is a vital consideration as it facilitates the discovery of what elements of European integration EPMs contested and why. Secondly,

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 477.

⁶⁸ Koopmans and Duyvendak, ‘The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe’, p. 242.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 249.

⁷⁰ Koopmans and Duyvendak, ‘The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe’.

for Kitschelt⁷¹, Kreisi et. al.⁷² and Tarrow⁷³ the use of political opportunity structures by social movements is vital to understanding how they affect policy change and in influencing what form their mobilisation takes and what actions of contestation they pursue. This thesis will follow on from their lead and investigate the use of political opportunity structures by EPMs, so as to understand how it influences EPM formation, EPM actions of contestation and any policy outcomes EPMs have affected.

1.5 EPMs across Europe

Having come to a concrete understanding of how Euroscepticism in civil society based protest movements can be analysed, the next stage of the process is to locate what cases should be studied. In order to locate what case studies would be the most suitable for the thesis an investigation into the presence of EPMs in all the EU member states, and some non-EU states (namely Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and Switzerland) was undertaken. This analysis took the form of an expert survey of specialists in Euroscepticism from the EPERN (European Parties Elections and Referendums Network) database at the Sussex European Institute.

The survey asked:

- 1.) “is there the presence or not of Eurosceptic protest movements in (your country)?”

If the answer was positive then it asked for the:

- 1.a) “names and/or prominent members of the EPMs?”

and for:

- 1.b) “a score on a rating of 1-5 (with 5 being high and 1 being no impact) for the impact of each movement on the European debate”⁷⁴.

⁷¹ Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest’.

⁷² Kreisi, et. al., ‘New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe’.

⁷³ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.

⁷⁴ See *Appendix I* for a full list of the respondents and further details of the questionnaire.

Table 1.2 Results of pan-European expert survey on number of EPMs in each state and their effectiveness in national debate in each country

High/Medium/Low/None	Country	Number	Effectiveness
High	UK	25	4
	Sweden	7	3
	Serbia	4	2
Medium	Ireland	3	4
	Estonia	2	2
	Austria	2	1
	Czech Republic	2	1
	Finland	2	1
	Iceland	2	2
	Slovenia	2	1
	Switzerland	2	4
Low	Croatia	1	1
	Denmark	1	2
	Malta	1	1
	Netherlands	1	1
	Norway	1	5
	Poland	1	1
	Romania	1	1
None	Belgium	0	0
	Bulgaria	0	0
	Cyprus	0	0
	France	0	0
	Germany	0	0
	Greece	0	0
	Hungary	0	0
	Italy	0	0
	Latvia	0	0
	Lithuania	0	0
	Luxembourg	0	0
	Montenegro	0	0
	Portugal	0	0
	Slovakia	0	0
	Spain	0	0

Source: Expert survey, see Appendix I for more details.

The results of this survey are quite stark. From *Table 1.2* a clear pattern emerges of EPM formation: high, medium and low. A group of states consisting of the UK, Sweden and Serbia have 25, 7 and 4 EPMs respectively; they represent a high level of EPM formation. Next, a group of states (Ireland, Estonia, Austria, Czech Republic, and Finland) have three to two EPMs and thereby represent a medium level of EPM formation. Seven states (Croatia, Denmark, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Romania) have only one EPM and are representative of a low level of EPM formation. Fifteen states however, have no identified level of EPM formation. EPMs, while present in many countries, are not a pervasive presence across Europe.

The social movement literature uses the number of movements mobilized as a common measurement for the salience of an issue in civil society. The logic for this approach is that the wider the spread of opposition across multiple movements that originate in different sections in society, the more important the issue of mobilization is beyond specific local factors. The most important example of this is McAdam's analysis of the US civil rights movement in the 1950s and 60s. In his path-defining work, McAdam showed that the civil rights movement was more a series of interlinked movements united behind a common goal rather than a singular cohesive movement.⁷⁵ McAdam examined the number and spread of civil rights movement mobilization and found that the strength of the US civil rights movement was its resonance with so many diverse strands of African-American and white-liberal society. He concluded that such a diverse coalition could not have united behind a single movement and been as successful as it was. Applying this process to the study of EPMs, the assumption is that the greater the presence of EPMs in a state, the greater the depth of Euroscepticism across a wider spectrum of society in that state.

The obvious follow on questions from a focus on the number of EPMs is – do a higher number of EPMs lead to more influence in policy formation? Or if that is not the case, then do a small number of EPMs with a broad base of support and significant human and financial resources have a greater say in policy formulation? On this dichotomy social movement scholars have a lot less to say. They are more concerned

⁷⁵ McAdam, Doug (1999). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930-1970*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 2-5.

with issues and strategies, rather than policy outcomes.⁷⁶ The thesis, as a bridging point between social movement studies and political science, will utilize the social movement approach of measuring the number of EPMs as an initial means of categorization for EPMs. As it progresses, the thesis will critically evaluate the policy influence of EPMs in each case. Finally, it will come to a conclusion as to whether the prevailing consensus in the social movements literature is correct, that the greater the number of movements mobilized the greater the influence, or if Euroscepticism is an example of issue mobilization where a single or a handful of movements can have a significant degree of influence over the policy making process.

Taking the existing social movements approach of using the number of movement mobilizations on a specific issue, specific patterns in EPM formation can be discerned from the data in *Table 1.2*. Firstly, there is strong EPM formation in those countries that are not EU member states (Iceland, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland), where they are also quite influential in the EU debate in those countries. Expert respondents from these four countries emphasised their importance and, especially in the case of Norway and Switzerland, their ownership of the European issue. This used to be the case in Iceland but the economic crisis of 2008 greatly weakened the hand of Icelandic Eurosceptics by removing their central argument of the success of economic independence from the EU. Perhaps the most interesting finding from the expert survey data is the presence of four separate and distinct EPMs in Serbia. As *Table 1.2* clearly shows, Serbian EPMs have had a significant impact on mobilising public opposition to EU membership. Near neighbour Croatia, at a more advanced stage of EU accession negotiations and with only one minor EPM, has not seen similar levels of EPM formation. The emergence of EPMs to contest EU membership in Serbia has been made possible largely due to the successful framing of the Eurosceptic issue in the context of extreme nationalism. Civil society-based Serbian nationalist groups emerged in the 1980s, well before the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, and played important roles in

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 17.

Serbian politics during the various conflicts over Kosovo in the 1990s and so their emergence to contest EU accession is understandable⁷⁷.

A common feature across all of these countries that exhibit EPM formation is that they are either non-original members of the EU or are not members at all. Not being an original member state influences the issue framing context in favour of EPMs as participation in European integration had to be opted into at one stage and was not the default proposition it was for the original six member states. Thus, the alternative Eurosceptic position of total or partial withdrawal from European integration has the benefit of historical precedence in those states. Membership of the EU and participation in European integration in these states has been and in many cases continues to be a contested issue. Chapter Four, on the UK case, shows how, despite accession in 1973 and a decisive referendum outcome in favour of membership in 1975, EPMs continue to form to contest EU membership. Looking at EPM formation from the perspective of issue framing helps to explain why a country with high levels of public support for membership, such as Ireland (66%), has EPM formation and a country with a low level of support for membership, such as Germany (50%), does not have EPM formation⁷⁸. Perhaps the greatest barrier social movements face in sustaining their mobilisation is in framing their issue as one which can be contested in the first instance. All of these states with EPM formation (apart from Iceland) have held referendums on European integration, showing the openness of the policy making process there in allowing Eurosceptics a platform to contest participation in European integration. Given the public debate on participation in European integration that followed these referendums, the tremendous obstacle of framing the EU as an issue that should be contested was overcome for EPMs, giving them the issue legitimacy, political opportunity and resources necessary to form and sustain their movement.

The EPM formation environment described here clearly resonates with Western Europe. Its relevance to Eastern Europe is less clear cut however. A clear lack of EPM formation is visible in the Eastern and Southern regions of the EU. Experts in Eastern

⁷⁷ Bieber, Florian (2003). 'The other civil society in Serbia: non-government nationalism – the case of the Serbian resistance movement'; Petr Kopécký and Cas Mudde (eds.) *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 23-5.

⁷⁸ Eurobarometer, Standard (2011). *Eurobarometer 74 Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels: European Commission.

Europe described the lack of EPM formation as being strongly related to the post-communist legacy of a weak civil society. Added to the lack of EPM formation in Eastern Europe is also its absence in the Southern or Mediterranean region of the EU: specifically Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This was explained by the experts as being part of the complex EU-State relationship in those countries that combined overarching issues of regional autonomy and deeply entrenched left/right political cleavages that left no space for civil society based formation to contest European integration. Combined with the relatively high public support for the EU and a long history of collective action based on high salience issues such as global justice and national political reform, Euroscepticism was channelled through the party system or well established civil society protest groups⁷⁹. These issues are explored in greater detail in Section 6.4.2 where the example of Spain is analysed to understand why, given a relatively favourable political opportunity issue framing structure, civil society has not formed against European integration in Spain.

Looking at the secondary question of the effectiveness of EPMs further interesting variations in the findings are noted. Here, the UK, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden are seen to have influential EPMs. In the cases of Norway and Switzerland, EPMs were seen by the experts as the ‘owners’ of the European issue there. In Ireland, Sweden and the UK EPMs were influential but had to share ownership of the EU issue with Eurosceptic political parties. The common thread between all of these cases of high EPM influence was their success in affecting policy outcome on the EU issue. This took the form, aside from the UK, of playing a key role in the rejection of referendums on EU issues. In Norway and Switzerland EPMs took the lead in coordinating campaigns between a range of actors such as political parties, trade unions, farmers’ organisations and other civil society groups. In Ireland and Sweden EPMs were not as cohesive but played central roles in creating the issue environment around the EU debate and in their campaigning in EU-related referendums. The influence of UK EPMs was high but for the opposite reasons of the other case studies. In the late 1990s EPMs emerged to successfully campaign against the holding of a referendum on EMU membership. More recently successive UK governments have been wary of holding

⁷⁹ Llamazares and Gramacho, ‘Eurosceptics amongst Euroenthusiasts’, pp. 222–229.

referendums on European integration, in part due to the sheer number of EPMs that exist and that would campaign against the EU issue in question. Overall EPMs were not seen as an intrinsic element of national debates on European integration, despite being in evidence.

This brief analysis of EPM formation across Europe has provided some fascinating data but this data can only point to the presence and location of EPMs. Its use in understanding EPM formation is far more limited. To overcome these limitations, but to also build on the substantial evidence from the expert survey, this thesis conducts a series of in-depth case studies. Taking a country from each of the three patterns of EPM formation from the survey; high – the UK, medium – Ireland and low level – Denmark, will allow for a deep understanding of why Euroscepticism emerges as a protest movement. Taking the additional case study of Estonia, an example of medium EPM formation, broadens out the scope of the thesis into Eastern Europe whilst also engaging with the findings of *Table 1.2*. In addition to these four case studies being examples of different types of EPM formation, they also exhibit variance between each other across a range of factors. More specific detail on why these case studies are relevant for the thesis will now be discussed.

1.5.1 The Case Studies

This research project proceeds on a case study basis using a most similar systems comparative design. As discussed in the previous section the countries vary with regard to the focus on this study: EPM formation. If the arguments of Ragin⁸⁰ and Peters⁸¹ are to be believed, however, this is not enough. According to their authoritative works on the use of comparative analysis in political science, a much more solid theoretical reasoning for their inclusion must be made. The reasoning behind choosing national case studies as a method for the investigation of the proposed research question is therefore evident. But why then choose Denmark, Ireland, the UK and Estonia specifically? The four country cases cover the range of relatively old and new member states, a traditionally pro-EU

⁸⁰ Ragin, Charles C. (1989). *Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁸¹ Peters, B. Guy (1998). *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*, New York: New York University Press.

member state, Ireland, more Eurosceptic ones, the UK and Denmark and a post-Soviet state, Estonia.

Structuring the thesis in this manner clearly makes the choice of these four case studies rather important, in order to avoid conflicting explanations. Given that only France and the UK have received any kind of scholarly work with regard to the phenomena of Eurosceptic mobilisation in civil society, any other country in the EU would be both interesting and useful to study. Hence the choice of Ireland, the UK, Denmark and Estonia needs to be justified both on absolute and relative grounds. In Ireland, Denmark and Estonia all of the EPMs the study focuses on are those who were active over a relatively sustained period of time. Although some smaller groups who could have been classified as EPMs were not discussed, this was due to their influence being determined as negligible, their presence ephemeral or simply not enough data available (website, documents, individuals) to provide a substantial analysis of them. For the UK case as will be explained further in Chapter 3, there were simply too many EPMs to analyse to a satisfactory level and so two EPMs who are representative of UK EPM formation in general will be discussed: *Table 1.3* shows the EPMs that are the focus of this study in each of the case studies.

Table 1.3 List of EPMs researched in-depth by case study

Ireland	National Platform, Peace and Neutrality Alliance, C��ir, Libertas, Peoples' Movement
UK	Business for Sterling, Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution
Estonia	Research Centre Free Europe, Movement No to the EU
Denmark	People's Movement No to the EU, June Movement

1.5.2 Ireland

The Irish case is necessary for inclusion as Irish EPMs were one of the few examples to have actually achieved their aims by securing the rejection of a European referendum: the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. In an exceptional development EPMs took the lead in the campaign and subsumed the efforts of established

political parties into a politically united Eurosceptic coalition.⁸² The origins of this development are interesting to explore, as Euroscepticism was present in the Irish party system, yet these political parties believed that EPMs represented the best channel to develop a Eurosceptic campaign. The work of FitzGibbon and Gilland has informed the debate as to the fundamentally opportunist nature of Irish party based Euroscepticism⁸³. Applying their research to this case therefore allowed for an analysis of why Euroscepticism moved down the political ‘food chain’, as it were, away from party politics towards civil society. Moreover, the Irish case is an example of EPM formation in a country that has consistently been amongst the most supportive of EU membership, with support for membership reaching well into 80% in the late 1990s and never dropping lower than 65% into the late 2000s.⁸⁴

As the chapter on Irish EPM formation will show, EPMs emerged to play a decisive role in the rejection of European treaties at referendums, as they were able to constantly reinvent themselves to represent shifting public opinions toward European integration. At the time of EU accession, the issues around which EPMs formed were nationalism and Irish sovereignty (*The National Platform, Peace and Neutrality Alliance*) with the ultimate policy goal of non- participation in European integration. As Irish EU membership became entrenched and public support for the EU remained strong, new EPMs (namely *Cóir, Libertas* and the *People’s Movement*) emerged to contest European integration on specific ‘soft’ Eurosceptic issues, such as neutrality, worker’s rights, traditional Catholic values and domestic taxation policy. Withdrawal from the EU was no longer the policy goal of the majority of Eurosceptics, as it was deemed to be too unrealistic. Instead, Eurosceptics mobilised to contest Irish participation in specific policies.

The examination of Irish EPMs will show the extent to which Euroscepticism is a dynamic phenomenon, and how studying Euroscepticism can track the development of national debates on Europe. Moreover, Ireland represents an example of Euroscepticism

⁸² FitzGibbon, John (2010). ‘The Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland’, 2 October 2009’, *Representation*, 46: 2, pp. 227- 239; Gilland, Karin (2002). ‘Ireland’s (First) referendum on the Treaty of Nice’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40: 3, pp. 527-35.

⁸³ FitzGibbon, John (2009). ‘The Triumph of Strategy Over Ideology? – Euroscepticism in the Irish Party System’, Neumayer, Laure et. al. (eds.) *L’Europe contestée: Espaces et enjeux des positionnements contre l’intégration européenne*, Paris : Nouvelle Imprimerie Laballery.

⁸⁴ Source: Eurobarometer Spring 1998 – Spring 2010.

in a pro-European country. Investigating the development of Euroscepticism in Ireland will therefore show how it can emerge and have effects on policy, in the rejection of European treaties, despite high levels of public support for European integration and the dominance of pro-EU sentiment amongst Irish political parties.

1.5.3 The United Kingdom

The UK case is exceptional simply for the sheer number of EPMs⁸⁵. An in-depth analysis of each was clearly unfeasible so this research project focused on two: *Business for Sterling* and *Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution*. Moreover, EPMs in the UK differed from EPMs in the other cases studies due to their close relationship with established political parties. This was because their membership was made up of members of political parties as compared to other EPMs who were often formed due to distrust of the political party system⁸⁶. The work of Usherwood has highlighted the prevalence of EPMs in the UK and their importance to the European debate there. But Bale, amongst others, has detailed that, despite the European issue arousing strong emotions in both the Conservative and Labour parties, it has been consigned to the political margins⁸⁷. Not only will the study of EPMs in the UK build on Usherwood's work to provide a further insight into the UK's relationship with the EU but it will also chart the outsourcing of contestation on Europe by the UK's two largest parties to civil society. In the other cases referendums have taken place and EPMs have played decisive roles. With no European referendum in the UK since 1975, EPMs there have had to engage different strategies to those EPMs of the other case studies not just to contest the EU issue, but to keep it salient in the first instance.

Examining UK EPMs reveals how and why collective action still occurs even when the issue of formation is present in the party system and covered in the national media. The relationship between the UK and the EU is one that has seen the UK labelled

⁸⁵ Usherwood and Gray separately located twenty-five EPMs from the mid 1990s to the early 2000s.

⁸⁶ Usherwood, 'Opposition to the European Union in the UK', pp. 215-6.

⁸⁷ Bale, Tim (2008). 'Between a Soft and a Hard Place? The Conservative Party, Valence Politics and the Need for a New Eurorealism', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 59: 3, p. 398.

as deviant from the EU norm, as a “Eurosceptic state”⁸⁸. George makes this statement as he believes that every facet of the UK state is inherently hostile to European integration from political parties, public opinion, the media to the institutions of the UK state itself. This study will analyse the veracity of his argument and with the aid of comparison to the other case studies contextualise UK Euroscepticism to evaluate if its Euroscepticism is exceptional or part of a wider pattern.

1.5.4 Denmark

The first Danish EPM, the *People’s Movement No to the EU*, was formed to contest the EU accession Treaty in 1973. It was reformed in opposition to the established political parties’ positions on Danish membership of the EU and contested these positions by competing in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. This change in direction represented an interesting shift in the political opportunity structure of protest movements in that they changed from an anti-political elite position to engaging repeatedly and at times with great success in the political system⁸⁹. This thesis will investigate the proposition that it was the Danish party system’s handling of Danish-EU relations that caused EPM formation or if hitherto unknown factors were the main cause. Here the nuances of the Danish political system and of Danish public opinion towards the EU will be crucial factors. Extensive research has been conducted on the apparent exceptionalism of Danish opposition to European integration. In particular Franklin, Sitter, Anderson and Worre have come to the conclusion (albeit through vastly differing means) that the Danish public held differing positions compared to their positions on domestic politics⁹⁰. But as yet there is little in the way of analysis of Danish EPMs.⁹¹

Exploring the Danish political system with the aid of the extensive body of research discussed provides an illustrative example of what factors propelled Eurosceptic

⁸⁸ George, Stephen (2000). ‘Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State’, *European Integration*, 22: 1, pp. 15-33.

⁸⁹ Worre, Torben (1987). ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 10: 1, pp. 79-96.

⁹⁰ Franklin, ‘Learning from the Danish case’; Anderson, Christopher J. and Kaltenthaler, Karl C. (1996). ‘The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2: 2, pp. 175-99.; Sitter, ‘Opposing Europe’; Worre, Torben (1998). ‘Denmark at the Crossroads: The Danish Referendum of 28 February 1986 on the EC Reform Package’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 26: 4, pp. 362-88.

⁹¹ Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’.

formation from civil society into the European party system, and how *People's Movement No to the EU* and its subsequent rival, the *June Movement*, were able to maintain their original social movement support base. Looking at Euroscepticism in Denmark will reveal how two party systems can emerge where the electorate votes in a substantially different manner between national and European elections. "Scandinavian exceptionalism" as a particular form of opposition to European integration has been put forward to explain why the Scandinavian states are reluctant EU participants, more focused on a few key policy areas, such as the environment.⁹² This thesis will look at Denmark from the comparative position of non-Scandinavian states and conclude as to whether Euroscepticism in Denmark as a Scandinavian state is indeed exceptional.

1.5.5 Estonia

There was no Eurosceptic representation in the Estonian national parliament. The majority of mainstream political parties flirted with Euroscepticism but upon entering government quickly became forceful proponents of Estonian membership. Campaigns through the office of the Presidency and the judiciary were thwarted by parliament and so the only open channel available to challenge the government policy of EU membership was an EPM-led No campaign in the accession referendum.⁹³ The open development of civil society in the Central and Eastern European Countries was prevented until the collapse of communism. Thus when EPMs emerged in Estonia (namely the *Research Centre Free Europe* and *Movement No to the EU*) there were no institutionalized non-party based pro-European elements to challenge them. Looking at EPMs in Estonia will therefore show if they were able to influence national debates on Europe to a degree comparable to those in the other case studies or if the weakness of civil society there made them ineffectual.

The Estonian case will be illustrative to a degree of the particular character of the relationship between the former communist states and European integration. This will allow for conclusions to be drawn as to whether Kopécky and Mudde are right in their

⁹² Lawler, Peter (2002). 'Scandinavian Exceptionalism and the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 35: 4, pp. 565-94; Raunio, Tapio (2007). 'Softening but Persistent: Euroscepticism in the Nordic EU Countries', *Acta Politica*, 42: 2, pp. 191-210.

⁹³ Mikkel, Evald and Pridham, Geoffrey (2004). 'Clinching the 'Return to Europe': The Referendums on EU Accession in Estonian and Latvia', *West European Politics*, 27: 4, pp. 716-48.

distinction between Euroscepticism in Western and Eastern member states or if looking beyond party politics shows distinct similarities that they overlooked.⁹⁴ Low public support for membership of the EU prior to the accession referendum saw Estonia portrayed as being one of the most Eurosceptic of the accession states.⁹⁵ Chapter four on Estonia will look at the dynamics of Euroscepticism in an Eastern European state, why it emerged and why it then failed to be acted upon in the accession referendum.

1.6 The Explanatory Factors

The focus of this study is: Eurosceptic Protest Movement formation. This in turn is measured by the number of EPMs formed in each case study. The case studies are characterised according to the number of instances of EPM formation: with the UK being high, Ireland being medium, and Denmark and Estonia being low.

This approach is taken on the basis of the assumption that the more favourable an environment was for EPM formation, the more EPMs that were formed, and so the actual number of EPMs could be used to measure the favourability of a country for EPM formation. A similar approach has been adopted in the wider body of research into social movements. Here a consensus (though by no means a universal one) has emerged that sees the number of social movements forming around an issue as both a measure of the depth of feeling on that issue and a measure of the openness of the national policy process on that issue.⁹⁶ Coming to a conclusion based on the number of EPMs in each case study will lead to an analysis of the depth of Euroscepticism and the openness of national policy making on the EU in each of the case studies.

In seeking to understand EPM formation five explanatory factors (EFs) that could contribute toward EPM formation are drawn from an analysis of the existing literature on both Euroscepticism and protest movement formation, and inductively from a preliminary analysis by the author of the various case studies. The areas found to be most common and relevant to the study are: the influence of media; the degree of

⁹⁴ Kopécky and Mudde, 'The two sides of Euroscepticism', pp. 318-9.

⁹⁵ Mikkel, Evald and Kasekamp, Andres (2008). 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia' in Szczerbiak and Taggart (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 300-2.

⁹⁶ Della Porta, Donatella et. al. (1996). *Social Movements: An introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 3-5.

prevalence of Euroscepticism in the party system; the frequency of European referendums; the nature of the policy process; and the resources available to EPMs. Distilling these into a coherent set of propositions gives this thesis a framework around which to investigate the causal factors in EPM formation:

EF1: The more pro-European the **media** are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

EF2: The lower **the level of Euroscepticism in the party system**, the more likely that EPMs will form.

EF3: The more **referendums on European issues**, the more likely that EPMs will form.

EF4: The more open the **policy process** (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private **resources**, the more likely that EPMs will form.

Role of the Media:

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

While many studies have provided substantive evidence as to the importance of the media in public attitudes towards European integration, few have sought to integrate this work into an analysis of European integration related political phenomena.⁹⁷ This is a curious omission as from the outlines of the case studies discussed above, it is clear that the media are viewed as an important player in the national European debate by EPMs.

The importance of the media in national debates on Europe has been identified by Koopmans and others in their desire to understand public attitudes toward European integration.⁹⁸ The print media in particular, are the focus of scholarly attention, as

⁹⁷ Kevin, Deirdre (2003). *Europe in the Media: A Comparison of Reporting, Representation and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe*, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

⁹⁸ See amongst others: Koopmans, Ruud (2007). 'Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46: 2, pp. 183-210; De Beus, Jos and Mak, Jeannette (2001). 'The missing European public: A note on the ethics and politics of contemporary European integration since Nice', *Acta Politica*, 36: 4, pp. 339-357; Trenz, Hans-Georg (2008). 'Understanding Media Impact on European Integration:

analysing the print media facilitates the tracing of long term trends in discourse on European integration at both the national and European level.⁹⁹ This confirms very strongly to the social movements literature where the media are seen as a key battle ground in terms of issue framing.¹⁰⁰ An analysis of the influence of the media in EPM formation therefore dovetails very well with the literature on both analysis of European integration and social movements.

For EPMs a pro-EU media must be challenged, as the social movement literature describes the media as a parallel “arena of contestation” to the political opportunity structures in that it allows access to the issue discourse (be that at the local, national, international level) as a relatively low cost, but potentially highly influential, means by which to get their arguments across.¹⁰¹ Should the media be viewed by the public as being pro-European, then this must obviously act as a mobilising factor for EPM formation as Eurosceptic arguments are not being put forward in the public domain and receiving an opportunity to influence public attitudes towards European integration. Likewise, should the media be viewed as Eurosceptic, then this should inhibit EPM formation as the public is being exposed to Eurosceptic arguments and European integration is being challenged. On the contrary however, this same presence of Euroscepticism in the media could encourage EPM formation by creating the issue environment necessary to support sustained protest against European integration. Further analysis of the wider consequences of media interaction with the EU will add a much needed new dimension of EU-media studies.

Enhancing or Restricting the Scope of Legitimacy of the EU?’, *Journal of European Integration*, 30: 2, pp. 291-309.

⁹⁹ Koopmans, ‘Who inhabits the European public sphere?’, pp. 187-9.

¹⁰⁰ Gamson, William A. (2007). ‘Bystanders, Public Opinion and the Media’, Snow et. al. (eds.) *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 242.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, pp. 249-51.

Level of Euroscepticism in the Party System:

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The extensive Eurosceptic literature discussed throughout this chapter emphasises the importance of political parties in understanding the nature of Euroscepticism at the national level. The obvious conclusion is that there must be a significant relationship between the political party sphere and EPMs given this level of importance. The question that this study engages with throughout the case studies is where does the balance of this relationship lie? This leads to obvious follow on questions such as: does a high degree of Euroscepticism in the party system promulgate Eurosceptic positions into civil society prompting individual citizens to form EPMs to further pursue these positions?; or does a lack of party based Euroscepticism cause EPM formation so that anti-European positions could be articulated at a national level? As Mair and Thomassen have clearly articulated the burden of the relationship between citizens and the EU is placed almost wholly on national political parties.¹⁰²

But as FitzGibbon¹⁰³, Hobolt¹⁰⁴ and O'Mahoney¹⁰⁵ have pointed out; there has been a degree of "elite withdrawal" on the EU issue by political parties. Apart from minority or extremist parties the EU has become an uncontested, non-salient issue for parties even for those parties who are not wholly supportive of European integration. This explanatory factor explores the validity of these emerging arguments in relation to EPM formation. Should Euroscepticism not be articulated in the party political system then opposition to European integration is likely to find expression in other forms; principally in EPMs. Likewise should Euroscepticism be an influential force in the party system then this should reduce the need for EPMs to form, given that Euroscepticism is already being articulated in the national political discourse.

¹⁰² Mair and Thomassen, 'Political representation and government in the European Union'.

¹⁰³ FitzGibbon, 'The Second Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. 2 October 2009'.

¹⁰⁴ Hobolt, Sarah, (2008) *Choosing Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁰⁵ O'Mahony, Jane (2010). 'Ireland's EU Referendum Experience', Katy Hayward and Mary C. Murphy (eds.) *The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South*, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 13-30.

Number of European referendums:

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The literature on referendums has provided a focus for researching Eurosceptic activity. Hobolt argues that they act as an excellent mobilisation opportunity for the dissemination of Eurosceptic positions in the crowded political marketplace.¹⁰⁶ Most importantly, however, they provide a chance of affecting change in national policy towards the EU for those outside of the mainstream political system. Pro-European majorities in parliament, the opaqueness of decision making in the European Council, and the limitations placed on the European Parliament act as restraints on any outside influence in the enacting of European Treaties; but as Taggart and Szczerbiak's study of European referendums found, referendums heightened public awareness of European issues and promoted extensive discourse on the subject.¹⁰⁷ This thesis investigates whether the relationship between Eurosceptic activity and European referendums they identified at this level was replicated in civil society. This will indicate the similarity of Eurosceptic causation at the party political and civil society levels.

Moreover, if EPMs mobilise around referendums, then they will confirm to the political opportunities model from the social movements literature. Referendums are listed as a political opportunity by Kitschelt¹⁰⁸ but they are not given significant attention by them for the simple fact that referendums, let alone repeated referendums, have rarely been held on issues that are of interest to social movements.¹⁰⁹ Investigating the importance of referendums in EPM formation ties this thesis closely towards the dominant social movement mobilisation theory.

¹⁰⁶ Hobolt, *Choosing Europe*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2004). 'Conclusion: Towards a Model of (European) Referendums', *West European Politics*, 27:4, pp. 767-8.

¹⁰⁸ Kitschelt, 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest', p. 68.

¹⁰⁹ The post 2000 vast increase in the number of referendums and plebiscites in the US on issues such as gay marriage have surprisingly not received much academic attention from social movement scholars.

Open Policy Process:

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

As discussed earlier, the political science literature that investigates social movements generally uses the political opportunity structures approach to encompass the many political and institutional factors that social movements encounter in their quest to affect policy change. The basic premise of political opportunity structures is that “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy”.¹¹⁰ Kitschelt concluded that anti-nuclear groups were not nearly as numerous in Sweden as the policy-making process took into account their opinions and substantially acted upon them. In France he found that similar groups were ignored at all levels of the policy process and so they were forced to swell their membership ranks and protest on the street as it was the only recourse available to them to get their policy positions across.¹¹¹ An open policy process is taken from Kitschelt to mean “the capacity of political systems to convert demands into public policy”, with the output phase offering “points of access and inclusion in policy making”.¹¹² Kitschelt cites four key areas that contribute to an open policy process from the input side:

- 1.) the number of political parties, factions and groups that effectively articulate different demands in electoral politics;
- 2.) the capacity of legislatures to control and develop policies independent of the executive;
- 3.) pluralist and fluid patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch, that facilitate the access of new interests to the centres of political decision making;

¹¹⁰ Mayer, David S. and Minkoff, Debra C. (2004). ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity’, *Social Forces*, 82: 4, p. 1457.

¹¹¹ Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest’, pp. 84-5.

¹¹² Ibid, pp. 62-3.

- 4.) mechanisms by which demands can be aggregated to build effective policy coalitions.

Similarly he lists three operational dimensions that increase the capacity of political systems on the output policy side:

- 1.) a centralised state apparatus makes national policies easier to implement;
- 2.) Government control over market participants, in that the greater the government control over economic resources and decision centres for the economy as a whole through political institutions, the more limited are the resources available with which to challenge policies;
- 3.) The relative independence and authority the judiciary enjoys in the resolution of political conflict.

The case studies of this research project have a mixture of open policy process systems (Denmark, Ireland) and closed (the UK, Estonia), as *Table 1.4* illustrates, and thus an analysis of the influence of these systems on EPM formation is compatible with the most influential form of analysis of social movement interaction with the policy-making process. Kitschelt expressly focuses on the extent of the open or closed nature of the policy making process specifically and not on the basic strength or weakness of the state, as the policy making process is far more influential in the activities of social movements.¹¹³ This is because the study of social movements is generally concerned with how social movements affect policy change or how states respond to them, and not so much the capacity of the state to produce policy output in the first place. Examining how civil society can interact with the EU policy-making process at the national level contributes to the study of the supposed democratic deficit in the EU and specifically to the new debate on accessibility of the European institutions for grass-roots social movements.¹¹⁴ It will show to what extent the national EU policy-making process can accommodate the views of civil society and grassroots movements on European

¹¹³ Kitschelt, 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest', pp. 61-2.

¹¹⁴ Kohler-Koch, 'Civil society and EU democracy'.

integration or indeed if it actively prevents them from participation in the policy-making process.

Table 1.4 Political Opportunity Structures in Ireland, the UK, Estonia and Denmark

Political Output Structures	Political Input Structures		
		<i>Open</i>	<i>Closed</i>
	<i>Strong</i>	Denmark	Estonia
	<i>Weak</i>	Ireland	UK

Availability of Resources:

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The relationship between the largesse distributed by wealthy Eurosceptics and the proliferation of UK EPMs has already been well established.¹¹⁵ From the social movement literature, McCarthy¹¹⁶ emphasises that understanding the availability and exploitation of resources by social movements is intrinsic to understanding how they form in the first place. The social movement literature articulates the need for a combination of “moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, and material resources” for social movement formation.¹¹⁷ The key however, is the equality of access to these resources between institutional and non-institutional actors such as social movements. The availability of such resources and access to them “are seen to enhance the likelihood

¹¹⁵ Cater, Neil et. al. (1998) ‘Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 51: 3, pp. 470-85.

¹¹⁶ McCarthy, John D. and Wolfson, Mark (1996). ‘Resource Mobilization by Local Social Movement Organizations: The Role of Agency, Strategy and Structure’, *American Sociological Review*, 61: 6, pp. 1070-88.

¹¹⁷ Edwards, Bob and McCarthy, John D. (2007). ‘Resources and Social Movement Mobilization’, Snow et. al. (eds.) *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 117.

of effective collective action”¹¹⁸ but such access to resources is reflective of broader social and economic inequalities. This explanatory factor is therefore important in evaluating if EPMs are formed in “privileged constituencies” with access to resources. If this turns out not to be the case and EPMs can access state and/or private resources despite being economically, politically or socially marginalised, then they will contradict “consistent patterns of differential mobilisation [...] in Western democracies” and the supposed democratic deficit between the EU and civil society will be smaller than some believe.¹¹⁹

In the wider social movements literature the practical understanding of resources is not just raw human manpower but more specifically the managerial capabilities to be able to harness the power of mass protest. McAdam in particular has strongly emphasized the primacy of human management skills as perhaps the key use of resources by social movements.¹²⁰ Financial resources are rarely discussed in the literature and when they are they are framed in terms of their use on organizational and human resources. In specific examples, most notably the UK, financial resources play an important role in EPM mobilization. As will be shown in the thesis the presence of financial resources in EPM mobilization is a rarity and in this regard, and from the social movement literature, the thesis takes resources to mean primarily human and managerial skills.

1.7 Data and Methodology

There were three key sources of data that were used for this research.

Firstly, semi-structured interviews with both current and former EPM activists were conducted to obtain data regarding:

- Attitudes towards the party system, given their decision to operate outside of it.
- The influence and use of media in campaigns and actions against European integration.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 142.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.142.

¹²⁰ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, pp. 32-3.

- The resources, both media and financial, that EPMs had available to them.
- Their perception of the opportunity structure of the political system in which they operated and how it influenced their actions.
- The dimensions that their campaigns took, whom they sought to influence and their perceived successes/failures.

Interviews in the UK and Ireland presented few problems given the ease of access of the location and the lack of language barriers. To surmount the difficulties of access to data posed by the Danish and Estonian cases, the connections of the Sussex European Institute-based international European Parties, Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), were used to establish a number of contacts, notably with political scientists working on Euroscepticism at the University of Aarhus in Denmark and the University of Tartu in Estonia. The assistance of individuals and departments at these Universities helped greatly in identifying English-speaking interviewees and the translation of key documents and resources.

In addition to interviewing the main protagonists in the EPMs, as a ‘control’ for each country a number of ‘third parties’, leading journalists and political scientists with expertise in that country’s debate on European integration and members of pro-European movements in the case studies, were interviewed.¹²¹ These national experts aided the study by helping to test the validity of preliminary findings developed through interviews with EPM members and leaders, as well as offering new insights, information and contacts.

Secondly the primary documentation of EPMs¹²² was used to answer these key questions:

- How EPMs’ strategies differed from referendum to referendum, with changing issues at European level.

¹²¹ A complete list of interviewees is included in Appendix VII.

¹²² These included posters, pamphlets and booklets for general Eurosceptic campaigns and for referendum campaigns; in-house magazines; published material on websites; policy position papers; and amongst other materials stickers, beer mats and key rings.

- Information on the group leadership, funding, membership, organizational structure and long term goals.
- Their contacts with members from EPMs in other member states.
- How the presentation of similar issues differed across the case studies.

These documents were reviewed in order to develop a qualitative understanding of the reasons for, foundation of, and strategies employed by the EPMs. While the language used and reasons listed in these documents had obviously been ‘adapted’ to suit a more ‘Eurosceptic’ audience, they provided basic data on each group and a subjective account of the key features of the group’s strategy when taken in conjunction with the interviews with their leaders and ‘third parties’. In Denmark a majority of the material of the *June Movement* and *People’s Movement* was available in English as well as Danish, due to the linguistic requirements of their funding from their respective European Parliamentary groups. Additional translation was provided by Prof. Drude Dahlerup of the *June Movement* and Lave Broch of the *People’s Movement*, which was corroborated by Danish graduate students at the University of Sussex and University of Tartu. Language problems were not an issue in Estonia where one of the EPMs studied published its materials in English for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter Four. During a visiting scholarship held by the author at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Tartu in Estonia, members of faculty and doctoral students translated any other materials and newspaper articles that were required for the thesis.

Thirdly, in addition for the comparison of the different POS of each state, this research analysed the secondary academic literature on the four cases in question. There was an abundance of information relating to public opinion on Europe, referendums and Euroscepticism in political party systems across each of the case studies.

At this point it is important to locate what data each source brought to the thesis. The sources used must have been of a sufficient quality to allow for the gathering of data that is measurable across the diverse range of case studies under consideration. Firstly, in relation to EPM formation, the use of primary sources of data, and in particular the semi-structured interview, allowed the corroboration that the movement was in fact a

movement and secondly that it was Eurosceptic. This may seem an elementary procedure but if the analysis were to rely solely on secondary literature and documentary research then there was a heightened risk of serious classification mistakes in applying the nuanced labels of Eurosceptic and movement. A documentary analysis performed the function of confirming the verbal assertions of the respondents. With reference to the social science method of triangulation, data (such as European Parliamentary election results, EU referendum votes, newspaper articles) and primary sources (EPM publications) were used to corroborated the findings of each other and hence to enhance the quality of that data.

Another important element of documentary analysis was that it allowed for a chronological evaluation of EPM formation. An example of this was the *People's Movement* of Denmark which originated as a protest movement but quickly evolved into a political party. They placed a continuous emphasis on the fact that their organisation was a movement and therefore fundamentally different from political parties despite their successful contestation of European Parliamentary elections. This sort of data acknowledged the dynamic element of the EPM formation whilst also allowing for easy comparison across cases.

Primary sources were vital with regard to the evaluation of the propositions. For the validity of the propositions to be established then their assertions needed to be measured against the responses of the interviewees. Of course this label only applied once proper considerations were made with regard to the organisation of interviews and their findings were confirmed by secondary sources of data. The data collected was checked for further relevance against the secondary literature which has focused largely on political parties. The extent to which the secondary sources followed a similar pattern of relevance to this literature and threw up some distinct elements of a pattern that was evident only in the case of EPMs, will be discussed in the comparative chapter and final concluding chapter.

1.8 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis proceeds on a case by case basis in the order of Ireland (Chapter Two), the UK (Chapter Three), Estonia (Chapter Four) and Denmark (Chapter Five). Each case

study chapter is divided into three sections that follow a broadly similar pattern. The first section provides an overview of each country's political system with specific attention to EU relations with focus on national party systems, public opinion towards the EU and referendums on European issues; the second section examines EPM formation in the country with a basic typology seeking to further categorize EPMs in that country; and finally the third section concludes on the relevancy of the explanatory factors in describing EPM formation in the country. Taking this structural approach to the thesis provided a coherent 'spine' to the thesis but also allowed for substantial flexibility to examine the nuances of each case study. To fully explore the specificities of each country's relationship with European integration and in what manner EPM formation has emerged different topics were covered in each of the case studies, though within the same overarching three fold structure.

For the Irish case extra emphasis was given to referendums in the first section due to their importance in EPM formation and more widely in that they have come to define in a manner the Irish-EU relationship. In the section on EPMs the Lisbon treaty referendum of 2008 and the role of EPMs in its defeat was studied in-depth as it represented a clear example of EPMs achieving specific policy goals. For the UK case the European issue and political parties were given an extensive analysis due to their centrality to EPM formation and the overall narrative of UK relations with the EU. An additional section on the UK media and Europe was added as the high profile engagement of the print media in particular with the European issue is relatively exceptional and has had important effects on both EPM formation and the wider UK-EU relationship. The first section of the Estonian chapter sought to contextualise how Estonia's history as a former constituent part of the Soviet Union made the EU debate there substantially different from those of the other case studies. A focus was provided on the geo-political and security issues that informed the debate there. Additionally the dominance of a liberal economic critique of European integration and the failure of an ethnic Russian EPM to emerge are discussed as they are representative of the specificities of the Estonian case. Finally in the Danish chapter as in the Irish chapter significant coverage is given over to the six referendums on European integration there. Similarly to the UK chapter additional space is spent discussing the relationship between parties and

the EU, though in the Danish case the influence of EPMs in elections to the European Parliament is the subject of in-depth analysis.

The thesis then proceeds to draw together this evidence from the preceding chapters to examine whether the explanatory factors identified were indeed crucial in channelling Euroscepticism into EPM formation (Chapter Six). In further developing the explanatory factors an ideal type of case for EPM formation based on these findings and on alternative factors that were located individually in the case studies is created. Additionally the example of a non-occurrence case, Spain, is analysed and conclusions drawn as to why EPM formation was not in evidence there. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the wider implications of the findings of the thesis, where they fit into the overall literature on Euroscepticism and social movements, and avenues for future research are suggested.

Chapter 2: The Irish Case

2.1 Introduction

In comparison to the other case studies, contestation of European integration in Ireland became a major and pressing national issue twice, with the rejections of the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 at referendums, spring-boarding the issue of Europe to the top of the national political agenda. The No vote came as a tremendous shock to both the Irish political establishment and governments across the EU. That one of the most pro-European electorates of a state that had received many billions in EU structural funds had rejected two out of the last three EU treaties at referendums provoked much exasperation at the EU level. This was all the more so as the pro-European political establishment had supposedly already engaged with the public on the EU issue after the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 to secure its passing in a second referendum on Nice in 2003. Politicians and commentators alike examined the headline figures for Irish support of EU integration and the measures taken in the post-Nice rejection period, but could not understand what drove the two decisive No votes to the EU. What this chapter will show is that while the Irish electorate has always been pro-EU there have been groups in Irish society that have continually actively contested Irish EU membership. With deeper integration these groups have been joined by those who have come to perceive themselves as being negatively affected by European integration. Added to the constitutional provision for referendums on the EU these disparate groups in civil society have been able to mobilise themselves to form EPMs to effectively contest Irish participation in European integration.

As will be discussed, these groups have had a profound influence on the Irish-EU relationship, and an analysis of them greatly aids in the understanding of why a pro-European electorate has rejected EU treaties. Their presence, while noted by other academic studies, has been the subject of only a handful of academic enquiries.¹²³ The

¹²³ See: O'Brennan, John (2009). 'Ireland says No (again): the 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty' in *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 2, 258-77; Holmes, (2008). *EPERN Briefing Paper No. 16: the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland*, Sussex European Institute; Milward Brown IMF, (2008). *Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings*, Dublin: Millward Brown IMF available at

conclusions of this chapter show that the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty did not emerge spontaneously but was the culmination of lengthy civil society based opposition to European integration in Ireland. While there are many similarities between the Irish case study and the others discussed in this study, Irish EPMs emerge as both numerous in number and as the most effective EPMs out of all those analysed for this research.

First Section: Overview of Irish Politics and EU Relations

2.2 The Irish Party System and Europe

Despite the rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties by the Irish electorate, Ireland has been characterised as one of the most pro-European member states. Indeed from the onset of negotiations in the early 1960's the two largest parties in Irish politics who have led each government since independence in 1922, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael¹²⁴, have been deeply committed to the policy of membership.

Irish politics has been characterised as being based on 'clientalism' in that the political system is based on rigid networks of political patronage and voter identification, rather than ideology, that have proven to be highly effective in retaining votes¹²⁵. This pattern of party competition in Ireland stems from the political split that emerged from the War of Independence with the precursors of Fine Gael supporting the Treaty with the UK that followed and Fianna Fáil being against it. Through the clientalist system this effective two party system has been perpetuated with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael being either the sole party or largest party in each post-war government. With the UK remaining Ireland's largest economic trading partner and the political situation in Northern Ireland meaning that Ireland had an intimate interest in political developments in the UK, Ireland followed the first move by the UK to participate in European integration in the early 1960s. Membership of the then Common Market fitted in well with then Taoiseach¹²⁶ LeMass's wider policy of economic liberalisation and he became

<http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Publications/Post%20Lisbon%20Treaty%20Referendum%20Research%20Findings/1.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Fianna Fáil being Conservative and until 2009 part of the UEN group in the European Parliament and Fine Gael as Christian Democrat and Democrat part of the EPP group in the European Parliament.

¹²⁵ Carty, Ken (1983). *Electoral politics in Ireland: party and parish pump*, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, pp. 8-11.

¹²⁶ Prime Minister

a strong proponent of Irish membership. The stark economic and political necessity of Irish participation in European integration was not lost on Fine Gael and the wider social and economic elite, and support for membership became a key government priority¹²⁷. Opposition to membership was based around the socialist critique of the third largest party, Labour, and the hard nationalism of the much smaller Sinn Féin. Both campaigned strongly against membership and ensured that supporters of accession had to organise an effective campaign as a Yes vote was not guaranteed despite the evidence of public opinion. The “fleshpots of Brussels” in the form of agricultural subsidies were too much of an allure for the large rural vote however¹²⁸, while strong party loyalty to Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael ensured that mainstream voters followed their cues. The result was an overwhelming 83.1% Yes vote in favour of membership in 1972 (*see Table 2.1*).

Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have continued to be supportive of European integration. In Fine Gael’s case they put themselves forward as the most pro-European of all Irish political parties, by highlighting their involvement with the largest group in the European Parliament, the European People’s Party.¹²⁹ The Fianna Fáil leadership at different times struggled to prevent their republican and right-wing elements from criticising EU policies, but it never threatened to spill over into a Thatcherite-like party rebellion or a split within the party ranks. With their domination of political office, pro-European policies became the norm in Irish government.¹³⁰ In recent years, however, senior ministers openly criticised EU policy and institutions, and even admitted to voting No in European referendums.¹³¹ This can be seen as an example of the growing discrepancy between the ostensibly pro-EU position espoused by government parties and their vocal opposition to specific EU policies and institutions.

¹²⁷ Reidy, Theresa (2010). ‘Blissful Union? Fine Gael and the European Union’, Katy Hayward and Mary C. Murphy (eds.) *The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South*, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 96-8.

¹²⁸ Lee, Joe (1986). *Ireland State and Society: 1912-1985*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 487.

¹²⁹ Gallagher, Michael and Marsh, Michael (2002). *Days of Blue Loyalty: The Politics of the Membership of Fine Gael*, Dublin: PSAI Press, pp. 158-161.

¹³⁰ Paul Sharp, (1990) *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, p. 170.

¹³¹ Former Finance Minister McCreevey, and future EU Commissioner, had a much publicised clash with the European Commission over Irish exchequer deficits, Minister O’Cuiv admitted he voted No to Nice I and argued that the Irish people were right to reject Nice in 2001. For more information on this see O’Brennan, ‘Ireland says No (again)’.

As mentioned the Labour party originally campaigned against entry into the Common Market in the 1972 referendum as the party came under the influence of its militant trade union wing. In the Dáil¹³² several Labour deputies vigorously challenged the government on the terms of the accession agreement. Labour's role in coalition government with Fine Gael in 1973-77 and 1982-86, however, cooled the party leadership's opposition to Europe somewhat. By the time of the Single European Act (SEA) referendum in 1987 the party leadership had moved towards a pro-European position, against the obvious sentiment of the party membership. The leadership felt that the party could no longer take an opposing position on an issue that was not salient with the electorate.¹³³ This chequered history of relations with Europe has seen tension within the party on the EU issue, with the party leadership advocating a Yes vote on all European referendums post-SEA,¹³⁴ while ordinary members and certain backbench TD's have come out strongly against EU Treaties¹³⁵ including Lisbon.¹³⁶

The leaders of these three largest parties, who up to the 2011 general election held 148 of the 166 seats in parliament, were pro-European. Given the domination of Irish electoral politics and government by these parties from independence in 1922 on, pro-Europeanism became the default policy position of mainstream Irish politics.¹³⁷ The EU became "depoliticised" in Irish mainstream politics, in that the large, centrist parties accepted Irish participation in the European project without question.

Of course opposition to the EU existed in Irish politics, but only on the margins. Taggart identified the Green Party, Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party and the Socialist Party as "protest based parties [within the Irish party system] who have taken an anti-EU position as an adjunct to their general opposition to the functioning political systems".¹³⁸ All of these parties, with the exception of the Green Party, have campaigned against

¹³² Irish Parliament.

¹³³ O'Donovan, Patricia (1999). 'Irish Trade Unions and the EU' in Jim Dooge (ed.) *Ireland in Europe 1972-1998: A Vital National Interest*, Dublin: IPA, pp. 44-6.

¹³⁴ 'Gilmore launches drive for Lisbon Yes vote', in *The Irish Examiner*, 12th May, 2008.

¹³⁵ Holmes, Michael 'The development of opposition to European integration in Ireland'. Paper presented at the *UACES Annual Conference, 2-4 September 2002, Belfast*.

¹³⁶ As will be discussed later on the Trade Union movement has grown particularly critical of European integration and those Labour Party members associated with TUs have reflected this criticism. Additionally those Labour Party members and TDs who are members of Irish CND have criticised the EU for its perceived increased militarisation.

¹³⁷ See Appendix II for a full table of electoral results in Ireland from 1973 on.

¹³⁸ Taggart, 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism', p. 378.

every European Treaty, largely on the basis of their negative impact on workers' rights and Irish sovereignty.¹³⁹ With the Green Party's accession to government after the general election in 2007, the Party held a special convention where a two-thirds majority of Party members was almost achieved to approve of the Lisbon Treaty. As a compromise to full party support for the Treaty, the Party leadership was allowed to campaign according to their conscience on the referendum¹⁴⁰. As a result of this convention vote, the Party moved from a Eurosceptic position to a more 'Eurocautious' position in favour of the current trajectory of European integration, which was taking "decisive action on climate change".¹⁴¹ With the continued electoral decline of the Workers' Party and the loss of the Socialist Party's sole TD¹⁴² in 2007, Sinn Féin was left as the only parliamentary Eurosceptic party up to the 2011 general election. By 2010 only 4 out of 166 TDs belonged to a Eurosceptic party. Quite clearly the Irish party system up to that point could be classified as having a very low level of Euroscepticism.¹⁴³

2.3 Irish Public Opinion and European Integration

Parallel to the party system, it would appear that the Irish electorate has been broadly positive towards European integration (See *Figure 2.1*); however, O'Brennan in his analysis of Irish European referendums argues that Yes votes were based largely on the utilitarian impact of the economic benefits of membership in the shape of CAP payments and structural funds. Such economic benefits encouraged voters to support referendums on Europe to "keep the money coming from Brussels".¹⁴⁴ His argument was that the increasingly visible impact of EU funds on Irish infrastructure and incomes was the main driver behind this trend. Sinnott et. al. (See *Figure 2.1*) found that despite high levels of support for the EU in Ireland, general enthusiasm for membership ("feeling sorry" should the EU be scrapped) has always lagged significantly behind support for

¹³⁹ Interview with Mary-Lou McDonald MEP, Sinn Féin, 31st March 2008; Interview with Joe Higgins TD and Socialist Party leader, 31st March 2008.

¹⁴⁰ Holmes, *EPERN Briefing Paper No. 16*.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Senator Deirdre de Burca, Green Party spokesperson on Europe, 20th August, 2008.


¹⁴² Teachta Dála, Member of Parliament.

¹⁴³ Gilland, Karin (2008). 'Shades of Green: Euroscepticism in Irish Political Parties', in Taggart and Szczerbiak (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The comparative politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 117-133.

¹⁴⁴ O'Brennan, 'Ireland says No (again)'.

membership (by some 20-30%). Moreover, despite the eight referendums on European integration and the salience of the EU issue that such regular events bring, levels of knowledge of the EU amongst the Irish electorate has either been below or about the EU average (see *Figure 2.2*).¹⁴⁵


Figure 2.1: Trends in support for European integration – Belief that Irish EU membership has been a good thing, belief that Irish EU membership has been a bad thing and expression of very sorry sentiment over dissolution of EU 1973 – 2008



Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 1 – No. 74.

¹⁴⁵ Sinnott et. al., 'Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon'.

Figure 2.2: % Agree that “I understand how the EU works”



Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 62 – No. 74.

European media coverage of the Irish Lisbon referendum rejection pointed out the contradiction of Ireland having high support for EU membership and the benefits of EU structural funds, with a No vote to the latest EU Treaty.¹⁴⁶ Looking at the level of support for Irish membership in the EU, however, does not reveal the full picture of Irish support for the EU. O'Brennan¹⁴⁷ and Gilland¹⁴⁸ both highlight the linking by successive Irish governments of Irish involvement with Europe to “money from Brussels”. At a wider level this meant that a solidly pro-European identification had not been created within the Irish electorate, as the low levels of enthusiasm for the EU show. Moreover, *Figure 2.1* shows that Ireland did not emerge as strongly pro-EU immediately upon membership. Irish support for European integration only began to increase some ten years after membership. The reasons for this initial negative reaction to membership have been located in the pain of readjusting the economy to catch up with the far more economically developed Western Europe.¹⁴⁹ It was with the infusion of vast sums of EU

¹⁴⁶ ‘Sarkozy will neues Referendum in Irland’, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 19th June, 2007.

¹⁴⁷ O'Brennan ‘Ireland says No (again)’.

¹⁴⁸ Gilland, ‘Ireland’s (First) referendum on the Treaty of Nice’, p. 527.

¹⁴⁹ Laffan, Brigid and O'Mahony, Jane (2008). *Ireland and the European Union*, Palgrave: Basingstoke, pp. 38-43.

structural funds in the mid to late 1980s and their supplement by extra funding in 1992 that Irish public opinion moved decisively in favour of European integration.

It can be seen how a more nuanced analysis of Irish public opinion towards the EU shows that the rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties did not emerge out of thin air. The level of attachment of the Irish public towards the EU never rose above 50%, while the Irish retained a higher than EU average of ‘national only’ feeling. Once the utilitarian aspect of European integration had passed by the early 2000s and Ireland moved towards becoming a net contributor to the EU budget as the second richest member state in GDP terms, the lack of attachment towards the EU became a key indicator of true Irish public sentiment towards the EU. The failure of mainstream parties to engage with the public on the future of Irish-EU relations in the EU referendums that took place at this time of flux in the electorate’s position on the EU was exploited by the EPMs. As will be explored in the next section, years of experience allowed EPM activists to gain an insight as to what dimensions of European integration they could campaign on despite strong public support for EU membership.

2.4 Irish Referendums on Europe

Ireland has held eight referendums on European integration, more than any other member state. This was due to a constitutional provision that stipulates the holding of a referendum in the event of national sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs being given up to a supranational authority.¹⁵⁰ This constitutional requirement followed the Crotty Supreme Court judgement in 1987. From this ruling it became established as the convention that each successive European Treaty was to be put before the Irish people regardless of its compatibility with the original Supreme Court ruling. Following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and with reference to the French and Dutch No votes, several prominent pro-European media commentators made a case for mounting a legal challenge to the Crotty ruling and allowing for parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Such a challenge was determined to be politically untenable by the then Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche, and by opposition party leaders and so Ireland proceeded as the lone state with a Lisbon referendum.

¹⁵⁰ Gilland, ‘Ireland’s (First) referendum on the Treaty of Nice’, pp. 527-8.

What is almost wholly ignored however, is that Crotty himself was a member of the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* EPM (which will be discussed in greater detail later in its most recent incarnation as the *National Platform*) and an active campaigner against Irish membership of the EU. He took the case as the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* believed that the Irish people had to be consulted on any further advances in European integration.¹⁵¹ If the case had not been taken then the convention in both law and politics that referendums must be held to ratify EU treaties in Ireland would not have been established. Had a similar constitutional challenge been taken to an EU Treaty after the ratification of the SEA then the government would have justifiably been able to claim that if a Treaty with such wide ranging impacts on national sovereignty as the SEA had been passed by the Oireachtas¹⁵², then other treaties did not require a referendum either. Ireland therefore has held referendums on the EU ever since the accession referendum because of the actions of EPM activists. The strict interpretation of the constitution in regard to the negative impact of European integration played a significant role in allowing the *National Platform* EPM access to the policy making process.¹⁵³ Indeed EPM activists repeatedly used the Irish courts to challenge the government on its EU policy on the basis of the Irish constitution. In the other case studies the court system has not been used extensively by EPM activists as there was a widespread belief that after unsuccessful attempts in each example to challenge government EU policy that their rulings would fall on the side of the government. These rulings concluded that the respective governments could pursue their EU policy as it was not contradictory with the national constitution.¹⁵⁴ Following on from the Crotty judgement however, Irish EPM activists repeatedly used the court system both successfully and unsuccessfully.

The Green MEP Patricia McKenna took a case against the government in 1995 over the allocation of government funding to one side during a referendum on divorce. Due to her successful challenge, the McKenna judgement, the media has been legally obliged to devote half of its coverage of a referendum campaign to both Yes and No sides, and the government to promote both sides of the argument in a referendum equally

¹⁵¹ Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December 2007.

¹⁵² Irish Houses of Parliament.

¹⁵³ Lysaght, Charles. 'Did we need a referendum in the first place?', *The Irish Independent*, 22nd June 2008; Gillespie, Paul. 'Engaging with public will help to ratify treaty', *The Irish Times*, 3rd May, 2008.

¹⁵⁴ This was particularly the case in Denmark, as will be discussed in the Danish chapter.

without favour.¹⁵⁵ McKenna, who would later lose her MEP seat, left the Green party and become involved in the *Peoples' Movement* EPM (which will be discussed in greater detail later). Other EPM activists-most notably *Cóir* (which will also be discussed in greater detail later)-challenged the government's decision to hold re-runs of the Nice and Lisbon treaties. While the courts found that the government could hold as many referendums as it required on any issue it chose, the success of the Crotty and McKenna judgements ensured that the government was keenly aware of the threat of legal challenges to its EU policy by EPM activists, specifically in relation to the holding of referendums on Europe.

When considering referendums on the EU in Ireland, the role of EPMs is fundamental to understanding why they are held in the first place and more recently under what structures. This shows that the political opportunity structure of Ireland was quite open for EPMs as they were firstly formed to contest accession at a referendum and were able to use the court system to contest further European integration and force the policy process open by compelling the use of referendums. As can be seen from *Table 2.1* however, EPMs did not have any perceptible effect in then contesting the referendums themselves as they were passed relatively comfortably until the 2001 Nice referendum. Why Irish voters, after three decades of increasing public support of EU membership and electoral passing of EU referendums, voted down Nice will now be analysed.

¹⁵⁵ O'Mahony, 'Ireland's EU Referendum Experience', p. 19.

Table 2.1: Irish EU referendum votes and results

Referendum	Turnout	%	Yes	%	No	%	Result
Accession (1972)	1,264,278	70.9	1,041,890	83.1	211,891	16.9	Yes
Single European Act (1985)	1,085,304	44.1	755,423	69.9	324,977	30.1	Yes
Maastricht (1992)	1,457,219	57.3	1,001,076	69.1	448,655	30.9	Yes
Amsterdam (1998)	1,543,930	56.2	932,632	61.7	578,070	38.3	Yes
Nice I (2001)	997,826	34.8	453,461	46.1	529,478	53.9	No
Nice II (2003)	1,446,588	49.5	906,317	62.9	534,887	37.1	Yes
Lisbon (2008)	1,621,037	53.1	752,451	46.6	862,415	53.4	No
Lisbon II (2009)	1,816,098	58	1,214,268	67.1	594,606	32.9	Yes

Source: ‘The European Parliament Election in Ireland, 5 June 2009’. European Parties Elections and Referendums Network European Parliament Election Briefing No 35 and http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/no_35_epernep2009ireland.pdf; and <http://www.rte.ie/news/features/lisbontreaty/index.html> - National Broadcaster

2.4.1 The 1972 Referendum on Accession, 1986 Single European Act (SEA) Referendum, 1992 Maastricht Referendum, and 1998 Amsterdam Referendum

These first four referendums proceeded with such a minimum of controversy that overviews of Irish referendums on Europe have described them as being...

“comfortably carried, helping to copper-fasten Ireland’s reputation as a constructive and *communaautaire* EU member state. The supportive attitude of the electorate in referendums on accession, the SEA, Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties was mirrored by public opinion polls on the EU: a healthy majority of

those surveyed declared themselves in favour of membership and appreciated the perceived benefits that membership brought to Ireland”.¹⁵⁶

As with the previous sections on the political system and public opinion, the Yes side was dominant because of a cross party appeal as to the necessity of a Yes vote to “keep the money coming from Brussels”. As will be discussed in the following section on EPMs, the arguments of the No side changed slightly at each referendum but they were on the whole ineffectual and have been largely ignored in analysis of the campaigns. The one thing to note from these referendums is that at each one the number of No votes increased. This increasing voter rejection of European integration was put down to a dismissal of the pro-EU side’s “donor/recipient narrative”, as a growing proportion of the Irish electorate voted No because they did not understand what they were voting for.¹⁵⁷ The number one reasons cited by No voters to Maastricht and Amsterdam was a perceived lack of information. Growing voter frustration at the failure of EU treaties to be ‘sold’ to them by Yes campaigners came to the political surface at the first Nice referendum where a combination of political party elite withdrawal and successful EPM campaign resulted in the Treaty being voted down.

2.4.2 The 2001 and 2002 Nice Referendums

Anti-Nice campaigners themselves did not believe that the Treaty would be defeated.¹⁵⁸ The rejection of the Nice Treaty was largely the result of two factors; firstly the very poor Yes campaign, and secondly the energetic and well organised No campaign. This combination had the effect of discouraging normally pro-EU voters from turning out, while mobilizing No voters to come out to vote. *Table 2.3* illustrates this with the number of Yes voters for the first Nice Treaty collapsing by nearly 500,000 from the Amsterdam referendum. The importance of Nice for EPMs cannot be over-emphasised. It showed that ‘fringe’ parties and civil society groups could not only successfully challenge the government and pro-EU elite on referendums but that they could also effect a degree of policy change. In response to the No vote the government

¹⁵⁶ O’Mahony, ‘Ireland’s EU Referendum Experience’, p. 13.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December 2007; Interview Frank Keoghan, Chairman People’s Movement, 31st March 2008.

made a declaration at the Seville European Council in June 2002. The substance of the declaration related to the ‘triple lock’ of Irish involvement in EU military missions. This referred to the fact that for Ireland to participate in such a mission it had to be approved by a UN mandate, the Irish parliament and the Irish cabinet.¹⁵⁹ The declaration on neutrality and the EU Council’s declaration respecting each member states approach to participation or not in ESDP¹⁶⁰, while not an explicit change of policy, ensured that any attempt by the government to develop Irish involvement in ESDP could not be done surreptitiously and would need a referendum vote to prevent a public backlash against the breaking of an explicit political promise. This success inspired No campaigners for the first Lisbon referendum. It made them realise that if Irish neutrality could be guaranteed by achieving a No vote, then other issues impacted by EU policy could be addressed by securing a No to Lisbon.¹⁶¹

For the Nice referendum rerun a solid and focused cross-party campaign advocated a Yes vote on European grounds; the main reasons being to allow for enlargement to proceed and keep Ireland at the centre of Europe. With the 500,000 voters who disappeared from the Yes side the first time around returning to support the Treaty, it was comfortably passed. Analysis following the second Nice vote showed that a unified, non-partisan campaign using European arguments was the strongest indicator of securing support for a Yes vote and therefore key to the passing of any future EU referendums in Ireland.¹⁶² The lessons of the first Nice referendum defeat were apparently learned as the pro-EU political elite had mobilised to successfully engage with the EU related issues raised by EPMs and convince the electorate to support further Irish participation in European integration.

2.4.3 The 2008 and 2009 Lisbon Referendums

The lessons from the Nice referendums were ignored by the pro-Lisbon political parties. Similarly to the first Nice referendum they simply did not produce an effective

¹⁵⁹ Gilland, Karin (2002). *EPERN Briefing Paper No. 1: Ireland’s Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice*, Sussex European Institute: Sussex.

¹⁶⁰ European Security and Defence Policy.

¹⁶¹ Interview Frank Keoghan, Chairman People’s Movement, 31st March 2008; Interview with Declan Ganley founder and former Chairman of Libertas, 14th August, 2008.

¹⁶² Garry, John et. al., (2005). ‘Second Order’ versus ‘Issue Voting’ effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums’, *European Union Politics*, 6: 2, p. 219.

campaign. Instead the parties focused on promoting candidates for European and local elections the following year. What was decisive about the first Lisbon referendum was not just that the Yes vote declined by 200,000 but more that the No vote jumped by 330,000 from the second Nice referendum. A more vibrant and wider No campaign with EPMs that appealed to left, centre and right wing voters can partially explain this. The Nice No outcome was attributed to an extremely low turnout, 34.8%, but Lisbon represented an unprecedented shift in voting patterns with a large number of former Yes voters turning against European integration. As EPMs dominated the No side their decisive role in securing a No vote represented the pinnacle of achievement in the contestation of European integration by Irish EPMs.

Immediately after the outcome, the Irish government stated that it would engage in an “extended period of consultation” with the Irish people as to the reasons for the No vote¹⁶³. This took the form of a Department of Foreign Affairs commissioned report by the market research company Millward Brown IMS to conduct an in-depth survey of voter behaviour in the referendum and then of Sinnott et. al. to analyse the data and locate the main factors that had led voters to reject Lisbon¹⁶⁴. These reports highlighted that low levels of knowledge of Lisbon, concerns over the effect of Lisbon on Irish taxation policy, workers rights, Irish abortion laws and the loss of Irish influence in the Commission with the ending of a guaranteed Commissioner, were the main contributing factors to the No vote. These were the issues first raised by the EPMs. The government sought to use the findings of the Lisbon reports as a basis for negotiating concessions on the Treaty from the other member states. These concessions could then be used to legitimise the re-running of Lisbon to the Irish electorate.

This strategy came to fruition at the EU summit meeting in June 2009 when the government announced a series of “legally binding guarantees” that it had secured after lengthy negotiation with other member states. These guarantees were separated into three: one guaranteeing a commissioner; another in relation to Irish competency over tax

¹⁶³ Smyth, Jamie. ‘Government admits that it failed to run effective campaign’, *The Irish Times*, September 11, 2008.

¹⁶⁴ Milward Brown IMF (2008). *Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings*, Dublin: Millward Brown IMF; Sinnott et. al. (2009). ‘Attitudes and Behaviour in the Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon’, unpublished paper, Dublin: Geary Institute.

rates, abortion, and neutrality; and finally an agreement on workers' rights¹⁶⁵. While these were not voted on in the referendum, the government put forward the argument that it had listened to the Irish people and had convinced the responsive EU member states to address their concerns of the Irish over Lisbon with these legally binding guarantees. Whereas anti-Nice EPMs received a declaration on their issue, anti-Lisbon EPMs forced the government to effectively re-negotiate with the European Council, this was especially true with the guaranteed commissioner for each member state where Ireland was supported by the Scandinavian states on this issue. Though the language was stronger and rooted in the EU's legal framework they were not to be incorporated into EU law as protocols until the next EU treaty, which at the time was believed to be the Croatian accession Treaty¹⁶⁶. The impact of EPMs on the Lisbon referendum was not the result of specific Lisbon-centric factors but can be traced back to the lengthy and continuous presence of civil society based Euroscepticism in Ireland, which the following section analysis as a coherent narrative for the first time in an academic context.

2.4.4 Referendums as vital to EPM mobilisation

Due to the strength of the Irish constitution, as regards foreign policy, Irish EPMs have had several crucial successes in forcing the government to hold referendums on the EU and on what terms. This shows the importance of the court system and the constitution in Irish EPM mobilisation. Knowing that they could challenge the government based on specific provisions in the Irish Constitution and that the courts had ruled in their favour provided a further area around which EPM activists could form. Since the *National Platform* helped to establish the requirement of referendums on EU issues they have proven to be of intrinsic importance in the formation of Irish EPMs. As the Irish party system moved toward a broad pro-EU consensus, referendums offered the only means for Eurosceptics to challenge Irish participation in EU integration. While Irish public opinion did not favour them, as the public was not going to vote against receiving billions of EU funds that were helping to modernise the country, they did build up valuable experience in campaigning and in the development of networks of

¹⁶⁵ Barrett, Gavin 'Revisiting Lisbon referendum was the only realistic option', *The Sunday Business Post*, December 14, 2008.

¹⁶⁶ FitzGibbon, 'The Second Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. 2 October 2009'.

Eurosceptic activists. Despite decisive Yes votes to accession, the SEA, Maastricht and Amsterdam the number of No votes increased with each referendum. At a time of strong public support for Irish EU membership (see *Figure 2.1*), with only small minor parties such as Sinn Féin, the Greens and the Socialist Party advocating a No vote, these large numbers of No votes were finding representation in the arguments of EPMs. This expression of Euroscepticism came to its conclusion with the first Lisbon Treaty referendum when a new set of EPMs based around a different set of arguments emerged to again defeat the government and the pro-EU political establishment, thereby forcing the government to take action at an EU level to resolve their issues.

This is perhaps the most interesting element to emerge from the analysis of EPM activity in Ireland's eight referendums on Europe. Energized by the rejection of the Nice Treaty, new EPMs emerged. These new EPMs put forward radically different arguments against ratification from those EPMs that had existed before. Such a shift was symptomatic of the wider change in Ireland's relationship with the EU, as the country had changed radically between 1972 and 2008. For the accession, SEA and Maastricht referendums EPMs rallied around arguments of national sovereignty and economic nationalism; for Amsterdam and the two Nice referendums EPMs used neutrality, anti-abortion and anti-elitism arguments; for Lisbon lack of a commissioner, workers' rights, and social values were used. Examining the formation of Irish EPMs by looking at their membership and their issues of contestation therefore will help to understand why an electorate generally supportive of European integration formed social movements to actively contest the EU.

Second Section: EPMs in Ireland

2.5 The Importance of EPMs in the Irish-EU relationship

Despite the Irish political system being strongly pro-EU the Irish electorate ignored their cues to vote No to the Nice and Lisbon treaty referendums¹⁶⁷. This occurred because mainstream Irish political parties withdrew from contesting the EU

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

issue, allowing EPMs the political space to successfully campaign against EU treaties at referendums. EPMs were aided in this by the Irish electorate for whom the utilitarian basis of their relationship with the EU was undermined by Irish economic success in the 2000s.¹⁶⁸ This exposed a lack of base support for European integration which the EPMs exploited. How and why EPMs emerged to play such an important role in the Irish-EU relationship is the focus of this section.

As discussed in the previous section, there has been a distinct pattern in EPM formation in contestation against EU referendums. This section will break down Irish EPMs into two groups: the ‘old timers’; and the ‘young guns’. This has been done as there is a clear distinction in issues of contestation and campaign tactics between those groups formed pre and post Nice. At the time of Nice the observation was that when “discussing the EU in Ireland, neutrality is always central, it is the ‘touchstone’ of the Irish debate on Europe”.¹⁶⁹ After Nice Irish neutrality ceased being a major issue of Eurosceptic contestation. Other issues dominated, despite the fact that Irish participation in EU battlegroups greatly increased post Nice.¹⁷⁰ Discussing these two distinct groups the pre and post ‘Nicers’ show how EPMs have come to represent shifting patterns in the issues surrounding EU debates.

2.6 The First Wave of Protest: *The National Platform* and the *Peace and Neutrality Alliance*

The *National Platform* was the EPM that was involved the longest in the Irish-EU debate, though in various incarnations. Its founder and Chairman Anthony Coughlan was present from the first organised civil society opposition to membership in the 1960s when Taoiseach Lemass first submitted an official application for membership, with the *Wolfe Tone Group*.¹⁷¹ These activities embody the republican and nationalist critique of European integration that defined early Irish opposition to European integration.

¹⁶⁸ Irish GDP tripled between 1990 and 2005, from just under €50 billion to over €150 billion. The Central Statistics Office (2010), *National Income and Expenditure: Annual Results 2009*, CSO: Dublin.

¹⁶⁹ Gilland, ‘Ireland’s (First) referendum on the Treaty of Nice’, p. 529.

¹⁷⁰ Ireland participated in the Nordic battlegroup with Finland and Sweden in Kosovo, UN mission KFOR from 2000 on; also the UN MINURCAT mission in Chad, again with the Nordic battlegroup from 2008-10.

¹⁷¹ Wolfe Tone being a Protestant Irish patriot, organiser of the 1798 rebellion against British rule in Ireland, and regarded as the father of Irish republicanism.

Believing in the inevitability of Irish membership and that this would have to be put to a referendum, with other nationalists he and other Eurosceptic activists set up the *Common Market Defence Campaign* in 1969. The main argument of this group was that joining the ‘Common Market’ (EU) would destroy Irish industry as it was so uncompetitive against Western Europe (in this it was very similar to the criticisms of the Labour party mentioned above but from a nationalist not socialist perspective).¹⁷² Describing the accession referendum as a “New Act of Union” the EPM acted as an information source for other Eurosceptic activists and political parties, Sinn Féin, the Communist Party of Ireland; who did the majority of the campaigning. The *Common Market Defence Campaign* did most of its campaigning as invited speakers to public debates and in opinion pieces and letter writing to the national newspapers. In this respect we can see strong similarities to the *Research Centre Free Europe* EPM in Estonia. Both were led by academics (Coughlan was a Professor of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin); both were founded to criticise the negotiation strategy of the government in relation to EU membership; and campaigned by publishing detailed research papers and articles in broadsheet newspapers. The EPM continued its existence in name only, when for the SEA referendum it changed its name to the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* as the *Common Market Defence Campaign* name had become irrelevant due to the evolution of the Common Market to the European Community.¹⁷³

It was an individual within the *Irish Sovereignty Movement*, Raymond Crotty, whose court case against the Irish government in 1986 led to the judicial review that forced Ireland to hold referendums to ratify EU treaties. As for the SEA referendum the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* left the majority of the campaigning to the anti-SEA political parties.¹⁷⁴ With the leadership of the Labour party and senior trade unionists moving towards a pro-EU position, the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* received support from Labour party members and trade union activists due to its anti-single market stance.

For Maastricht the *Irish Sovereignty Movement* changed its name to its most recent incarnation, the *National Platform*. At this time Coughlan and the EPM began to

¹⁷² Incidentally they were joined in this campaign by future Irish President Mary McAleese, when she was a young law student with strong republican sympathies.

¹⁷³ Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December 2007.

¹⁷⁴ Crotty, Raymond (1988). *A Radical's Response*, Dublin: Poolbeg, p. 17.

develop strong links with Danish EPMs, the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* discussed in Chapter Five, and engaged in information swapping and ideational support. This relationship increased greatly at the time of Maastricht as both Danish EPMs used the support of the *National Platform* to show that their criticisms of the Treaty were shared in other member states.¹⁷⁵ The debate was heavily centralised around economics as Ireland had been undergoing painful economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s that had led to a high unemployment rate in the early 1990s. The campaign was lost when then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds returned from a European Council meeting in Brussels with £8 billion in Irish punts of structural and regional funds.¹⁷⁶ Coughlan noted the beginnings of change in the nature of the EU debate at this time in Ireland, with anti-war/neutrality activists becoming increasingly visible in Eurosceptic circles.

The *Peace and Neutrality Alliance* (PANA) was formed by Roger Cole in 1996 as an alternative EU referendum campaign movement to the *National Platform* which he and other left-wing activists viewed as being too socially right wing. PANA sought to organise Ireland's multitude of anti-war, anti-nuclear and global justice groups under a single umbrella to contest Irish participation in ESDP. Cole himself had been a long term member of Irish CND and the Labour party¹⁷⁷, and his and PANA's criticism of the EU was based on the perception that the EU was dominated by nuclear powers (France and Germany) and the nuclear weapon armed NATO military alliance. The perceived nuclear and military dimensions to the EU, PANA argued, were incompatible with a neutral and nuclear-free Ireland. The EPM unsuccessfully contested the Amsterdam Treaty referendum, but an analysis of their failure led Cole to understand that an alliance would have to be made with the Eurosceptic political parties. This strategy was adopted as the financial and manpower resources of the parties were needed to counter the resources of the pro-treaty side.¹⁷⁸ As a strong commitment to neutrality was a common cause between all the sides involved PANA could position itself as a leader of such an alliance as the perceived civil society 'owner' of the neutrality issue. The anti-Nice political

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December 2007.

¹⁷⁶ Holmes, Michael (2010). 'The Irish Labour Party: Advantages, Disadvantages and Irrelevance of Europeanisation?', Katy Hayward and Mary C. Murphy (eds.) *The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South*, Abingdon: Routledge, p. 114.

¹⁷⁷ The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Roger Cole, Chairman PANA, 10th December, 2007.

parties were in agreement as they understood that a civil society-led alliance would lend significant public legitimacy to their arguments, in that they were motivated by genuine ideological Euroscepticism and not merely for electoral gain.¹⁷⁹ The *No to Nice* group was the umbrella organisation for the No side during the first Nice referendum in Ireland. *PANA* took a similar form to the *No to the EU* group in Norway in joining civil society groups and political parties together. Membership included anti-war groups, NGOs, ecological groups, anti-nuclear groups, the Socialist Party, Green Party, and Sinn Féin. The group had a simple and effective slogan, “No to NATO: No to Nice”, and organised mass meetings where all the groups and parties shared the same platform.

The impression remained that the Greens and Sinn Féin were using the *No to Nice* group to legitimise their anti-Nice campaign by aligning themselves with civil society. This impression was given further credence when for the second Nice referendum campaign, the *No to Nice* group was not supported by the Greens and Sinn Féin. Instead both parties launched their own separate anti-Nice campaigns for the referendum rerun following their significant electoral success in the general election that took place between the two Nice votes.¹⁸⁰ This is not to say that the political parties were not motivated by genuine ideological opposition to the EU but that they used these civil society groups to push forward their own electoral policy. The *No to Nice* group was happy for political parties to do this as parties possessed the resources, experience and organisation to effectively challenge Nice in the media and in the political arena. In many ways *PANA* was used by the political parties for their own electoral gain as Sinn Féin and the Greens went on to make significant electoral breakthroughs in the general election in the following year. *PANA* were accepting of this as they saw the rejection of Nice and the gaining of explicit legal guarantee on Irish neutrality as a great success.¹⁸¹ After Nice and the Lisbon referendum campaigns both *PANA* and the *National Platform* continued to campaign against European integration, however they did not achieve the same high profile or level of influence they achieved at the time of Nice. When the Lisbon Treaty referendum became an issue of national importance a new set of EPMs had

¹⁷⁹ Gilland, *EPERN Briefing Paper No. 1*.

¹⁸⁰ FitzGibbon, ‘The Triumph of Strategy over Ideology?’.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Roger Cole, Chairman *PANA*, 10th December, 2007; See also *PANA*’s interpretation of Nice I in their own history, <http://pana.ie/idn/index.html>: accessed 10th September 2007.

emerged that did not need the court system or political parties to successfully contest the EU in Ireland.

What makes the post-Nice EPMs different from the examples of *PANA* and the *National Platform* is that they took centre stage in the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns from political parties. Not only were they dominant over Eurosceptic political parties but they successfully challenged pro-EU parties as well. With the defeat of the Lisbon referendum EPMs emerged as *the* effective leader of opposition to the EU in Ireland. The pre-Nice EPMs were effective campaigners but were always overshadowed by the anti-EU political parties. From the 1960s to the mid 80s this was the Labour party, and from then on the smaller left wing parties Sinn Féin, the Greens, the Socialist Party and the Workers' Party were the focus of opposition to European integration. This focus on political parties has underestimated the role of EPMs. The Crotty judgement enshrined the role of referendums in the ratification of EU treaties in Ireland. For Nice I EPMs were used as a highly effective umbrella for anti-Nice political parties to shelter from criticisms of self-interest and use the credibility of civil society campaigners to create a positive public image for their campaigns.

Despite the presence of Eurosceptic political parties, EPMs still formed in Ireland to contest membership and each subsequent Treaty. For the founders of the *National Platform* an argument against membership based on republican principles was not being made and so they formed to put those arguments across to the public¹⁸². Similarly *PANA* was formed to contest the EU as they believed that European integration would inevitably lead to Irish membership of NATO and ultimately Irish participation in an EU army. They perceived that Eurosceptic political parties were not doing enough to raise awareness of this issue. The level of Euroscepticism in the party system was an important factor in the formation of these EPMs but more precisely it was due to the lack of effectiveness and ideological compatibility of that party-based Euroscepticism. The relevance of issue framing in combination with the openness of the political opportunity structure along the lines outlined by Koopmans and Duyvendak is clearly evident in the case of the *National Platform* and *PANA*.

¹⁸² Sinn Féin was a proscribed organisation at the time of the accession referendum.

2.7 The Second Wave of Protest: *Libertas*, *Cóir* and the *People's Movement*

For the first Irish Lisbon vote, despite the presence of the anti-Lisbon Sinn Féin, civil society groups dominated the No campaign. This is in contrast to the examples of the *National Platform* and *PANA* where ultimately their campaigns were subservient to those of the Eurosceptic political parties.

Table 2.2 lists those No campaign groups that received the most coverage in the Lisbon Treaty from a study of the three main daily broadsheets and two broadsheet Sunday newspapers. What is evident from this table is that civil society groups outnumbered political parties in the No campaign. Additionally, there was no overarching No alliance or single all-encompassing No movement, as was present in the first Nice vote à la *No to Nice*. Each political party and group operated independently. What Table 2.2 does not show however, is the extent to which the EPMs dominated the campaign itself through their early, extensive, and expansive strategy. Despite Sinn Féin and the Socialist Party receiving plentiful media coverage due to each having a high profile spokesperson on the Treaty, the issues of the campaign were set firmly by the civil society groups.

Table 2.2: Breakdown of Main Campaigners on No Side, Irish Lisbon I Referendum

Name	Pol. Party/EPM	Issues of Contestation	Focus of Contestation
Sinn Féin	Political Party	Sovereignty/Workers Rights	Commission, Council
Socialist Party	Political Party	Workers Rights	Commission, Council, ECJ
Libertas	EPM	Sovereignty/Tax	Commission, Council
Cóir	EPM	Sovereignty/ Abortion/ Catholic Values	Commission/ECJ
People's Movement	EPM	Sovereignty/Workers Rights	Commission/ECJ

Calculated by counting the number of references to each group/party in articles relating to the Lisbon referendum in *The Irish Times*, *Irish Independent*, *Irish Examiner*, *Sunday Business Post*, and *Sunday Tribune*.

It was the *Libertas* EPM that emerged as the ‘story’ of Lisbon as it started its referendum campaign before the government had even announced a date for the referendum to be held in the first place. From the start, *Libertas* highlighted a series of arguments for rejecting Lisbon that would come to dominate the agenda of the entire debate and be specifically addressed by the government in their strategy for getting Lisbon passed after the rejection.

Libertas’ first argument was that passing Lisbon would force Ireland to abandon its low tax policy, thus encouraging the many multinational companies that have bases in Ireland to avail of the low taxes to leave, taking hundreds of thousands of jobs with them. The success of their campaign was evidenced by the belief of 43% of voters that Lisbon meant the loss of Ireland’s low corporate tax rate (12.5%), despite the assurances of all of the country’s main business groups that it did not.¹⁸³ Secondly, *Libertas* argued that the proposed reduction in size of the EU Commission would lead to the loss of Irish influence in the EU, to the benefit of the big states over the small states. The securing of a guaranteed Commissioner for every member state became the cornerstone of the Irish government’s plan for securing a Yes vote in the Lisbon II referendum. *Libertas* put the issue on the agenda as an example of what the group believed was Lisbon’s role in the “relentless erosion of Irish national sovereignty by an unelected and unaccountable Brussels bureaucracy”¹⁸⁴, that sought to undermine the independence of small states in the EU in favour of “Franco-German domination”.¹⁸⁵ In addition to their billboard campaign, *Libertas* engaged in media launches, handed out leaflets, organised meetings, and toured the country in a campaign bus. The media focus intensified on *Libertas* and its leader, multi-millionaire businessman Declan Ganley, as its emergence became perceived as the ‘story’ of the campaign. The result of this attention was the elevation of Ganley to unofficial leader of the No campaign by the media.¹⁸⁶

The origin of *Libertas* was Ganley himself. His opposition to Lisbon originated in the proposed harmonisation of taxes by EU Commissioner Kovacs which clashed with

¹⁸³ Milward Brown IMF, *Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings*.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman *Libertas*, 14th August, 2008. After the rejection of Lisbon, Ganley changed *Libertas* into a political party, registering it in every member state to contest the EP elections in 2007. Only one MEP was returned and Ganley closed the party.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Clifford, Michael. ‘The stature of *Libertas* and all things Ganley’, *The Sunday Tribune*, 17th May, 2009.

his interests as an entrepreneur and his belief in the importance of an independent taxation policy for Irish economic success. Ganley saw proposals for tax harmonisation across the EU as an attempt by the European Commission to impose bureaucratic control over business in Europe. Moreover this was compounded by his belief that the EU was actively challenging Europe's Christian heritage and trying to replace it with a secular society. He points to the failure of the scrapped European Constitution to either mention God or acknowledge the Christian heritage of Europe as the most obvious example of this. Given the scale of his resources Ganley was able to found and develop a protest group, *Libertas*, specifically to campaign against Lisbon and what he perceived to be its impact on his interests.¹⁸⁷

A crucial role played by *Libertas*, was in providing mainstream voters who opposed the treaty but were uncomfortable with falling on the side of supporters of the terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA), radical-left policies, and traditional Catholic values, with an 'acceptable' form of Euroscepticism. *Libertas* appealed to their concerns about the direction Lisbon was taking the EU whilst also crucially coming without domestic political baggage. From the Nice Treaty referendums onwards, high profile individuals within the three largest parties expressed concern about the EU project but party loyalty always prevented any widespread party revolt on Europe.¹⁸⁸ *Libertas* emerged as a non-party political flag of acceptable dissent on Europe for disgruntled Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil voters to rally around. Ganley was keenly aware of this latent No vote and he targeted it specifically, but he admitted that *Libertas* had underestimated the sheer numbers of mainstream voters who were ready to come out and vote No. They focused on Ireland's relationship with Europe and not on domestic issues to attract these voters.¹⁸⁹ *Libertas* did this by specifically raising the corporation tax issue, hitting a nerve with the Irish middle class who relied on multinational corporations for employment and who had benefitted greatly from a low taxation regime more generally.¹⁹⁰ The success of *Libertas'* campaign based on mainstream policy arguments can be traced to the lack of opposition to the EU amongst mainstream Irish parties. In

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman *Libertas*, 14th August, 2008..

¹⁸⁸ Holmes, *EPERN Briefing Paper No. 16*.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman *Libertas*, 14th August, 2008.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Naoise Nunn, *Libertas* campaign manager, 14th August 2008.

Norway or the UK such mainstream arguments would be articulated by the Centre or Conservative parties respectively. In Ireland a civil society group was required to put such arguments before the public.

In contrast to the high media profile campaigning and expensive billboards of *Libertas*, were the more grassroots based and direct campaigns of *Cóir* and the *People's Movement*.¹⁹¹ Although each group represented opposite ends of Irish society, radical right and left respectively, they were both linked in their opposition to further European integration specifically to the increasing authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to make decisions that impact at a national level.¹⁹²

For *Cóir*, whose main purpose was to oppose the introduction of abortion into Ireland and to defend “traditional Catholic values”, the fear was that the Irish pro-choice lobby would take a case against the Irish state to the ECJ, who in turn would use the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as a basis for legalising abortion in Ireland.¹⁹³ For the *People's Movement* their fears had already been realised with the ECJ ruling in the Laval case which they believed fundamentally undermined workers rights and would lead to a “race to the bottom” as regards the importation of cheaper Eastern European labour to the detriment of Irish workers.¹⁹⁴ Both groups relied on an extensive network of volunteers to conduct their campaign strategy which relied on three main outlets; public information meetings, pamphlet drops on households and the most widespread strategy of posters.

Cóir had extensive experience of campaigning against EU referendums in its previous incarnation as Youth Defence.¹⁹⁵ In its reincarnation, *Cóir* broadened out its membership to include individuals not previously associated with Youth Defence, becoming an umbrella group of anti-abortion and fundamentalist Catholic activists

¹⁹¹ *Cóir*, means the Gaelic word for truth, the group was made up of anti-abortion and fundamentalist Catholic campaigners. The Peoples' Movement was a left wing pro trade union and Irish republican group.

¹⁹² Interview with Frank Keoghan, Chairman People's Movement, 31st March 2008; Richard Greene, 'Cóir's anti-Treaty stance has been vindicated by succession of events', *The Irish Examiner*, 4th September 2008.

¹⁹³ Greene, Richard. 'Cóir's anti-Treaty stance has been vindicated by succession of events', *The Irish Examiner*, 4th September 2008.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Frank Keoghan, Chairman People's Movement, 31st March 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Youth Defence was not classified as an EPM as their central focus was on protesting against the introduction of abortion in Ireland, at family planning clinics and in general public awareness campaigns on their cause.

numbering some 2,000 members.¹⁹⁶ Its members broke with the Catholic Church in that they favoured direct action against both individuals and institutions that would allow the legalisation of abortion and gay marriage in Ireland. Their actions centred mostly on holding protest rallies outside family planning clinics and protesting against individual politicians who advocated liberalising laws on abortion and gay marriage.¹⁹⁷ As Youth Defence, the group was ostracised by other anti-EU treaty campaigners for its perceived extreme position on abortion and alleged links to neo-Nazi organisations in Italy.¹⁹⁸ Conscious of the damage these links had on its previous campaign against the Nice rerun, the group changed its name to *Cóir* and avoided direct references to abortion and instead focused specifically on the issue of sovereignty and the loss of Ireland's guaranteed commissioner: "The New EU Won't Hear You, See You or Speak for You" was a typical example of their campaign rhetoric.¹⁹⁹ Here *Cóir* emerges as an interesting example of a civil society group forming an EPM to contest European integration as its original 'brand' was perceived as being too extreme. From the *No to Nice* and Danish *People's Movement* examples it was shown that political parties used EPMs as umbrella organisations to legitimise their Eurosceptic activities with the supposedly non-partisan label of civil society, due to negative public sentiment towards political parties. It appears that civil society groups also have to react to negative public sentiment against them as well by using EPMs.

The *People's Movement*, which began campaigning against the EU at the time of Maastricht, experienced an increase in membership as Labour and Green Party members disaffected at their respective party leaderships' pro-Lisbon stance volunteered to campaign against Lisbon.²⁰⁰ The group's leadership noticed a substantial difference between the Lisbon campaign and previous EU referendum campaigns, due to the numbers of young people volunteering to help the group's activities. The leadership believed this was down to a widely held belief amongst those young people that the type

¹⁹⁶ Greene, 'Cóir's anti-Treaty stance has been vindicated by succession of events'

¹⁹⁷ Edwards, Elaine. 'McDowell heckled at 'civil partnership event'', *The Irish Times*, 26th May 2006.

¹⁹⁸ Scally, Derek. 'Neo-Nazis' affirm links with Youth Defence', *The Irish Times*, 12th October, 2002.

¹⁹⁹ Available at *Cóir* website, http://www.lisbonvote.com/info/POSTER_MONKEYS.pdf, accessed 4th May 2009.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Frank Keoghan, Chairman People's Movement, 31st March 2008.

of Europe that Lisbon was creating was “not the Europe that they had grown up with”.²⁰¹ Their perception was of an inherent neoliberal bias in the policies of the Commission and rulings of ECJ that was at odds with a supposed “social Europe” that existed before. The origins of their campaign against Lisbon, which propelled them to the forefront of Euroscepticism in Ireland, began with a large protest in Dublin in April 2006, when over 30,000 people took to the streets to protest against Irish Ferries firing some 300 Irish workers in favour of cheaper Eastern European labour²⁰². This action, they believed, was sanctioned under EU law. From then on the *People’s Movement* sought to campaign against any future EU treaty on the grounds of protecting workers rights and preventing a “race to the bottom” in terms of working conditions that an expansion of the Single Market or of new EU legislation might bring. The leadership of the *People’s Movement* believed that job losses such as those at Irish Ferries were allowed to happen because Ireland had adopted wholesale neo-liberal “EU economic law” and that the “political class [had] given up the ability [of the Dáil] to challenge such laws” and protect the rights of Irish workers.²⁰³

Cóir and the *People’s Movement* were formed, because they made the connection between the real or imagined threat to their specific issues of interest by the EU institutions and the extension of that threat with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. While the issues that were the founding causes of both groups were specific to the Irish case, it was events at an EU level, the ECJ ruling on the Laval case and the linking of the ECJ to decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights, which caused them to campaign against EU treaties and not just Lisbon. Successive Irish governments used EU law and directives as a highly effective means of bringing in contested legislation, particularly with regard to social and economic liberalisation, without the need to face down entrenched interests at a domestic level.²⁰⁴ Those groups that saw themselves as ‘losers’ of this implementation of EU laws and their enforcement by the ECJ, fundamentalist Catholics and trade unionists, organised themselves into protest

²⁰¹ Ibid. Further confirmed by findings of post vote analysis, see: ‘Poll reveals Lisbon treaty was sunk by young voters’, *The Irish Examiner*, 20th June 2008.

²⁰² O’Connor, Jack. ‘Stronger and better enforced labour regulation is needed’, *The Irish Times*, 10th October 2006.

²⁰³ Interview with Frank Keoghan, Chairman People’s Movement, 31st March 2008.

²⁰⁴ Laffan and O’Mahony, *Ireland and the European Union*, pp. 38-43.

movements outside of their institutionalised ‘parent’ groups to campaign against what they perceived as the source of the attack on their interests, the EU itself.

While the Irish Catholic Church (hereafter referred to as ‘the Church’) and the trade union umbrella group, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, were both in favour of Lisbon, prominent members of both were openly sceptical of the trajectory of European integration that Lisbon represented.²⁰⁵ Open criticism of Lisbon would have earned a severe reprimand to the Church and the Irish trade union movement from the Government as a rejection of the Social Partnership process. Both were members of this process which has been used by the Government to formulate wider economic policy with strong input from both the Church and trade unions. Rejection of this Social Partnership process would have weakened their political hand in full participation of this process which has been extremely beneficial to both. Thus the leadership of the Church and the trade unions could not act on their members’ anger at the impact of participation in European integration on their interests. Active members of the Church and trade unions were left with no other option but to take their campaign into civil society-based protest movements, where both sides received tacit support from their respective established organisations. The general removal of the EU as a contested issue from the party system became apparent at the elite level of Irish civil society, in the leadership of TUs and the Church with the result that ordinary members of both groups formed EPMs to contest European integration.

The coalition organised to secure the ratification of Lisbon, the *Alliance for Europe*, was portrayed as a broad coalition of Church, trade union, business and political parties.²⁰⁶ However this broad coalition appeared to have operated almost exclusively at the elite level of these bodies beyond their ordinary members. The successful actions of *Cóir* and the *People’s Movement* are representative of a long history of rejection of elite-level cues by interest group members on EU referendums in Ireland. It was the massive influx of Eastern European workers and the perception that they were taking Irish jobs from 2004 on that led to a strongly negative working class sentiment towards European integration in Ireland. With the competencies of the EU moving increasingly into new

²⁰⁵ ‘SIPTU to support Lisbon if conditions are met’, *The Irish Examiner*, 31st May 2008.

²⁰⁶ Leahy, Pat. ‘Yes side must now play catch-up’, *The Sunday Business Post*, 4th May, 2008.

areas, the linking of the Lisbon Treaty to the supposedly secular European Convention on Human Rights and the dropping of references to God and Christianity from the European Constitutional Treaty, Ireland's Catholics were mobilised by their fringe elements to reject Lisbon.

What the most recent wave of Irish EPM formation shows is that certain sections in Irish civil society held the perception that it was the EU institutions that impacted negatively on their interests and not simply the Irish government. While both *Cóir* and the *People's Movement* formed to bypass their institutionalised representative interest groups and the Government in their Lisbon campaign, *Libertas* sought to challenge the Government's leadership on the EU in Ireland. *Libertas* acted as a direct challenge to the mainstream political approach to Europe, that of full participation in the current trajectory of European integration, and sought to convince the Irish electorate that "another Europe is possible".²⁰⁷ This in itself is a fascinating example of civil society rejecting both political party and social elite cues. Perhaps even more interesting is the focus on national level contestation despite the European-level nature of the issue. This contradicts directly Imig and Tarrow's argument that groups in civil society from different countries would mobilise together and contest European integration on a specific issue relevant to all of them at the European level.²⁰⁸ The failure of European level mobilisation to develop would appear to be explained by the openness of the political opportunity structure at the national level, in the Irish case referendums, and secondly the sheer organisational difficulty and expense of organising pan-European contestation. As the Irish case illustrates, these two factors push civil society contestation of the EU to the national level.

2.8 Why EPMs Emerged to 'Win' Lisbon

The question remains: how did Irish EPMs emerge to become so effective in comparison to those in the other case studies? Tarrow has long sought to explain why protest movements emerge and take divergent actions across different countries, and his work provides a template by which to examine why Irish EPMs emerged in the form they

²⁰⁷ Interview with Declan Ganley founder and former Chairman of *Libertas*, 14th August, 2008.

²⁰⁸ Imig and Tarrow, "Political contention in a Europeanising polity."

did and helps to answer as to why they became so effective. Tarrow explains that most “opportunities [for protest movements] are situational” and “compensate [...] for weaknesses in cultural, ideological, and organisational resources”.²⁰⁹ Thus it can be seen that not only did EPMs have the repeated “structural opportunity” of a referendum to mobilise around they were also presented with the “situational opportunity” of a disorganised pro-Lisbon side.²¹⁰

The main figures in the *National Platform*, *PANA*, *Cóir*, the *People’s Movement* and other groups had been actively campaigning against European referendums since the Maastricht Treaty, and in relation to a few individuals, since the accession Treaty. This high level of specific experience with European referendums allowed the leadership of the No groups to firstly recognise the structural and situational opportunities that were available to them; and secondly to provide them with the organisational capacity to act decisively on these opportunities.

This experience came to fruition in the first Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign. While the change of Taoiseach was dominating Irish politics in early 2008, No groups were actively campaigning in opposition to the Treaty. The referendum campaign began in December 2007, not when the Taoiseach announced the date of the referendum but when the civil society group *Libertas* began a poster campaign outlining the points on which they believed the Irish public should reject the Lisbon Treaty.²¹¹ Other No groups moved forward with their campaigns to take advantage of the prominence being given to No arguments in the media as well as to prevent *Libertas* from dominating the No side.²¹² Soon after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty these groups knew that a referendum was inevitable and began to organise themselves for a campaign. Both the Catholic *Cóir* and the left wing *People’s Movement* began to organise volunteers to drop leaflets, print and place posters, and hold discussion meetings by February 2008. They engaged in these tactics specifically as they recognised the effectiveness of direct campaigning on the electorate from the success of No to Nice in the first Nice referendum campaign. In contrast to the actions of these No groups, the main Yes campaign, *Alliance for Europe*,

²⁰⁹ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p. 77.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Interview with Naoise Nunn, *Libertas* campaign manager, 14th August 2008.

²¹² Interview Frank Keoghan, Chairman *People’s Movement*, 31st March 2008.

was not formed until late April 2008,²¹³ by which time civil society groups had taken advantage of this situational opportunity and set the agenda of the Lisbon campaign.

Garry et. al. have shown that an early, energetic campaign with a clear message was vital in encouraging mainstream voters to come out and vote Yes after they absented themselves for the first Nice vote.²¹⁴ For the first Nice referendum No voters obviously needed something similar to encourage them to vote No. This was provided by the *No to Nice* group and their simple and coordinated message of Nice being detrimental to Irish neutrality. The issue of neutrality has been described as the “touchstone” issue for the Irish electorate and by using neutrality-based EPMS, anti-Nice political parties were able to tap into this issue with Irish voters and challenge the pro-Nice parties on it. For the first Lisbon referendum the *People’s Movement* and *Cóir* not only motivated their respective sections of Irish society but through their rigorous campaigns ensured that voters were exposed to their arguments for voting No to Lisbon. Added to the strategy of *Libertas* to allow voters of mainstream pro-European parties to feel comfortable in voting No, then the impact of these civil society based anti-Lisbon campaigners can be viewed as very important to the outcome.

While no definitive causal link between the Nice and Lisbon No votes and the activities of *No to Nice*, *Libertas*, *Cóir* and the *People’s Movement* can be conclusively proven, their relevance to each campaign as a whole is without question. The Nice referendum campaign was dominated by the neutrality issue and the government was forced to negotiate an explicit legal guarantee on Irish neutrality from the European Council. The arguments of *No to Nice* were given credence by the preponderance of anti-war and anti-nuclear groups in the campaign, with the political parties involved arguing that they were merely representing the arguments of the civil society groups in the campaign. The issues first articulated by *Libertas* in the first Lisbon referendum campaign formed the basis of the government’s strategy for the next vote on Lisbon.²¹⁵ The poster campaigns of the *People’s Movement* and *Cóir* were the focus of extensive criticism by the mainstream political parties as their effectiveness became apparent.²¹⁶

²¹³ Leahy, ‘Yes side must now play catch-up’.

²¹⁴ Garry et. al., ‘‘Second Order’ versus ‘Issue Voting’ effects in EU Referendums’.

²¹⁵ ‘Government lines up a number of Lisbon opt-outs’, *The Irish Examiner*, 22nd November, 2008.

²¹⁶ ‘Labour criticises ‘alarmist’ no vote poster campaign’, *The Irish Examiner*, 15th May, 2008.

While the *Alliance for Europe* and Government figures were quick to dismiss Sinn Féin and Socialist Party arguments against Lisbon as purely “political opportunism”, they found it much more difficult to refute the claims of civil society based anti-Lisbon campaigners and thus much more difficult to convince the electorate to vote Yes to Lisbon.²¹⁷ The civil society No campaign presented itself as free from political influence and instead focused specifically on the issues they thought important about Lisbon. Unable to accuse them of political opportunism, the Yes side found it difficult to deal with their diverse range of issues.

With the first Lisbon referendum campaign, Irish civil society dominated the No side, pushed anti-Lisbon parties to the side and challenged mainstream political parties leadership on the EU issue in Ireland. They were able to achieve this by utilising campaign tactics honed from the experience of the failures of previous EU referendum campaigns and the success of the *No to Nice* campaign in 2001. The repeated structural opportunity of referendums provided Irish Eurosceptic groups not only with the opportunity to defeat European treaties but also with the opportunity to build experience in both campaigning and organising against European treaties. The situational opportunity of a weak and divided Yes campaign allowed civil society groups unhappy with the impact of European integration on their interests, to take full advantage of the structural opportunity of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and to campaign successfully for its rejection. In essence Irish EPMs did not ‘emerge’ to ‘win’ Lisbon they were in hibernation from their previous incarnations in the first and second Nice referendum campaigns. As emphasised in this section, the knowledge that a referendum on the next EU treaty was guaranteed to be held meant that individuals could close down their EPM after Nice and re-form it before the next referendum with a specific name and focus to oppose that new treaty. The continued use of referendums to ratify Irish participation in European integration allowed individuals to build up skills and expertise in campaigning and of their knowledge of the EU in general. Those opportunities allowed for both repeated EPM formation and the creation of highly effective anti-Treaty referendum campaigns.

²¹⁷ Sweeney, Connor. ‘Mandelson criticises Lisbon Yes campaign’, *The Irish Times*, 20th June, 2008.

Irish EPMs successfully contested Irish EU policy outside the strict confines of the political system. This is different from the Danish Maastricht example, where it was anti-Maastricht political parties that negotiated the opt-outs and not EPMs. The arguments of Irish EPMs were used by the government in the immediate post-Nice I and post-Lisbon I periods to resolve the effects of each No vote. While the extent of the actual policy changes affected by the Irish EPMs was debatable, their actions nevertheless forced the government into policy straitjackets on a number of key issues such as neutrality and social issues.²¹⁸

Third Section: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

For Irish EPMs gaining access to the media was not a problem. Coverage was given to their press launches and they had occasional articles published in the main newspapers. They all believed, however, that the media editorialised against them and were strongly biased in favour of the pro-EU/treaty side. There were strong similarities with the Danish case where ostensibly the media gave coverage to EPM campaigners but EPMs were of the strong opinion that editorials urged Yes votes or pro-EU support, implicitly dismissed Eurosceptic arguments and gave far more coverage to pro-EU advocates.

A perception of pervasive pro-EU coverage in the media by individuals involved in EPMs did indeed play a role in the formation of Irish EPMs. In a similar manner to UK EPMs they felt that the real facts of the impact of European integration in Ireland – workers' rights, ECJ rulings, the reduction of Irish neutrality, Franco-German dominance of the EU – were not reported in the Irish media and that they had a duty to inform the Irish people of what they saw as the negative reality of Irish EU membership.

²¹⁸ Interview with Dr. Paul Gillespie, former international editor of The Irish Times, 29 September 2010.

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

EPMs mobilised to contest accession in 1973 were formed despite the presence of anti-accession political parties such as Labour and Sinn Féin. Irish EPMs clearly emerged despite the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system. As the level of Euroscepticism in the party system declined EPMs became increasingly influential, to such an extent that smaller Eurosceptic political parties associated themselves with EPMs, such as *No to Nice*. As the number of Eurosceptic parties in parliament continued to decline, with the Greens no longer advocating a No vote, the number of EPMs increased even further. Those members and voters who perceived themselves to be negatively affected by European integration became involved in Eurosceptic circles providing increasing levels of resources, both financial and human, that made EPM formation more feasible and their campaigns more successful.

Irish EPMs were formed due to the ideological incompatibility of party-based Euroscepticism with civil society-based Eurosceptics who formed social movements to avoid association with domestic politics. EPM formation also allowed members of formerly Eurosceptic parties to contest the EU. The level of Euroscepticism in the party system was clearly important to the formation of Irish EPMs.

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The history of Irish-EU relations is dominated by the eight referendums on the EU. Their importance in the formation of EPMs is obvious. EPMs were first mobilised to contest the onset of negotiations between Ireland and the EU, and then to contest the accession referendum. When it became apparent that the then government was going to pass the SEA without holding a referendum, an EPM was formed to challenge the government and force the holding of a referendum. Since then, EPMs have repeatedly formed to contest specific referendums and disband after the vote, only for the same individuals to come together for the following referendum and form a new EPM to contest European integration.

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

The most successful engagement of Irish EPMs in the Irish policy process was their use of the court system. The courts found in EPM activists' favour in two very important decisions that levelled the playing field distinctly to their advantage. This made contesting EU policy much easier for EPMs. Firstly, it forced the government to hold referendums. Secondly, it ensured that the government could not spend the full resources of the state solely on a Yes vote, and would in fact have to give equal coverage to No arguments in the public media and official government documents on EU referendums. Both of these factors proved extremely valuable in providing EPMs with a national platform from which to articulate their arguments.

While the Irish electoral system has the potential to be favourable to individuals and non-established parties,²¹⁹ electoral politics has been dominated by the three mainstream pro-EU parties. Those few Eurosceptic individuals and parties that made it through the electoral system were faced by executive dominance in the Dáil of the strictest Westminster sort, where any form of meaningful contestation of European integration is prevented. The contrast between the closed nature of the Dáil and the openness of the referendum system in accommodating dissenting views on the EU means that Eurosceptic activity was channelled into contesting referendums rather than the party system. EPM formation was greatly aided by the openness of the judiciary and their interpretation of the Irish constitution. The closed nature of the Irish parliament, however, also played a role in EPM formation. This interaction of EPMs with the Irish policy-making process provides an important example of the potential influence of constitutions' on the openness of the policy-making process. Indeed, the Irish system has been characterised as very similar to the UK policy making process with the important exception of a written constitution.²²⁰ While ostensibly lacking the electoral system constraints of the UK, the ineffectiveness of the Irish parliament relevant to executive dominance is similar to that of the UK. The Irish codified constitution, with specific

²¹⁹ With no minimum vote threshold required for entry into parliament, multi-seat constituencies and the PR:STV voting system.

²²⁰ Laffan, Brigid and O'Mahony, Jane (2007). 'Managing Europe from an Irish Perspective: Critical Junctures and the Increasing Formalization of the Core Executive in Ireland', *Public Administration*, 85: 1, p. 169.

provisions for the use of referendums and references to limitations on the foreign policy-making power of the government, proved to be a vital component of the policy-making process. Irish EPMs were able to exploit this access point to the policy-making process to full effect by forcing the government to hold referendums and open up the policy process further. The openness of the Irish policy process therefore did indeed encourage EPM formation but within the specific context of the Irish constitution. The closed nature of the political policy process was also an important factor in EPM formation.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

For the most part resources were not a factor in EPM formation. The early EPMs relied mostly on the intellectual power of their members as academics, economists and barristers as their main resource. As the Eurosceptic movement in Ireland matured and more individuals became involved, the main resource became the number of ordinary members. The *People's Movement* and in particular *Cóir* were able to use their large numbers of volunteers to steal a significant march on pro-Lisbon campaigners to pursue a very successful campaign. The presence of a potential membership willing and able to campaign did play a role in the formation of certain EPMs. This was particularly the case with the *People's Movement*, for whom the level of inquiry from TU officials and Labour party members about campaigning against the EU ensured that the movement would be founded to contest the next EU referendum held. The grassroots nature of both movements allowed them to exploit these human resources and have a wide geographic base in relation to their organisational strength. In this regard, the role of resources in EPM formation is typical of the movements represented in the wider literature on social movements. Irish EPMs relied on human and organizational resources to mobilize and contest European integration. The Irish case does also have the relatively isolated example of *Libertas* which relied wholesale on the resources of millionaire Declan Ganley. *Libertas* is a clear example of an EPM relying almost solely on financial resources for its formation. In the social movement literature such examples are rare, and indeed *Libertas* were an outlier with their financial resources in the Irish case.

2.9 Main Conclusions from the Irish Case

The Irish case emerges as something of an ideal type for EPMs to form, with all of the propositions in evidence to a fairly significant degree. The level of Euroscepticism in the Irish party system declined with each passing decade and the number of EPMs increased as anti-EU sentiment removed itself from the Dáil. With the Irish political system dominated by three parties, who from the late 1980s on held the same general position as regards European integration, the level of Euroscepticism in the party system would inevitably play a role in EPM formation. With the added presence of multiple referendums, EPM formation in Ireland was largely driven by the two powerful factors of a low level of Euroscepticism in the party system and the presence of multiple referendums. What this chapter has found is that Irish EPMs were able to take full advantage of the relative openness of the political opportunity structure to firstly form and secondly to contest European integration. Resource mobilisation was not an explicitly important factor but more subtle resources such as experience of campaigning and human resources also played a role in EPM formation.

Perhaps the most interesting element of this chapter on EPMs is how the vast majority of EPMs accepted Irish membership of the EU. Only extreme hard left groups, associated with political parties, notably the Socialist Party and the Workers' Party, opposed Irish membership²²¹. By the time of the Nice Treaty in 2001 amongst EPMs there was a wider acceptance of membership. This was driven by an appreciation that there was overwhelming public support for Irish membership of the EU and that a withdrawalist platform was at odds with this reality. Once accession had been decisively passed at referendum and positive public opinion toward the EU increased by the mid-1980s, advocating an anti-membership position was not viable for EPMs. Instead, new EPMs were formed that changed the focus of the contestation toward specific issues that they believed negatively affected their constituency, be that trade unionists, Catholics or global justice activists. In many respects this has led to them being the most successful example discussed in this thesis. Instead of advocating withdrawal or a dramatically changed relationship with the EU as in the other case studies, from Amsterdam on they began articulating specific critiques of the EU Treaty in question. When treaties were

²²¹ And even with that they espoused a form of European integration based on socialist principles.

rejected at referendums this put them in an incredibly strong position, as the onus was not on the government to secure a complete renegotiation of the Treaty but to secure explicit guarantees or legally binding agreements on very specific issues. For Nice this was related to neutrality, and although *PANA* and others still opposed the second Nice Treaty, they loudly trumpeted their success in getting these concessions in the first place. Similarly, after the first Lisbon referendum the opt-outs negotiated by the government were the main points first articulated by the three main EPMs. This shows the difference between successful and unsuccessful issue framing. Despite similar members and similar reasons for forming campaigns, pre-Nice EPMs were not effective, as they framed their issues of contestation in terms of withdrawing from European integration. As they shifted their issue framing significantly to adapt to the specific concerns of the public, they were able to put forward arguments that strongly resonated with the Irish public and forced the pro-EU parties to engage directly on these arguments. They succeeded where other small EU member states failed by securing a guaranteed commissioner for each member state.

Chapter 3: The UK Case²²²

3.1 Introduction

Euroscepticism is synonymous with the UK to such an extent that leading scholars hold the default position that any comparative study of Euroscepticism that includes the UK will find that the depth and pervasiveness of opposition to European integration is of the greatest magnitude in the UK.²²³ In the context of this study this assumption is no different, as the UK case emerges as having the greatest number of EPMS espousing the hardest degree of Euroscepticism, that of complete withdrawal from the EU.

The academic literature on UK Euroscepticism has almost wholly ignored EPMS, focusing heavily instead on the UK party system and public opinion. The two party system and the electoral system,²²⁴ international relations²²⁵ and socio-cultural²²⁶ factors have been highlighted as a means of explaining high levels of UK opposition to European integration. On the surface these approaches appear sensible as the UK had a major openly Eurosceptic party, no referendums on Europe since 1975 and media that was seen to be hostile to European integration. Despite these three factors that ought to negate the presence of EPMS, the UK emerges as an example of widespread EPM formation. Usherwood located twenty-four in the period 1985-2000;²²⁷ similarly Gray located twenty-four in the period 1999-2002.²²⁸ Comparing this to the two in Estonia and Denmark and the seven in Ireland in a relatively similar time period, it can be seen that there were specific factors related to the UK that led to a far higher degree of EPM formation.

²²² The focus of this chapter is the national electoral system base in Westminster and not the devolved assemblies. It is also interesting to note that no regional based EPMS (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) have been located.

²²³ Aspinwall, Mark (2004). *Rethinking Britain and Europe: plurality elections, party management and British policy on European integration*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Wallace, William (2005). 'The Collapse of British Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, 81: 1, pp. 53-68.

²²⁶ George. 'Britain', pp. 15-33.

²²⁷ Usherwood, *Beyond Party Politics*, p. 92.

²²⁸ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 14.

The electorally successful Eurosceptic parties, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Conservative Party (Conservatives), held both hard and soft Eurosceptic positions²²⁹ respectively.²³⁰ There should be little motivation for EPMs to form, given the diverse range of Eurosceptic discourse that was present in the UK political system, and where soft Euroscepticism has, to all intents and purposes, become a mainstream position. Despite this, the overwhelming presence of Euroscepticism in the UK party system appears not to have discouraged EPMs to form but, as will be shown, actively played a significant role in *causing* them to form. What the UK case shows is that the presence of Euroscepticism in the mainstream party system did not prevent the formation of Euroscepticism in civil society groups. This contradicts one of the propositions outlined in the first chapter and the findings from the other case studies. This chapter will highlight the causal factors that underlie these differences between the UK and the other case studies.

There must be factors beyond the immediate Euroscepticism in the UK party system that cause such high levels of EPM formation. Examining UK public opinion towards the EU will give an insight into how Eurosceptic UK political parties do not represent the attitudes of the public at large. There is a significant gap between the two and this space allowed EPMs to emerge and be successful. The UK on average is the least enthusiastic member state when it came to perceptions of EU membership ‘as a good thing’ since joining in 1973 (see *Figure 4.2* below). The UK public is more receptive towards leaving the EU than any other electorate, least identified with the EU and has the least trust in the EU. Given this level of public opposition to European integration it can be argued that far from the party system being Eurosceptic, it is in fact failing to represent the levels of public opposition to European integration. Hence the wider support for the emergence of EPMs can be understood.

With only one referendum on the EU in 1975, UK political parties were able to avoid facing this Eurosceptic public opinion in a direct vote on the EU issue for a

²²⁹ As per Szczerbiak and Taggart’s definition of hard and soft Euroscepticism. See: Taggart and Szczerbiak, ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe’.

²³⁰ See Appendix III for a table on UK election results showing % vote and seat numbers for the major parties. Also see Appendix IV for a table on UK European Parliamentary election results showing % vote and seat numbers and more relevantly the recent success of UKIP.

substantial period of time, unlike the other case studies. Ireland, Denmark and Estonia have shown that referendums not only become the focus of EPM formation and activity but also force each respective national party system to engage the public directly on the EU. The lack of referendums on Europe in the UK did not prevent EPM formation. Rather it resulted in the formation of EPMs to campaign for a referendum on the EU to be held in the first place. In the UK the holding or not holding of referendums has become a focus of mobilisation for EPMs. Moreover, examining the UK's experience of held and 'un-held' EU referendums shows that the referendums themselves became contested as much as national participation in European integration is.

This cumulative level of opposition towards European integration led George to label the UK as a "Eurosceptic State", as he saw the ingrained nature of hostility to the EU across the UK party system, civil service, media, history and ultimately its people.²³¹ Despite this apparent pervasiveness of Euroscepticism, EPMs still emerged from civil society to contest the EU. This chapter will ultimately conclude as to why EPMs emerged in such large numbers despite the UK being a "Eurosceptic state".

First Section: Overview of UK Politics and EU Relations

3.2 The UK Party System and Europe

In the immediate post-war period, as European leaders engaged in negotiations that were the beginning of European integration, the UK was a disengaged observer. Alongside these developments at the European level, opposition to European integration emerged in the UK. While classical left- and right-wing critiques were used to dismiss the prospect of UK membership, the central anti-membership narrative from leading figures on both the left and right was one of opposition on historical and cultural grounds. Former leader of the Labour party Hugh Gaitskill rejected participation as throwing away "a thousand years of history",²³² while leader of the Conservatives Winston Churchill argued that Britain's future lay with the US and the British Empire, not with Europe.²³³

²³¹ George, 'Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State', p. 13

²³² Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 132.

²³³ Ibid, p.79.

Non-participation in the beginning of European integration by both Conservative- and Labour-led governments was based on the post-war UK policy of alignment with the US and a focus on the British Empire. There was a common belief among the UK political elite that the shattered states of Western Europe needed to form an organisation but that the UK did not need to be involved, given its relationships with the US and the British Empire, relationships informed by the twin bonds of culture and history. Churchill was strongly supportive of initial European cooperation, with his government hosting many international conferences on the issue, but he was equally steadfast in his opposition to UK involvement in it.²³⁴ From the beginning of European integration the UK stood apart from it, regarding it as an organization for the defeated European states while the UK chose to focus on its own foreign policy priorities. Ten years later in the 1950s, however, the UK economy was stagnant while Europe experienced a post-war ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ of rapid post-war economic expansion. By this time a pro-EU membership argument began to emerge, based on the necessity for UK participation in European integration for the survival of the UK economy.²³⁵

This argument eventually formed the basis for the UK’s first formal application to join in 1961. At the time party discipline prevented any widespread opposition to the process of applying for membership. Both the Labour and the Conservative leaderships were agreed on the economic necessity of membership of the Common Market as the EU averaged annual growth of 4.7% between 1950 and 1971 compared to the average 1.4% annual UK economic growth at this time.²³⁶ As the Empire began to rapidly break up and the US focused on competition with the Soviet Union, participation in European integration became an imperative for the UK political elite.²³⁷ In opposition to the growing elite consensus in favour of EU membership, a handful of prominent members of each party, such as Enoch Powell and Tony Benn were public in their criticism of

²³⁴ Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’, p. 66.

²³⁵ Eichengreen, Barry and Vasquez, Pablo (2000). ‘Institutions and Economic Growth in Post-War Europe: Evidence and Conjectures’, Bart Van Ark et. al. (eds.), *Productivity, technology and economic growth*, Boston: Kluwer, p. 96.

²³⁶ Ibid, p. 95.

²³⁷ Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’, p. 66.

membership – though their positions were more in line with party membership thinking than that of the party leadership.²³⁸

After a decade of French vetoing of UK membership, the UK joined in 1973. This divide between political elite support for membership and wider ordinary party membership rejection of the EU deepened during this time. This was compounded by public support being 2:1 against membership from the late 1960s to 1975. To resolve this conflict the Labour party included an election manifesto promise to hold a referendum on continued British membership of the Common Market, which they held less than a year after the October 1974 election on June 5th 1975. The referendum campaign saw the pitting together of left-wing trade unionists and senior Labour MPs (Foot, Benn); and right-wing Conservative MPs (Powell, Joseph) together against the referendum. Prime Minister (PM) Wilson suspended collective cabinet responsibility and allowed senior Labour party members and officials to campaign as they saw fit. This was almost wholly due to the majority of ordinary Labour members being against membership and Wilson's wish to prevent party members explicitly voting against the leadership's position, thereby creating a split in the party. The Conservatives meanwhile were largely in favour of joining at both the leadership and party membership level. There were opponents to the party line on the hard right, led by Powell, who opposed largely over sovereignty issues, but the splitting of Labour over the issue convinced the majority of Conservative party officials and members to support the party line.²³⁹

The pro-membership argument was fundamentally one of economics, as continued Common Market membership was seen as vital to supporting the then struggling UK economy. Questions over the threat to national sovereignty and damage to UK industry were the basis of the anti-membership side's argument. The debate hinged on the benefits or drawbacks of common market membership for the UK economy, and only to a far lesser extent on the ceding of national sovereignty to 'Europe'.²⁴⁰ The question was put as: "Do you think the UK should stay in the European Community (Common Market)?" The electorate said Yes by a majority of over 2:1 (67% to 33%).

²³⁸ George, 'Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State', pp. 17-19.

²³⁹ Aspinwall, *Rethinking Britain and Europe*, p. 66.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 74-5.

This result was a reversal of opinion polls which showed a 2:1 majority against further UK participation in European integration.²⁴¹

Through the late 1970s and early 1980s the dominant Conservative party was relatively positively disposed towards European integration. This was largely due to the success of the SEA and its drive to create a true single market that removed all barriers to trade between member states, which even PM Margaret Thatcher acknowledged as a positive for the UK economy. On the other ideological side the development of the Single Market was anathema to Labour, which held a hard socialist position. This staunch Labour opposition to European integration also contributed towards the positive European policy of the Conservatives at this time. Labour opposition to membership reached its zenith in its 1983 election manifesto, which called for unequivocal UK withdrawal from the EU²⁴². The basis of this policy was a socialist critique of the single market. Specifically that as a capitalist project it damaged workers rights and undermined British industry. UK participation in European integration was contradictory to the socialist policies of the Labour party at the time and withdrawal was considered a necessity to achieve these policies outside of the liberalising influence of the EU.²⁴³

The EU policy positions of both parties slowly reversed, however, a change that was symbolised by the reaction of each party to two speeches made by two individuals who came to characterise the European debate in Britain from the late 1980s on. Firstly, Margaret Thatcher made a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988 in which she outlined her opposition to the path that she believed European integration was proceeding. While praising European integration for removing barriers to trade she singled out the dangers of increasing federalism and regulation by the European institutions as a threat to the sovereignty of member states. The speech was followed by the launch of several EPMs and anti-EU think tanks, most importantly the eponymous *Bruges Group*.²⁴⁴ These groups will be discussed in more detail but it is important to note this time period as the starting point and intellectual basis of concerted and organised right-wing critiques of European integration. Secondly, European Commission

²⁴¹ Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, pp. 212-3.

²⁴² The Labour Party (1983). *The New Hope for Britain*, Labour Party election manifesto.

²⁴³ George, 'Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State', p. 24.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

President Jacques Delors made a speech to the Trade Union Council (TUC) a few months after Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech, in 1988 in Bournemouth. In this speech he argued that the development of a single market would also be accompanied by a pan-European charter of workers' rights to be enforced at the supranational European level. Faced with a free market, anti-union Conservative government and Labour seemingly incapable of winning national elections, the Delors proposals were strongly endorsed by the TUC as a means of achieving trade union policy goals in the UK through by-passing the national government. This change in position by the trade unions in favour of European integration quickly came to be represented in changed Labour party policy towards the EU.²⁴⁵

The Conservatives, who had since MacMillan been seen as the party of Europe, moved gradually to a Eurosceptic stance as party policy followed Thatcher's Bruges speech which accepted pro-market reforms but strenuously objected to proposals identified as moves towards European federalism. Labour which had historically been the most divided and opposed to the removal of barriers to European trade, moved towards a pro-EU policy position. Delors' provisions for a social Europe with a strong emphasis on workers' rights came up against growing Conservative criticism of Europe, which encouraged Labour to strategically, but no less ideologically, move to a more pro-EU position.²⁴⁶

Following on from Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was a crucial mobilising factor for Euroscepticism in the UK²⁴⁷. The creeping federalisation that Thatcher warned about in her Bruges speech was believed to have become incarnate in the new 'European Union' that was launched with the Maastricht Treaty. The creation of a 'Union', single currency and social Europe, negated the benefits of a single market in the minds of Conservatives and formed the basis of Conservative opposition to various EU policies.²⁴⁸ With this creation of "Delors' social Europe", Labour Party members and Eurosceptics on the left began to soften in their opposition and indeed became active pro-Europeans, due to a realisation that progressive

²⁴⁵ Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, pp. 242-3

²⁴⁶ Bulmer, Simon (2008). 'New Labour, New European Policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian Supranationalism', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 61: 4, p. 598.

²⁴⁷ Usherwood, *Beyond Party Politics*, pp. 136-7.

²⁴⁸ Gowland and Turner, *Reluctant Europeans*, p. 289.

social and workplace legislation could be brought into the UK through the EU level. Since then opposition to the EU amongst the left has significantly weakened compared to the 1975 campaign and became concentrated amongst the hard left, such as former minister Tony Benn and the RMT Union.²⁴⁹ These developments meant that the left and right switched positions as the left came to hold a broadly pro-EU position and the right became associated with a more Eurosceptic position.²⁵⁰ As each party became more clearly associated with each position, it became reinforcing, due to party identification as much as a genuine ideological shift in each party's position. Such a development fits in neatly with the Hooghe-Marks model of a shift in patterns of Euroscepticism from left to right as European integration evolves beyond the single market and into more social policies.²⁵¹ But as Hooghe et. al. put forward, the long-term effects of this shift are not known. The UK offers an example of how political parties react to shifting patterns in competition on European integration by gradually reducing the salience of the issue.

The convulsions in the Conservative party, due to disagreements over the change to a more Eurosceptical policy have been well documented.²⁵² Notwithstanding their leading to the ousting of Margaret Thatcher as PM in 1990, they continued to plague the Major government from 1990-97 as the party became fractured over Major's Maastricht Treaty policy. The Maastricht Treaty became the point at which opposition to Europe became effectively mobilised at the political, EPM and public opinion level. More relevant for the party system, and to explain how Euroscepticism evolves beyond the Hooghe-Marks model, is that Bale and Bulmer both point to Maastricht as a motivator for Labour's desire to "reduce the electoral salience of Europe"²⁵³ a policy which was belatedly followed by the Conservatives after the 2005 election.²⁵⁴ Despite Labour coming to power with a promise to "give Britain leadership in Europe",²⁵⁵ analysis of the Blair government's EU policy has shown that this was true at the supranational level but

²⁴⁹ National union of Rail, Maritime and Transport workers.

²⁵⁰ Aspinwall, *Rethinking Britain and Europe*, p. 72.

²⁵¹ Hooghe et. al., 'Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?', pp. 985-6.

²⁵² Berrington, Hugh and Hague, Rod (1998). 'Europe, Thatcherism and traditionalism: Opinion, rebellion and the Maastricht treaty in the backbench conservative party, 1992-1994', *West European Politics*, 21: 1, pp. 44-71.

²⁵³ Bulmer, *New Labour, New European Policy?*, p. 617.

²⁵⁴ Bale, 'Between a Soft and a Hard Place?', p. 394.

²⁵⁵ The Labour Party (1997). *New Labour, because Britain deserves better*, Labour Party election manifesto.

not at the national political level or in the UK public sphere.²⁵⁶ In this regard the Labour government pursued the party's and the national interest in a 'normal' member state fashion at the supranational level²⁵⁷ but actively suppressed internal party debate and avoided public engagement on Europe.²⁵⁸ The Conservatives, on the other hand, pursued a strongly anti-EU line for the 2001 election, where the party made a reversal of the government's policy on the Euro one of their key election priorities; the week before polling day they held a large media launch to announce that Britain had 'seven days to save the pound'.²⁵⁹ For the 2005 election they avoided Europe but similarly focused on immigration and asylum as issues they perceived they were stronger on rather than on "bread and butter issues".²⁶⁰ But for the 2010 election Europe was almost wholly missing from the election campaign as concerns over the economy and the growing budget deficit took precedence. Just as rapidly as the EU became one of the central issues in UK politics in the early 1990s up to the early 2000s, it disappeared again by the end of the 2000s. While ostensibly Labour appeared pro-European and the Conservatives Eurosceptic, at the elite party level a new consensus emerged to avoid discussions on Europe as much as possible.²⁶¹ This approach appears to have had a profound effect on public opinion in the UK towards Europe, with the issue dropping into statistical insignificance amongst the public by 2010 (see: *Figure 3.2*).

Public opinion on political leadership of the EU issue (see: *Figure 3.1*) supported the parties' position of avoiding the issue altogether. This was because it appeared to be closely linked to the electoral fortunes of each party. The tremendous 16% increase in support for Labour's European policy in 1997, and 4% increase in 2001 over the Conservatives were obviously linked to the elections of both years. As the next section will show, public opinion in favour of membership at this time was declining and ought to have favoured the Conservative's Eurosceptic EU policy more. This dissonance between voters' preference on the EU and their preference for each party's EU policy convinced parties that the internal party factionalism caused by the EU was not

²⁵⁶ Bulmer, *New Labour, New European Policy?*, p. 598.

²⁵⁷ Such as adoption of the Social Chapter, JHA cooperation, opt outs from CSFP etc.

²⁵⁸ Bulmer, *New Labour, New European Policy?*, p. 615.


²⁵⁹ Bale, p. 388.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ Bale, 'Between a Soft and a Hard Place?', p. 394.; Bulmer 'New Labour, New European Policy?', pp. 597-8.

commensurate with votes received or not received on the basis of their EU policy. Both the Conservatives and Labour had a policy of avoiding the EU issue, as they were confused about what EU policy voters wanted and were not willing to pay the price of internal party discord to find out. Beyond electoral politics and examining what the UK case shows about the Hooghe-Marks model is that once the shift from left- to right-wing based Euroscepticism is complete, the next shift in party positions towards the EU is to ignore the issue altogether.

Figure 3.1: % of UK Public identifying party with best policies on the Europe issue



Source: Ipsos MORI (2010), *Issues Facing Britain Index April 2010*.

This section has shown that the UK's relationship with European integration was closely related to that of its party system with the EU. In contrast to Ireland and Estonia where party positions on the EU were almost wholly similar, there were dramatic differences in EU positions between both of the main parties. At the beginning of European integration both the Conservatives and Labour were equally opposed to membership. As the economic necessity of membership became more apparent, the Conservatives pushed strongly for participation and became the default party of Europe as opposed to a divided and largely Eurosceptic Labour party. With the advent of a

social Europe in the late 1980s, Labour became more pro-EU and the Conservatives began to move toward a more strongly critical stance. These positions reached their zenith in the early 2000s with Labour advocating Euro membership and the Conservatives advocating withdrawal from many EU policies. Following this period of competition on the EU issue both parties did their best to avoid public discussion of the EU.

3.3 The UK and Referendums on Europe

The UK held one referendum on Europe, in 1975. The referendum was held by Labour PM Wilson as part of an election promise to assuage Labour Eurosceptics after their opposition to the UK joining the EU in 1973 without holding a referendum. Wilson and the majority of senior members of the cabinet were in favour of membership but ordinary party membership was strongly against.²⁶² Holding a free referendum vote was the political escape route for the Labour party leadership to avoid a damaging split over Europe. The first and only referendum on Europe in the UK was not the pre-accession public endorsement of political-elite negotiated EU membership that has been held in each of the non-original six accession states (apart from Bulgaria and Romania). It was more a party-political settlement to deal with internal party elite/member divisions over Europe. Here, there are some similarities with the Danish case, as the referendum served as a ‘release valve’ for internal party pressure. The negative impact of the 1975 referendum on Labour unity was profound. Elite Labour cues were decisively ignored, with the Cabinet’s Yes recommendation being rejected at the 1975 party conference by 3.74 million to 1.99 million votes²⁶³. Though a clear 67% majority of the electorate voted Yes to continued membership, internal Labour opposition to European integration remained. The implication was that a referendum had not sufficed to quell party divisions over Europe, and so, given the non-constitutional need for one, there was no point in holding another.

This situation changed following Labour’s electoral breakthrough in 1997, PM Blair sought to change the previous cautious Conservative policy towards Europe to a

²⁶² Leduc, Lawrence (2005). ‘Saving the Pound or Voting for Europe? Expectations for Referendums on the Constitution and the Euro’, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 15: 2, p. 170.

²⁶³ Ibid, p. 70.

more positive position. This included open acceptance of joining European Monetary Union (EMU).²⁶⁴ Given the strength of the Labour electoral victory and both party and personal approval ratings Blair put forward the policy of holding a referendum on membership of the Euro.²⁶⁵ as *Figure 3.1*, shows the public endorsed this policy in the immediate post-1997 election period. This was a factor of formation for the *Business for Sterling* EPM, as it launched with the goal of turning public opinion against Euro membership so as to encourage the government *not* to hold a referendum.²⁶⁶ This is an overlooked element of the UK's relationship with Europe – that the holding of referendums on Europe became as much a contested issue as the subject of the referendums themselves. The failure of successive Labour governments to hold an EU referendum by the mid-2000s was to emerge as a central cause of formation for EPMs, alongside that of opposition to European integration.

Following on from EMU, the Constitutional Treaty (that re-emerged as the Lisbon Treaty) became the focus of Eurosceptic opposition. The main issue of contestation was not the content of either Treaty but rather that the British public did not get an opportunity to vote on either. Both the Conservative and Labour parties promised to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. But once that was replaced by the Lisbon treaty PM Brown refused to hold a referendum on it and instead it was passed by a vote in parliament. Had such a referendum been rejected, it would have not just simply endangered the passing of the Lisbon Treaty but would also have damaged the UK–EU relationship itself.²⁶⁷ One group of Eurosceptic campaigners sought not merely to campaign against British membership of the EU and specific policies but also for a referendum on EU treaties as they believed it would serve as a proxy for a referendum on British membership of the EU.²⁶⁸ The other group of Eurosceptic campaigners sought a referendum not for the UK to leave the EU but to secure a No vote that would serve as the basis to secure opt-outs on a range of EU policies (the pre-Maastricht position).²⁶⁹

²⁶⁴ Bulmer, *New Labour, New European Policy?*, p. 601.

²⁶⁵ The Labour Party, *New Labour, because Britain deserves better*.

²⁶⁶ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

²⁶⁷ Stephens, Philip 'A dispiriting return to Europe's trenches', *Financial Times*, 14th January 2008.

²⁶⁸ Interview with Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June 2010.

²⁶⁹ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

Referendums were a central component of the UK's relationship with the EU. The presence of the Referendum Party in the 1997 general election and the role they played in the policy debate on the EU in the 1990s is evidence of this. The party was formed in 1994 as a non-political single issue party, on the basis that the UK public had been cut out of the EU policy decision making process. Its presence forced the two main political parties to take a position on the holding of a referendum on further UK membership of the EU.²⁷⁰ The Conservatives and Labour avoided a direct referendum on membership and instead both promised a referendum on the specific issue of EMU membership. Initially the party was successful in attracting a wide base of support beyond its Conservative Peer founder, Lord Goldsmith, to the left and also to some pro-Europeans. This was due to the original argument of addressing the lack of democracy in the EU policy process, which appealed to some pro-Europeans who wanted a direct mandate for continued UK participation in European integration. Closer to the election date the party adopted a hard Eurosceptic stance based on nationalist arguments and focused less on the democratic element of their platform. This alienated left wing supporters and concentrated its support on the right.²⁷¹ Though the electoral impact of the Referendum Party was negated by the Labour landslide, its ultimate legacy was to reinforce the link between European integration and referendums in the policy of the Conservatives and Labour. Its greatest impact was on the Conservatives, where the migration of backbench and benefactor support to the Referendum Party meant that the Conservative leadership was left in no doubt as to the dangers of a pro-EU policy or a lack of commitment to hold an EU referendum on party discipline. From this point on, a policy of holding a referendum on involvement in specific EU policies (EMU being chief amongst them) was adopted by the party. This was in contrast to both Thatcher and Major (before 1997) who rejected such a position as detrimental to the party leadership structure.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Carter, 'Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party', p. 479.


²⁷¹ Heath, Anthony et. al. (1998). 'Euroscepticism and the referendum party', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 8: 1, p. 110.

²⁷² Carter et. al., 'Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party', pp. 480-4.

3.4 UK Public Opinion and European Integration

With such significant political energy expended on avoiding a referendum, UK public opinion was obviously important in understanding why the political parties were reluctant to hold them. Investigating UK public opinion on European integration requires a high degree of nuance with the question of EU support being not one of “pro and anti, but rather [one of] widespread indifference or uncertainty”.²⁷³ As can be seen from *Figure 3.2* the EU was no longer thought of as a relevant issue by the UK public. Though the level of importance assigned to the European issue by the UK public was at times highly volatile, the overall trend in support has been resolutely downwards since early 2000. In 2001 Europe was amongst the top five issues of importance of the day, but by late 2005 Europe was not even listed as amongst the top eleven issues of most importance facing Britain. This decline continued, so that by the start of 2010 1% of the UK public listed Europe as an important issue, well within the statistical margin of error.²⁷⁴

Figure 3.2: % of UK public identifying Europe as an important issue facing the country



Source: IPSOS Mori, *Issues facing Britain index: April 2010*


From *Figure 3.2* extreme peaks of interest in Europe, such as late 1999, early 2004, and mid 2005 are clearly noticeable. These peaks occur at times of critical activity

²⁷³ Usherwood, ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK’. p. 216.

²⁷⁴ Ipsos MORI (2010). *Issues Facing Britain Index April 2010*.

at the EU level. Potential UK membership of the Euro in late 1999, the accession of the Central and East European Countries in 2004, the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, each led to a spike in public awareness of the EU; though they were just as quickly followed by declines. This suggests that events at the European level were once noticed by UK voters and their importance to the UK appreciated but by the end of the 2000s this was no longer the case. The Conservatives and UKIP both attempted to make the failure to hold a referendum on Lisbon a major political issue during 2007 but it hardly registered by the UK electorate: an example of how the European issue had collapsed in salience by the late 2000s.

Figure 3.3: UK public opinion % agreeing that UK membership of EU is a 'good thing' and % disagree that UK membership of the EU is a 'good thing'.



Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 1 – No. 74.

It can be clearly seen that the European issue came to be ignored by the vast majority of the UK public. What made the low salience of the EU issue in the UK different to that in other member states was that it was compounded by a lower overall level of support for membership of the EU, as *Figure 3.3* shows, in comparison to the EU average. This failure appears to have fed into a negative perception of Europe. Again

from *Figure 3.3*, positivity towards the EU was highly volatile at times, with variances closely related to trends in public opinion across the EU. This can be seen in the increase in support at the time of the completion of the Single Market in the late 1980s, and the various drops in support at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, proposed Euro membership and accession of the CEECs. Academic work on public opinion has tended to focus on the headline figures of support for a country's membership of the EU, contrasting it to other member states and extrapolating from the difference between the two whether a country is Eurosceptic or not.²⁷⁵ Contrasting the Eurobarometer Autumn 2009 79% support from the Irish public for membership to the 30% UK figure appears to show the UK electorate as hostile towards European integration. While this hostility is incontestable, what needs to be emphasised is that over the long term UK public opinion has been stable. Over the full period of membership from 1972 to 2010 the average of UK positivity towards the EU was 37%, the average of negativity was 32%, showing that the UK was broadly supportive of European integration throughout its period of membership. Both of these figures were quite low, showing that the high rate of neutrals on the issue was perhaps the greatest effect of the lack of salience of the EU. When the UK-EU relationship made it to the top of the political agenda (such as the completion of the single market in the late 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and proposed EMU membership in the late 1990s) there have been impacts on public opinion. With the removal of the EU from the political agenda in the late 2000s the UK public largely ignored the issue, as *Figure 3.2* shows conclusively. Since then, events at the EU level, such as the Lisbon Treaty, did not impact on public opinion and consequently a significant proportion of the UK public remained neutral on it.


Various studies have noted that a supposed decline in UK support for EU membership can first be spotted at the time of the Maastricht Treaty.²⁷⁶ The ratification of Maastricht was followed by the collapse of the pound sterling as the UK fell out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), an event known as Black Wednesday, and a recession followed. This economic humiliation, due to the perceived failure of European level economic management, did significant damage the UK public's positive

²⁷⁵ McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p. 23.

²⁷⁶ Usherwood, *Beyond Party Politics*, pp. 83-9.

disposition towards the economic benefits of European integration. Since ‘Black Wednesday’ the UK public became sceptical of the economic benefits of EU membership, even more so due to the long economic boom which followed after the recession once the UK was fully removed from ERM.²⁷⁷ This fed into public opposition to the Euro which in the UK remained dramatically below that of the EU average and even that of other non-EMU members such as Denmark (See *Figure 3.4*). This assertion of a post-Maastricht collapse in UK public support for European integration appears slightly misguided when approached from the long term view. Looking at *Figure 3.3* again it can be seen that the late 1980s and early 1990s public support for EU membership moved significantly above its historical average – some 20% at its peak in autumn 1991. The post-Maastricht ‘collapse’ can instead be seen as a return to the average level of public support for EU membership. The wider perspective of the UK as a reluctant, almost forced, participant in European integration shows the surge in pro-EU sentiment in the late 1980s as deviant and not the post-1992 decline back to average levels of support. Opposition to economic integration was hardly surprising, not only for the legacy of ERM but also for the post-2000 superior GDP growth rate of the UK to the Eurozone – a point which successive governments were not shy about repeating.²⁷⁸

Figure 3.4: UK and Danish public support for a ‘European Monetary Union with one single currency, the Euro’



Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 54 – No. 72.

²⁷⁷ Howarth, David (2007). ‘The Domestic Politics of British Policy on the Euro’, *Journal of European Integration*, 29: 1, p. 55.

²⁷⁸ The average annual GDP growth rate in the UK from 2000-2008 was 2.5%, this compares to the 1.4% average annual GDP growth rate in the Eurozone’s largest member, Germany, in the same period. See: OECD (2010) *Country Statistical Profiles 2010*, Paris: OECD.

There are two key points from the Eurobarometer data presented above. The continuously high level of opposition to the EU amongst the UK public was without question, as *Figure 3.3* and *Figure 3.4* show. What makes this data interesting was that this low salience fed into higher levels of opposition and neutrality towards membership. In other member states there was little to suggest that the low salience of the EU issue resulted in lower, or indeed higher, levels of support for national membership of the EU. The conclusion was that opposition towards EU membership was the default position of a clear majority of the UK public. Referring back to the history of UK–EU relations, the original position of the UK was one of non-involvement at the beginning of European integration and a focus on other foreign policy priorities. Only later, largely through reasons of economic necessity, did the UK seek EU membership. The wider trend of *Figure 3.3* reflects this conflict at the beginning of UK membership of the EU. Despite numerous periods of shifts in favour of, and against, membership, most notably centred on the period of the Maastricht Treaty, support for and against membership was in the same range in 2009 as it was at the beginning of membership in 1972: between 30% and 40%. This reveals UK public opinion towards the EU to be quite stable when taken over the entire period of membership. The long term average in support of membership of 37% and against of 32% shows that it is simply not relevant to compare UK public support for membership to that of other states given that it has always been low. Only for a brief period in the late 1980s did it meet the EU average.

The previous section on UK-EU relations highlighted the distancing of the UK from European integration at its inception due to the socio-cultural influence of US and imperial relations.²⁷⁹ This appears to be the most relevant long-term factor in explaining this long-term trend. Euroscepticism has always been the original position of both the UK public and party system. When this status quo has been challenged by events at the EU level that are supported by a majority of the public and party system (such as enlargement and the single market) it has changed into a more pro-EU position. When there are no events at the EU level that resonate with the public or are ignored by the party system, public opinion goes back to its historic Eurosceptic position.

²⁷⁹ Wallace, 'The Collapse of British Foreign Policy', p. 66.

3.5 The UK Media and Europe

In terms of understanding the complex relationship between the UK electorate and the party system over the EU issue the role of the media is vitally important. As with almost all elements of the UK and Europe, the domestic media's treatment of the EU issue is characterised as being of entrenched hostility. This has not always been the case, however. Indeed, it was only with changes to UK media ownership that this pervasive negative bias towards the EU emerged. While the *Daily Mail* newspaper was long sceptical of EU membership, the change of ownership of the *Daily Telegraph*, *Times* and *the Sun* newspapers to the ownership of Conrad Black (with the *Daily Telegraph*) and Rupert Murdoch (*Times* and *Sun*) in the 1980s meant that the three main right-wing newspapers and largest tabloid all held strongly Eurosceptical editorial positions.²⁸⁰ It was this bloc of media owners who editorialised a Eurosceptic position that pro-EU activists identified as being the largest impediment towards deeper UK participation in European integration.²⁸¹ The Eurosceptic media was concentrated in the print media. Broadcast media, dominated by the BBC, was identified as being strongly pro-EU by Eurosceptic activists.²⁸² Coverage of the EU in the UK media was seen as a preserve of the print media with the right-wing newspapers listed above believed to have been pushing the anti-EU agenda, whether their readership liked it or not: analyses of the 1997 general election campaign showed that Europe was the issue that received the most print media coverage but was only the eighth most relevant issue to voters.²⁸³ The strength of this argument is debatable but it does show the extent to which the level of opposition to the EU in the UK media is out of proportion with other policy positions. This depth of opposition is not matched on the other side of the debate where the left-wing papers, the *Independent* and the *Guardian* hold neutral positions on the EU with only the *Financial Times* coming out in support of UK membership of the Euro and deeper UK participation in the EU in general.

The *Business for Sterling* EPM had few problems in getting its arguments across in the print media as the right-wing media were most receptive to their arguments

²⁸⁰ Aspinwall, *Rethinking Britain and Europe*, pp. 15-16.

²⁸¹ Interview with Simon Buckby, former Chief Executive of Britain for Europe, 21st June 2010.

²⁸² Interview with Robert Oulds, Director of the Bruges Group, 11th June 2008.

²⁸³ Cater et. al., 'Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party', p. 483.

regardless of their relevance; it was helped by its “friends in the media”.²⁸⁴ This shows that EPMs could be confident of getting coverage of their activities to a media sympathetic to its cause: though one EPM, the *Campaign for a Referendum*, argued that the right-wing media in the UK were in fact quite pro-European as they refused “to put forward withdrawal from the EU as a legitimate option for the UK”.²⁸⁵ *Business for Sterling* activists were cautious however, as they sought to put forward a professional looking campaign in the media, as they were wary of being branded amateurs and their arguments ignored. Pro-EU groups, on the other hand, believed that they had to be extremely proficient and dedicated to receive media coverage for their arguments and events.²⁸⁶

Stringent and pervasive opposition to the EU in the media did aid EPMs in their formation and activities. It allowed access to the national debate on the EU but only to those EPMs that conformed to their editorial line. The UK media contradicted the other case studies for its anti-EU bias and the related easier path of access for EPMs to media outlets; though this was for EPMs whose members and sponsors had connections with the editorial staff and owners of the media. Indeed it appears that it was precisely the ownership of the UK media since the 1980s that drove this strongly anti-EU editorial line, often against public opinion, as the evidence of the 1997 election shows. Certain EPMs took advantage of this and used it to access major national media outlets. For other EPMs, however, the UK media was seen to have a pro-EU bias, as despite criticism of certain EU policies and treaties outright withdrawal was not put forward thereby encouraging them to form to inform the public of their arguments for ending UK membership of the EU.

The hostility of much of the print media in the UK to anything Brussels-related partly explains why the two main political parties withdrew from the EU issue by the end of the 2000s, as they sought to avoid any unnecessary negative media confrontation over a non-salient issue. In relation to the formation of EPMs, however, such a media environment contradicted the assumption that a Eurosceptic media will inhibit EPM

²⁸⁴ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

²⁸⁵ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Simon Buckby, former Chief Executive of Britain for Europe, 21st June 2010.

formation. EPMs were still formed in the UK despite the print media culture of Euroscepticism, as for some EPMs they were not Eurosceptic enough. These EPMs wanted to educate the public on the dangers of continued UK membership of the EU and for them the media was not doing its job as it failed to advocate withdrawal from the EU and just criticised various EU policies. This depth of Euroscepticism amongst UK EPMs and where it came from will be discussed in the next section.

Second Section: EPMs in the UK

3.6 Two types of EPMs

Between them Gray and Usherwood located twenty-four EPMs active in the UK in the late 1990s to early 2000s. The common argument between them was that this was due to a strong reaction against events at the European level.²⁸⁷ Gray proposed the typology outlined in *Table 3.1* below, but this chapter proposes a different typology. This has been done largely due to the overlap between the different typologies that Gray suggested. All of these groups campaigned: the key difference was in, a) who the target of their campaigning was, and b) what EU issues they focused on. Gray failed to appreciate just how many of these groups were in fact closely linked to political parties, and therefore identifying just one group as originating due to party factionalism in the Conservative party was simply not correct. Her wholesale dismissal of Usherwood's argument that UK EPMs are an extension of party politics was a kneejerk reaction to the appearance of a series of ostensibly non-party aligned EPMs.

²⁸⁷ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 92.

Table 3.1: Groups campaigning against the euro in Britain, 1999-2002

Type	Right Wing	Left Wing
Political Party	All-Party Alliance Against Brussels	
	UK Independence Party [UKIP]	
	The Democratic Party	
Business organisation	Business for Sterling	
Labour organisation		Trade Unions Against The Single Currency [TUASC]
Party Faction	Conservatives Against a Federal Europe	Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign
		Labour Against The Euro
Research organisation	New Europe	
	Global Britain	
	European Research Group	
	European Foundation	
Campaign Organisation (Coalition/Alliance)	No Campaign	
	Anti-Maastricht Alliance [AMA]	
	Congress for Democracy	
	The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements [TEAM]	
	Campaign Alliance for Referendums in Parishes	
Campaign Organisation	Democracy Movement	
	Campaign for an Independent Britain [CIB]	
	Anti-Common Market League	
	British Democracy Campaign	
	Youth For A Free Europe	
	New Alliance	
	Freedom Association	
	Campaign Against Euro-Federalism	
	The Bruges Group	

Source: Gray (2003) 'Waiting for the Starting Signal: the UK's pro and anti-Euro campaigns', p. 14

This section will show that both Gray and Usherwood were correct in pointing to the ability to access the policy arena and the constraints of the party system respectively as important factors behind EPM formation. Neither of the two theses were, however, correct in saying that they each exclusively describe the origins of EPMs in the UK. Combining both sets of research together with the data and analysis presented in this section produced a more adequate explanation. This chapter shows that the two-party UK political system led to the formation of two distinctive types of EPM:

1. One type that focused on *influencing* the *elite level* of political party and business leadership
2. Another type that focused on *direct action* at the *grass roots level*.

Some of these EPMs were closely tied to political parties and others were not. The argument of this study is that the presence of large and successful Eurosceptic political parties caused EPMs to be formed both as an extension and as an opposition to them. While events at the European level, public opinion, media and the availability of resources all played a role in UK EPM formation, it was this elite/grass roots EPM dichotomy that provides a concrete explanation for the form of mobilisation they took. The two types of UK EPM *elite-level* and *grass roots-level* are similar in that both remained closely affiliated with the organisation/political party that they formed around. Where they differed was in the focus of their activities. *Elite level* EPMs targeted senior decision-makers and other influential persons within the organisation/political party. *Grass roots-level* EPMs were more focused on direct action to raise public awareness of their arguments and to take action against what they perceived to be pro-EU activities by local and national government.

This approach for analyzing UK EPMs appears as an alternative typology to that proposed in the first chapter. A more accurate description of this elite-level/grass roots level dichotomy would be as a further subdivision of the existing EPM typology based on the specificities of the UK case. Looking at the UK case with this further typology provides an analysis of a rarely encountered social movement; one that is focused on the *elite-level* in society. The overwhelming body of the literature on social movements is

focused on those groups that operate distinctly at the *grass roots-level*. There they seek to contest their issue by mobilizing ordinary citizens through various means. Social movements that operate at the *elite-level* are all too rare. This is because it is assumed that they exert such influence over the policy making process that they do not need to mobilize.²⁸⁸ Understanding why *Business for Sterling* was formed is of significance because it reveals why the UK's policy making process on Europe changed to such an extent that even supposed members of the elite had to mobilize a protest movement to gain access to it. Such a distinction is important for understanding the relevance of *Business for Sterling* for wider studies of social movements and of Euroscepticism in the UK. *Campaign for a Referendum* is of interest because of a combination of factors. Firstly, it was typical of the small, regionally based EPMs listed in *Table 3.2* below. Secondly, examining it addresses one of the principal conundrums of EPM formation in the UK – why would civil society mobilize to protest against Europe given the high level of Euroscepticism in the UK party system? This is because many of their members were present and former members of either UKIP or the Conservatives. Understanding their motivations for mobilizing *Campaign for a Referendum* will explain, in part, why EPM mobilization occurred, apparently unnecessarily, in such an apparently Eurosceptic environment. Finally, their focus on the holding of a referendum will bring further detail as to why referendums are intrinsic to the UK – EU relationship.

Taking the further typology of *elite-level/grass roots-level* for UK EPMs emphasises the difference of the UK from the other case studies. In acknowledging that the UK is the “Eurosceptic State” of George’s assertion,²⁸⁹ and the glaring outlier in Ray’s mainstream party Euroscepticism study,²⁹⁰ then the evidence of a further deviation as regards the study of social movements on Europe in comparison to other European states should come as no surprise.

²⁸⁸ Edwards and McCarthy, ‘Resources and Social Movement Mobilization’, pp. 118-125.

²⁸⁹ George, ‘Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State’.

²⁹⁰ Ray, ‘Mainstream Euroscepticism’.

Table 3.2 Groups campaigning against European integration in Britain, 1999-2010

Elite Level	Grass roots Level
Business for Sterling	The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements [TEAM]
Trade Unions Against The Single Currency [TUASC]	Campaign Alliance for Referendums in Parishes
Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign	Democracy Movement
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe	Campaign for an Independent Britain [CIB]
Labour Against The Euro	Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution
New Europe	Youth For A Free Europe
Global Britain	New Alliance
European Research Group	British Democracy Campaign
European Foundation	Campaign Against Euro-Federalism
No Campaign	
Anti-Maastricht Alliance [AMA]	
Congress for Democracy	
Anti-Common Market League	
Freedom Association	
Democracy Movement	
I Want a Referendum	

As *Table 3.2* shows, there were numerous EPMs which fell into the typology. Using this typology emphasises the specific differences that preclude these EPMs from

being grouped together as the same. Firstly *elite level* EPMs had low public mobilisation and no desire to be a mass movement. Secondly they were founded, led and resourced by individuals who operated at the elite level of politics, media, business and therefore enjoyed easier access to the political decision-making structure, that typically social movements had difficulty in accessing. This meant that their campaigning was almost exclusively based around forming intellectual arguments through research and disseminating them to the decision-making elite. They differed from think tanks in that they had clear specific goals and ended once they achieved or failed to achieve these goals. These three points, membership, resources/access to decision-making structure, campaign tactics are reversed for *grass roots* level EPMs. They desired as many members as possible to provide subscription fees and to participate in their direct action campaigns. As ordinary current or former members in either the Conservatives or UKIP, they had little access to the political decision-making structure and so they had to engage in direct action campaigning to get their arguments into the decision-making process.

Rather than provide a small narrative on each of the EPMs listed in *Table 3.2*, two in particular will be focused on so the particular characteristics of the *elite-level* and *grass roots-level* EPMs can be analysed in depth. These are the *elite-level Business for Sterling*; and the *grass-roots level Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution (Campaign for a Referendum)*. Both EPMs exhibited the characteristics of social movements in that they were non-office seeking, campaign focused, and civil society based groups staffed by activists. Where they differed was between their focus on the party system and on public opinion.

Clearly different types of individuals mobilised different EPMs, *Business for Sterling* was founded by multi-millionaire businessmen, senior Conservative activists and professional campaigners. Given their background they focused on the area which they knew well, the Conservatives and the influential business lobby group the Confederation of Business Industry (CBI). Additionally they were much more focused on policy outcome and achieving stated goals, as opposed to engaging with the public and raising awareness of the EU issue more generally.²⁹¹ For the *Campaign for a Referendum*, as members of the public or ordinary members of the Conservatives and UKIP, an EPM-

²⁹¹ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

based campaign to influence the major UK policy makers was not feasible. Instead, they focused their activities on raising public awareness of the EU issue by holding marches, conducting postcard campaigns, and letter writing to local newspapers. Additionally they favoured more forms of direct action such as dismantling metric signage and taking court cases against local authorities to raise awareness of the illegality of “Brussels imposed” metric signage and measurements in the UK.²⁹² *Grass roots-level* EPMs operated distinctly outside of the political system. They were strong critics of the government both at local and national level. They did not seek to change government European policy through the means espoused by the *elite-level* EPMs. Instead, they sought to change it through the only means they saw as legitimate: the will of the British people by means of a referendum. Their policy goal was therefore to force the government to hold a referendum on the latest EU treaty. While both UKIP and the Conservatives put forward this same policy, these EPMs did not trust political parties to follow through on these promises. They cited the failures to hold referendums for the 1973 European accession, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as evidence of this.²⁹³

Both types of EPM diverged from their respective political parties due to their failure to take perceived adequate action against European integration. By adequate action they meant policies putting forward withdrawal from certain EU policies (or from the EU itself) or to hold the Labour government more to account for failing to hold an EU-related referendum. For the leadership of both types of EPM the EU was wholly salient and they were more than willing to attack their party over Europe.²⁹⁴ They were not, however, willing to change their links to the party, because they were aware that the EU issue was not salient with the electorate at large. Removing these links would lead to their exit from the public policy arena for *elite level* EPMs, whilst denying access to resources and a wide organisation of members for *grass roots level* EPMs. There appears to have been a fundamental contradiction in the formation of UK EPMs, in that their founders were opposed to the European policies of their parent group and so founded an EPM to rectify this, and indeed formally challenge them on this, yet they remained firmly

²⁹² Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Interview with Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June 2010.

committed to their parent group. For EPM activists this was no contradiction. They were of the opinion that the party had been led away from its true Eurosceptic position and that the pro-EU elements within the party had marginalised them. An EPM that successfully mobilised Eurosceptic elements within the party, they believed, would put pressure on the party to take a harder stance on the EU and return to its true Eurosceptic roots.²⁹⁵

3.7 EPMs at the elite-level: *Business for Sterling*²⁹⁶

Business for Sterling was founded not just out of disgruntlement with the European position of the Conservatives but also with the EU position of the CBI.²⁹⁷ There was a crossover in membership between several supporters and members of the Conservative party and the CBI, the most high profile of which was Lord Kalms, CEO of retailer DGSi.²⁹⁸ In the late 1990s the CBI moved close to the Blair Labour government, as it had become sidelined under previous Conservative governments. The then leader of the CBI, Adair Turner (and after him in 2001 Digby Jones) was close to Blair and agreed with his policy of bringing the UK into the Euro.²⁹⁹ This pro-Euro position was at odds with a significant proportion of ordinary members of the CBI, ranging from 40% to 75% from 1997-2002, and so a hard core of concerned members decided to form *Business for Sterling* to oppose the CBI's position on joining the Euro.³⁰⁰ Those individual Conservative supporters and members sought to use their influence as members of the CBI to convince the business group to lobby government to change its policy on the Euro. However, Turner as chairman was "seen as far too close to both the Labour party and the pro-Europeans" and chose to ignore the "protestations of his members" on UK membership of the Euro.³⁰¹ With the extra restriction of the Conservative party in opposition, those individual Conservative party supporters and members who opposed the Euro in Britain were forced to form their own EPM. Indeed, *Business for Sterling*

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ *Business for Sterling* merged with *No to the Euro* in 2000, the vast majority of its key activities described in this section took place from 1997 to early 2000 and thus for this reason it is referred to as *Business for Sterling* rather than *No to the Euro*.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

²⁹⁸ The parent group of the Dixons electronic store chain.

²⁹⁹ Howarth, 'The Domestic Politics of British Policy on the Euro', p. 61.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

officials described the situation as “heated and urgent”, as prominent businessmen decided to act and begin an immediate campaign against UK membership of the Euro.³⁰² After the loss of 179 seats in the 1997 general election and their failure to resolve divisions over the party’s European policy from the early 1990s the Conservatives were an ineffective base from which to prevent UK membership of the Euro.³⁰³

With one party in a two-party system holding a Eurosceptic position an anti-EU policy was always going to be clearly articulated at the national political level. It did not guarantee however, that this would have any effect on the policy outcome. The party had been engaged in a rebuilding process since the 1997 election. Expecting it to launch a unified, aggressive and successful national campaign against Euro membership was not realistic. The founders of *Business for Sterling* came to the conclusion that should the question of Euro membership be held in a referendum, they were very likely to lose, as it would more than likely boil down to a straight choice between the deeply unpopular Conservatives and the still popular Labour party and Blair. Faced with such an impossible scenario, their strategic goal was to prevent Euro membership coming to a referendum in the first place. This meant a campaign on two fronts, firstly convincing elites within the business, media and political community of the negative consequences of UK participation in EMU; and secondly of spreading this opposition towards the Euro amongst the general public as well.³⁰⁴

Going back to the first section, *Figure 3.2* shows that 35% of the UK public was aware of the importance of the EU issue in the late 1990s. *Figure 3.3* shows that support for the EU was at its lowest point of 20% around this same time when *Business for Sterling* was founded. Targeting public opinion was an obvious strategy for the EPM as the issue was salient and the public were at their most negative towards the EU. But despite these figures, the EPM’s worst outcome was the holding of a referendum. Even under conditions of negative public sentiment, *Business for Sterling* believed that Labour could swing a referendum to the pro-EMU side. This highlights the fragility of UK public opinion towards the EU. Even with historically favourable data, Eurosceptic

³⁰² Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

³⁰³ Barker, David (2002). ‘Britain and Europe: More Blood on the Euro-carpet’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55: 2, p. 328.

³⁰⁴ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

campaigners were very wary it could be shifted to a pro-EU position by a Labour referendum campaign. *Figure 3.1* shows how correct they were in this strategy as the Labour pro-Euro policy was decisively favoured by voters in the late 1990s. Their ultimate goal to get a referendum on EMU off the political agenda was based as much on the changeable nature of UK public opinion on the EU as it was on the fear of an electorally dominant Labour Party winning such a referendum in the same manner as the 1997 general election.

From the other case studies it can be seen that EPMs were founded to specifically contest European referendums. This makes *Business for Sterling* an important case study in that it was founded to prevent a referendum in the first place. EPMs in Ireland and Denmark required the presence of referendums for access to the national political decision making process, in addition to the mobilising effect of a referendum on resources and activists. *Business for Sterling*, as an *elite EPM* whose members were extremely well resourced and with access to influential decision-makers in politics and business, did not need a referendum to access the national political opportunity structure.

Instead they focused on a campaign strategy to win over media, political and business elites, and ultimately they hoped public opinion, to the anti-Euro side before any referendum was announced.³⁰⁵ Their ultimate goal was to create an anti-Euro sentiment across the business elites and wider UK public opinion that would discourage the government from holding a referendum. For despite their resources and access to the decision-making process, they were a handful of individuals facing the prospect of a referendum with an electorate that had voted overwhelming in favour of an ostensibly pro-European party.³⁰⁶ In this they were successful, as despite an election promise to hold a referendum on the Euro before 2000, the Labour government introduced 'Five economic tests' that needed to be passed for potential membership of the Euro and the issue was parked and not dealt with.³⁰⁷ *Business for Sterling* emerged as an example of an EPM with large-scale resources and access to elites but without public mobilisation that formed successfully to achieve its stated aims. It shows that abundant resources and

³⁰⁵ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 13.

³⁰⁶ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

³⁰⁷ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 13.

access to the elites in the media and party system can negate the need for mass public support that a referendum can generate.

The availability of resources allowed *Business for Sterling* to exercise significantly different tactics from those of other EPMs. Their tactic was to use technical economic and financial reports to back up their arguments of the dangers of Euro membership to the UK's economy and business. They advertised these arguments in newspapers (*Daily Telegraph*, *Financial Times*) read by financial, business and government workers, in addition to targeted billboard campaigns in specific areas where these same groups lived and worked.³⁰⁸ Their strategy was that should the public and those potentially directly affected by Euro membership be aware of the government's Euro policy and its perceived negative effects, then they would demand an end to it. To achieve these goals they commissioned various economists and finance specialists to write reports on the potential damage that membership of the Euro would have on the UK's economy and business.³⁰⁹ They contested public opinion on Europe largely through the policy arena and a sympathetic media more than through direct campaigning.³¹⁰

The leadership of *Business for Sterling* hired experienced staff from previous campaigns related to Conservative issues, the *Countryside Alliance* and anti-Maastricht campaigns, to organise the group. Where these staff members believe the campaign was most successful was in the battle of arguments by economic and finance experts. The use of detailed arguments backed up by respected figures with finance and economics backgrounds was meant to show that *Business for Sterling* was not "amateurish and extremist due to the credibility of its contributors". Such an approach meant that "friendly" newspapers such as the *Daily Telegraph*, *Times* and *Daily Mail* were even more receptive to their arguments.³¹¹ When engaging in debates on radio or television, their detailed knowledge of the impact of EMU membership on the finance industry in the UK meant that they were taken seriously by the BBC and other media outlets. This

³⁰⁸ A billboard campaign was organised for the City in London, with smaller campaigns in other financial centres such as Leeds and Edinburgh.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 16.

³¹¹ Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18th May 2008.

allowed them access to debates with pro-European groups and government ministers in national media outlets.

The staff members persuaded the group's leadership that the aim of the group should not be to directly oppose membership of the EU and rule out any eventual membership of the Euro but to cast doubt on the economic and financial benefits of membership. This denied the government and the CBI the opportunity to cast them as "Eurosceptic nutters" on a par with UKIP and the Referendum Party. In turn the pro-Euro side was forced to debate purely on the economic and financial issues related to the EMU in which *Business for Sterling* was well versed.³¹² The goal for the group was not to secure a total and absolute withdrawal of government policy for joining the Euro but to "muddy the waters on the benefits of membership" in the minds of city financiers, leading economists and business leaders.³¹³ With a history of uncertainty towards European integration, there needed to be a strong shift in opinion across all aspects of UK society towards being wholly in favour of the benefits of EMU before it would join. The prospect of the government forcing the end of Sterling without the unequivocal support of business interests and the City, would have made many of their backbenchers wary and the media question the policy, leaving open the possibility of a major public backlash.³¹⁴ Once the case for the Euro became less clear cut after a period of continuous and vocal campaigning in media outlets and amongst business leaders, the government pushed the Euro off the agenda, as then Chancellor Brown announced that certain criteria would have to be met before the UK would consider joining the Euro.³¹⁵ *Business for Sterling* considered this to be a victory, as EMU membership was off the government agenda.

The example of *Business for Sterling* shows how UK *elite-level* EPMs were mobilised by a combination of factors. While Gray believes that the EPM was purely a business lobby group, this fails to take into account the motivation of the founders, who were reacting to the inability of the Conservatives to adequately contest the Euro issue, and the CBI's move to a pro-Euro position. Had the Conservatives been in a position to

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Eglene, Ophelia (2008). 'British Business and the Euro', *American Consortium for European Studies*, ACES Cases No. 2008.2, p. 23.

³¹⁵ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', pp. 15-9.

challenge the government's and the CBI's Euro policy, then the founders of *Business for Sterling* would have utilised their close links to the party, as members and donors, to have their anti-Euro interests represented effectively at the national political level. Instead it fell to *Business for Sterling* to campaign against UK membership of the Euro. The specific access point to the policy making process most often used by the founders of *Business for Sterling* was closed off to them, when the Conservatives became wholly ineffective after the 1997 election. This forced those behind *Business for Sterling* to mobilise in civil society to seek a new means to contest the government's EMU policy. Such a development is perfectly logical. For instance, labour and gender equality social movements became absorbed into political parties as social democratic parties rose to electoral success. *Business for Sterling* shows the reverse is also true: when political parties' electoral fortunes decline, social movements emerge from them to contest issues through civil society unencumbered by a toxic political brand. The causal factor of formation was the failure of Euroscepticism in the party system to successfully express itself to the satisfaction of certain business elites. Additional factors were the availability of extensive resources which allowed for the formation of an EPM with such an expansive strategy. Had those resources not been available, the challenge of competing with an organisation of the size, funding and expertise of the CBI, as well as a popular new government, would have appeared insurmountable and the EPM might not have mobilised in the first place. Finally, the openness of the UK media to criticism of European integration meant that the founders of *Business for Sterling* knew that influential newspapers such as the *Times*, *Daily Telegraph* and *Daily Mail* would cover their press releases and arguments.

3.8 EPMs at the grass roots level: *Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution*

If *Business for Sterling* was an elite-level EPM then the *Campaign for a Referendum* was most certainly a grass roots-level EPM. *Campaign for a Referendum* was highly typical of the multitude of fragmented regionalised EPMs referred to by Usherwood,³¹⁶ Gray³¹⁷ and Howarth³¹⁸. What is missing from these academic analyses of

³¹⁶ Usherwood, *Beyond Party Politics*, p. 133.

such groups is that they did not operate as stand-alone groups. The members of the *Campaign for a Referendum* interviewed were active in the Conservative party and UKIP. Again this challenges the assumption of this study that high levels of Euroscepticism in the party system will negate the need for mobilisation of EPMs. With both hard and soft Euroscepticism represented in the party system there was therefore little incentive for EPMs to be formed, given the articulation of Euroscepticism at the national political level. Yet the most striking feature of *Table 3.2* was the sheer number of local level EPMs. From studying *Campaign for a Referendum*, interviews with various activists and analysing Eurosceptic magazines and other publications a general pattern emerged of involvement in EPMs coexisting with membership of either UKIP or the Conservatives. From the *Business for Sterling* example it was shown that perceived failings in the ability of the Conservatives to challenge a pro-Euro government mobilised the EPM. As will be shown, it was the desire to engage in social movement based Eurosceptic actions and a distrustful attitude toward the political system that drove party members to form *Campaign for a Referendum*. The EPM followed along a more classical line of social movement mobilisation, as articulated by Tarrow, in that it was a grass-roots movement and used protest techniques like marches and letter-writing campaigns.³¹⁹ Their issue of formation moved from direct contestation on Europe to the holding of a referendum on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty. As with the Referendum Party, it sought to channel their Eurosceptic activities into a democratic campaign to broaden their support and success in achieving a tangible goal: a referendum on the EU.³²⁰

Members of the Conservative Party and UKIP saw no contradiction between their involvement in *Campaign for a Referendum* and their political party work. This was because they saw the two operating at different levels through different means for the same goal. The division for these activists is between a Eurosceptic political party that campaigns at the elite political level and an EPM that uses direct campaigning at the local grass roots political level. As much as these EPMs mobilised Eurosceptic opposition and

³¹⁷ Gray, 'Waiting for the Starting Signal', p. 14.

³¹⁸ Howrath, 'The Domestic Politics of British Policy on the Euro', p. 61.

³¹⁹ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.

³²⁰ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

campaigned against European integration, they also acted as a faction for the membership of their local UKIP/Conservative organisation. As part of a pattern seen throughout this study, the passing of the Treaty of Maastricht acted as an important mobilising agent. Successive treaties led the members who went on to found the *Campaign for a Referendum* to join UKIP in the late 1990s.³²¹ These individuals placed a high salience on the European issue and UKIP was an obvious political outlet for their opinions on the EU. Other members who were active Conservatives became involved in wider Eurosceptic circles after the passing of Maastricht.³²² The schism in the Conservative Party created by Maastricht was obvious in the parliamentary party, it was no great surprise then that this division would also have consequences at the grass-roots party level. Given that a Conservative government had passed the Treaty that established a European Union, they believed that it could not be trusted on the European issue again. Links were still maintained to UKIP and the Conservatives as they were of the belief that they could be turned to their side of the argument, due to a feeling of strong attachment to the party on issues such as immigration and economic policy. Given the European issue's lack of salience amongst the public, complete withdrawal from a political party would have prevented *Campaign for a Referendum* members from involvement in the political system on other policies important to them; notably immigration, social welfare reform, taxation and government spending. Retaining membership and activity in UKIP and the Conservatives allowed access to basic resources but, more importantly, ideologically minded activists from whom support for their organisation could be drawn to lobby for a more Eurosceptic position within the party.³²³

Della Porta³²⁴ and Tarrow³²⁵, amongst many others, have shown that protest groups emerge from civil society at times of distrust of the political system. When such distrust is at its height public sentiment that typically finds its expression in the policies of opposition parties is diverted to organically formed groups. What the example of *Campaign for a Referendum* shows is that such distrust can form around a particular

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Wilkinson, David, 'These Tides from Tallinn', *These Tides*, March, 2004.

³²³ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

³²⁴ Della Porta, Donatella (2006). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³²⁵ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.

issue, in this case Europe. The failure of political parties to follow through on promises to hold a referendum on Europe, coupled with the gradual removal of Europe from the political discussion, was the focus of this distrust between individual members of the public and the political system. This breakdown of trust, not just over the EU issue but more the failure to hold a referendum, led to the mobilisation of the social movement.

Campaign for a Referendum engaged in classical grass roots protest movement contestation. They wrote letters to local newspapers as they believed they had a better chance of receiving coverage there than in the national media. After the Lisbon Treaty was passed in parliament, they held a fake funeral procession to Harlow, Essex, town hall to symbolise the ‘death’ of the UK constitution.³²⁶ They did collaborate at a national level, however, with the *I Want a Referendum* EPM. This EPM used the activists of local-level EPMs such as *Campaign for a Referendum*, to organise regional campaigns on its main issue of demanding a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, or the revised Constitutional treaty as they referred to it, before culminating in high-profile national media covered protests in Westminster and Brussels.³²⁷ The prospect of participation in a professionally run national campaign with high media exposure towards a common non-ideological goal was most welcome to them and they lent their support to the campaign.³²⁸

As the name suggests, the *raison d’être* of *Campaign for a Referendum* was to force the government to hold a referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), since that particular treaty ended the EPMs focus on the Lisbon Treaty. A referendum was the focus of their campaign (and also obviously that of *I Want a Referendum*) as they believed that only a plebiscite could decide the UK’s EU policy, given the lack of legitimacy of the political system. This lack of legitimacy stemmed from the Conservatives’ active participation in European integration and failure to reverse the influence of EU law in the UK. Even UKIP were perceived as being too “close to the system” as they became embroiled in a series of financial scandals with their

³²⁶ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

³²⁷ <http://www.iwantareferendum.com>.

³²⁸ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

EP expenses and relentless party infighting³²⁹. With the UK holding only one European referendum in 1975 and none in the post-Maastricht period, despite an electoral promise by Labour and a personal guarantee from Conservative leader David Cameron to hold referendums on the Euro and the Lisbon Treaty respectively, the holding of a referendum has allowed EPMs to put forward legitimate arguments about a lack of democracy over the UK's EU policy. Conscious that left wing voters held similar distrusting views of European integration, an EPM based around demanding a referendum held a broad appeal across ideologies as a unifying positive issue.³³⁰

Although Usherwood and Gray were dismissive of them, *grass-roots* EPMs had a distinctive role in the UK-EU relationship. They represented a ready-made, widely diffused No campaign to contest any potential future EU referendum in the UK. As such, their presence, continuous activity and ability to attract cross-party support was most certainly noted by the government and pro-European groups in their considerations for holding a referendum.³³¹ *Grass-roots* EPMs were highly motivated activists who campaigned against any element of European integration they deemed oppressive in their own locality. This may not have affected national policy debates on the UK's future relationship with the EU. It did, however, prevent local government from instituting specific policies, mostly related to EU symbolism, such as EU flags on government buildings, metric signage and measurements on official local authority publications and material, and even preventing EU flags on car registration plates.³³²

Campaign for a Referendum was mobilised despite its founders' membership and work with political parties as, very similarly to *Business for Sterling*, they felt that their parties were ineffectual in contesting the ratification of EU treaties. For them, the parties were too involved in the political system to be taking effective direct action against UK membership of the EU.³³³ The core belief of the group became that the "political process

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Interview with Simon Buckby, former Chief Executive of Britain for Europe, 21st June 2010.

³³² The Drive the Flag EPM was started in the late 1990s when the British department of transport was to follow an EU directive and allow the printing of the EU flag, or no flag at all, on UK car registration plates. The EPM launched a letter writing campaign and picketed the department of transport. The issue was picked up by Conservative party MPs who in turn pressurised the government to allow for the option of having the British flag instead of the EU flag in 2001, whereupon the EPM folded.

³³³ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

is illegitimate” and that there was a huge need to “engage ordinary people” on the impact of European integration on UK sovereignty.³³⁴ Feeding into this, they believed that political parties and the media denied ordinary voters access to information on how European integration actually worked and how it negatively affected them.

Using the Koopmans-Duyvendak model to analyse *Campaign for a Referendum*, it can be seen that they were successful in issue framing and this contributed toward their sustained campaigning.³³⁵ While they had modest success at the local level in contesting the introduction of EU symbols and metric signage, the closed nature of the UK policy making process meant that they were ineffective at the national level.

Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

There was a difference between the *elite* and *grass-roots* EPMs as regards relations with the media. *Elite* EPMs saw certain sections of the media as being open to their arguments and supportive of their campaigns. They were sceptical that the BBC was impartial but they accepted that to be taken seriously by the BBC and the financial press they had to put forward well-researched arguments. The right-wing press were accommodative of their press releases and opinion articles, as they were perceived to be ‘on the same side’. As the founders of *Business for Sterling* were major advertisers in, and personal acquaintances of, the right-wing press editors and owners, they were treated as experts in the impact of European integration on the UK. *Grass-roots* EPMs believed that the entirety of the mainstream media was inherently biased against them. They based this on the fact that withdrawal was not put forward as a legitimate policy goal for the UK government. Instead they focused on local media through letter-writing campaigns and local protests because it is much easier to access. *Elite* EPMs had a very good relationship with the national print media and so the fact that the media was relatively anti-European enabled them in their formation. *Grass roots* EPMs, on the other hand, firmly believed that the media was pro-European and so formed to contest

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Koopmans and Duyvendak, ‘The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe’.

media coverage of European integration and educate the public as to what they believed was the reality of UK membership of the EU.

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

In contrast to the other case studies, a high level of Euroscepticism in the party system did not dampen the mobilisation effect of EPMs in the UK. The presence of Eurosceptic parties in fact played a role in EPM formation. This appears contradictory, given that hard and soft Euroscepticism are clearly represented in two electorally successful political parties. What the examples of *Business for Sterling* and *Campaign for a Referendum* show is that it is not so much the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system but the perception of the success of party-based Euroscepticism in contesting European integration that had an effect on EPM formation. Members of both EPMs were convinced of the Eurosceptic bona fides of the Conservatives and UKIP but were less convinced of their ability to successfully challenge what they perceived as a pro-EU government and win a referendum on European integration.

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The lack of referendums in the UK should have significantly limited the access of EPMs to the political opportunity structure, in turn reducing their ability to mobilise and their overall numbers. The mobilising issue of a referendum to organise around has been shown to be vital in the other case studies. In the UK the mobilising issue has become the campaign to hold a referendum in the first place as with *Campaign for a Referendum*. The one issue that motivated EPMs more than opposition to European integration was the fact that the public had not been given a vote on European integration since 1975. Contrary to this, *Business for Sterling* showed that EPMs could be mobilised to prevent a referendum where there was a strong chance it would be won by the pro-EU side. The collective understanding of the role of referendums in mobilising social movements needs to be re-examined in the light of this evidence as a campaign to hold a referendum

has an important a mobilising effect as a campaign to defeat/win one does. The activities of both EPMs followed on from that of the apparently forgotten Referendum Party of the mid- to late-1990s, showing the long term centrality of referendums to the UK relationship with Europe.

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

The first past the post electoral system did appear to play a significant role in the formation of EPMs. Taken in conjunction with the rigidity of the two party system discussed above, Eurosceptic factions in political parties were reluctant to split and form their own party, as the electoral and party systems would make election almost impossible. Forming an EPM allowed them to remain within the party and access the policy-making process while also putting forward Eurosceptic arguments. The concentration of power over the holding of a referendum as the ultimate decision of a few key individuals (Blair, Brown, Cameron) and not as an explicit norm in the political system was also a factor of formation for EPMs. Ordinary and elected members of political parties believed that they could not influence party leaderships over the holding of referendums (as they could in Denmark) and so they formed EPMs to place outside pressure on party leaders over the EU issue. The closed nature of the UK political system and the linking of European referendums to the decision of individual politicians, meant that EPMs emerged as the only means of contesting the EU even to insiders in the UK political system.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

For *Business for Sterling* resources were vital. The EPM was set up by wealthy donors to the Conservatives with the specific goal of affecting elite level public opinion through specific means (advertising, media launches, newspaper opinion writing). This was only possible due to the resources at their disposal. Once the goal was achieved, the resources were pulled and the EPM dissolved. Due to the sheer amount of resources at their disposal, *Business for Sterling* appears as something most original, an elite level

social movement. Social movements almost universally rely on the power of large scale collective action in the form of human resources to affect policy change, as they generally lack financial resources. Significant financial resources allowed *Business for Sterling* to execute a campaign strategy focused on influencing elite level opinion through the use of expensive advertising and media campaigns, not through the sheer number of people it could mobilise. As with *Libertas* in Ireland, they were a rarity as regards the importance of financial resources in their formation. The norm in the social movement literature is for financial resources to be second in importance to formation behind human and organizational resources. Typically once the human and organisational capacity is present in a successful movement, then the financial resources follow. The reverse was the case for *Business for Sterling* where financial resources came first and other resources followed. *Campaign for a Referendum* on the other hand was not influenced in their formation by the availability of resources. The role of resources in its formation was typical of social movements in that they relied on the human and organizational resources of its members as a key driver of formation.

3.9 Main Conclusions from the UK Case

One of the most salient points to emerge from this analysis of EPM formation in the UK has been that high levels of Euroscepticism in the party system did not decrease the presence or number of EPMs. The assumption that a party system with a withdrawalist party and a large and successful mainstream Eurosceptic party would attract all Eurosceptic support and activity has proven to be greatly mistaken. The reason for this appears to be the desire of party leaderships to avoid conflict on Europe with ordinary party members. Ordinary party members then went on to form EPMs to galvanise the large amount of Eurosceptic public opinion behind their anti-EU arguments and force the party leadership to take a more explicitly EU-critical position. This was most evident with the Conservatives and to a lesser extent with Labour. UKIP members also formed EPMs, as despite the party's hard Eurosceptic policy stance, there was a belief that more direct action against UK participation in European integration was needed. Failure to advance the UKIP Eurosceptic policy at the national level was blamed on the party leadership becoming too 'Europeanised' through their participation in the European Parliament.

Referendums became a key issue of EPM contestation beside that of EU policies and treaties despite their non-presence in the UK political system. Even though there was only one referendum on the EU in the UK, referendums were central to the UK-EU debate and the source of contestation from the late 1990s to 2010. Referendums acted as a factor of formation for EPMs, not so much for their presence but for the campaign to have them held or to prevent them from being held in the first place. Such a situation was present in the political system as well, where the Conservatives and Labour were in conflict over the holding of a referendum in 2006 on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, with the Conservatives in turn coming under criticism for not coming good on their promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty once they acceded to government in May 2010. Despite the presence of just one in 1975, referendums have been central to the EU debate in the UK and their importance to the formation of EPMs reflects this.

The public opinion data discussed on the UK and Europe has shown that the low salience of the EU amongst the UK public has led to a default position of opposition to membership that was present at the start of UK involvement in European integration. Following on from the analysis of the party system it was shown that the EU was moved to the political sidelines as an issue in the UK as the two major parties came to a delicate consensus on EU policy. The negative public position towards European integration was exacerbated by the repeated failure of the two main political parties to follow through on promises to hold a referendum. Public support for EPM formation becomes apparent in such an environment. A high level of negative sentiment towards EU membership, added to the failure of the political system to deal with these attitudes, was a key driver of EPM formation in the UK. The EU was not a salient issue so there was little benefit in political parties focusing on it.

The UK case challenges this study's propositions not only as regards the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system but also in relation to the media. The UK print media has been shown to have developed a strong editorial anti-EU bias in contrast to other long established member states. For EPM activists the presence of Eurosceptic arguments in the national media did not discouraged them from mobilising. On the contrary the perceived 'soft Euroscepticism' of the print media in criticising certain EU

policies and not openly advocating withdrawal, meant that they were lumped in with such purported august pro-EU media outlets as the BBC by certain EPM activists. The desire to inform the public of their interpretation of the negative consequences of European integration outside of the mainstream media acted as a factor of formation for EPMs. This unhappiness with UK media EU coverage was symptomatic of the depth of opposition to the EU held by certain EPMs, and how hard it was compared to that of the media and political parties. For the *Business for Sterling* EPM a Eurosceptic media was a positive boon to their activities, as it ensured that their articles and press releases received positive coverage and space in national media. Their level of resources strongly differentiated them from the findings from the other case studies, where EPMs were mobilised almost wholly regardless of the level of resources. The amount of resources available to them was considerable as they became the civil society proxy for the Conservative party, as rich financiers and retailers who stood to lose significantly from Euro membership resourced the EPM. *Business for Sterling* emerges in an original form as an elite-level social movement. A protest movement is typically a grass roots level campaign of ordinary individuals, *Business for Sterling* was not a think tank or a party faction but a protest movement that displayed all the characteristics of one, except for its small membership being made up of the wealthy and well connected.

George referred to the UK as a “Eurosceptic state” in all its facets, from the opinion of the public, to the policies of the political parties, the actions of the institutions of state to the pervasive anti-EU sentiment in UK history and culture. Academic analyses of the UK political system and Europe reinforced this perception, largely through the evidence of low support for membership from Eurobarometer data and electoral data showing strong support for parties with an anti-EU position. What this case study has shown is that while the UK indeed appeared to be an archetypal “Eurosceptic state”, incorporating a more nuanced view of UK public opinion and the party system shows that the wider historical perspective was of a state consistent in its uncertainty towards European integration. The UK public at only very specific times for fleeting moments were positively disposed towards the EU. Incapable of resolving popular negativity towards EU membership and the practical necessity of it for the state, the UK party system chose to avoid the EU issue. To describe the UK state as Eurosceptic would be to

ascribe a concerted effort on behalf of the state to undermine the process of European integration. A more accurate description would be that while the major UK political parties came to an uneasy truce with European integration, many of its citizens did not, and they campaigned for their own vision of a Eurosceptic state through the myriad of EPMs they formed.

Chapter 4: The Estonian Case

4.1 Introduction

Estonia was the only Eastern European and new member state case study undertaken for this research. Only a handful of previous studies have attempted to formulate general hypotheses about Euroscepticism in both East and West, new and old member states and most certainly not about civil society based Euroscepticism.³³⁶ Examining the development of EPMs in Estonia not only highlighted the different factors stimulating Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe as opposed to those in the West, it also allowed an analysis of civil society development there in comparison to the highly developed nature of civil society in Western Europe to be made. It is a generally accepted argument in studies of the former communist states that civil society is weak in the post-Soviet space.³³⁷ Only the most cursory of analyses have been made into social movement formation in Estonia. Thus far there has been a relatively ephemeral formation on ecology and minority rights.³³⁸ To understand if the EU was a more powerful issue of formation than these issues, which are typical of social movement formation across the literature, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides extensive analysis of the Estonian party system, a timeline of Estonia – EU relations, levels of support for EU membership amongst the Estonian public, before going on to highlight key ‘outside’ issues surrounding Estonian relations with the EU and the accession referendum itself. The second section focuses on EPMs and how they became the main proponents of Euroscepticism in Estonia. It also discusses the issue of Ethnic Russian Euroscepticism specifically, as analysing this group’s failure to mobilise against EU accession contributes to broader research on ethnic minority support for the

³³⁶ Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*; Kopécky and Mudde, ‘The two sides of Euroscepticism’. Marks, Gary et. al. (2006), ‘Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structures, Same Causality’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 39: 2, pp. 155-175.

³³⁷ Howard, Mark M (2003). *The weakness of civil society in post-Communist Europe*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

³³⁸ See: David Galbreath, (2003), ‘The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia’, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 4: 1, pp.35-54; Ehala, Martin (2009). ‘The Bronze Soldier: Identity Threat and Maintenance in Estonia’, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40: 1, pp. 139-158.

EU. Finally, the explanatory factors are used to investigate whether Eurosceptic mobilisation in Estonia follows a similar pattern to that suggested in the Eurosceptic and social movements literature or if its history as a former Soviet state has caused Euroscepticism there to take its own distinctive path.

First Section: Overview of Estonian Politics and EU Relations

4.2 The Estonian Party System and Europe

To understand the post-Soviet Estonian party system, three key points need to be emphasised.³³⁹ Firstly, post-independence Estonian politics has seen the dominance of right-wing parties over the left. Not until the election of 2001 was a party with any left leanings in government. Even in that case the largest winner in the election, the neo-liberal Reform Party, dominated the government agenda to such an extent that it forced the exit of the left-leaning Centre Party in under two years. The result of this right-wing domination of government during the nascent state's early years has been that liberal policies became institutionalised as the *de facto* Estonian government position. Additionally, the electoral and government dominance of right-wing parties left Estonia initially with no relevant social democratic party and no parliamentary reformed communist party. The Communist successor Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) made a breakthrough of six seats in the 1999 general elections but failed to win any in the 2002 elections and subsequent elections. In 2004 the Moderate party rebranded itself as the Estonian Social Democratic Party and had some degree of electoral success but its left policies were more focused on social issues, as it subscribed to liberal economic policies.³⁴⁰ This absence of an effective national left political party makes Estonia exceptional in Eastern European terms.³⁴¹

Secondly, all the main political parties have been part of government during the EU membership negotiation process. While the party names have changed, elected

³³⁹ Mikkel, Evald (2006). 'Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia: Consolidation unaccomplished?', Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.) *Post Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems*, Burlington: Ashgate, p. 23.

³⁴⁰ See Appendix V for a table of Estonian election results in % vote and seat numbers from 1992 on which illustrates this point.

³⁴¹ Mikkel, 'Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia', p. 29.

officials and indeed even the majority of members have stayed the same. Only the Greens out of all the Parliamentary parties up to the 2011 parliamentary election failed to hold office. While the Estonian party system was most certainly dynamic in terms of electoral volatility, its defining characteristic was more of consensus politics.³⁴² Parties that had diametrically opposed policies on issues such as Europe and clashing leadership personalities, added up the numbers of seats, put their differences aside, and formed governments. The case in point was that of the 2001-2 government of Savisaar and Kallas where, despite the former being centrist and ambivalent on Europe and the latter neo-liberal and strongly pro-Europe, both agreed with the EU negotiation policy of previous governments. As Sitter has shown, Euroscepticism is a government/opposition dynamic.³⁴³ In the Estonian case each party had experience, or its members had experience, of government or were being considered for government at the next election. Thus, the particular dynamics of Estonian coalition formation had a dampening effect on the use of Euroscepticism by opposition political parties as a policy platform to attack the government. It was difficult for Savisaar and the Centre Party to come out formally for a No vote in the accession referendum, despite their supporters perceiving themselves as those with most to lose from accession, as they had been part of a government that had advanced the EU negotiations significantly.³⁴⁴

Finally, the third general point about the Estonian Party system was that extremist and ethnic parties failed to succeed electorally in Estonia. Their share of the vote fell in successive elections from 15% in 1993 to 0.9% in 2011.³⁴⁵ This was largely the result of mainstream parties successfully broadening their appeal to ethnic Russians and the swift conclusion to the independence question which prevented the rise of national extremists.

³⁴² Ibid, p. 28.

³⁴³ Nick Sitter (2002). 'Opposing Europe: Euroscepticism, Opposition and Party Based Competition', *Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 56*.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

³⁴⁵ National Electoral Committee of Estonia; <http://www.vvk.ee/?lang=en>, accessed 29th November, 2008.

4.3 A Timeline of Estonia-EU Relations

Mikkel and Kasekamp outline a timeline of Estonian-EU relations around four key periods.³⁴⁶ The first period from 1991 to 1995 they label *Decommunisation*, whereby the political establishment was focused on reorientating the country away from the Soviet/Russian sphere towards a European sphere of influence. This did not specifically mean attempting to gain membership of just the EU but also any international body such as NATO, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations, that would take the country in a Western direction. This move was part of a dramatic shift in Estonia which saw the national economy, politics and society move in a liberal direction, reinforced by the electoral victories of right-wing parties, and the search for post-independence international recognition.³⁴⁷

The second period they refer to is that of *Euro-enthusiasm*: 1995-1998. In this period two factors placed considerable pressure on Estonia to speed up the accession process. Firstly its two main trading partners, Sweden and Finland, joined the EU, thus leaving Estonia separated from them by the Single Market. Post-communist Estonia had sought to create a new identity for itself as part of the Nordic group of nations based on geography, history and some shared cultural heritage.³⁴⁸ For two of its Nordic ‘brethren’ to join the EU meant that Estonia had to follow in their footsteps as well lest it fall too far behind and be labelled as too ‘backward’ to join the Western, rich and now Nordic EU. The other issue was the announcement by the Foreign Minister that NATO membership negotiations were progressing much more slowly than previously thought, with the result that Estonia would not be a member for the foreseeable future. The government decided that the country’s immediate security could be best pursued through the EU if the NATO option was not forthcoming. They communicated this belief in the need for EU accession to guarantee NATO membership and thus the long-term national security of Estonia to the Estonian public.³⁴⁹

The third period of Estonian-EU relations is labelled as *Euroscepticism*: 1999-2002. From the previous section on the Estonian party system it was shown that all the

³⁴⁶ Mikkel and Kasekamp, ‘Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia’, pp. 295 – 313.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 298.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 299-300.

³⁴⁹ Interview with Prof. Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 11th October, 2008.

main parties had spent time in government and come to a common position on the necessity of EU membership for the country. This common position was based on the generally held view of the government's need to play catch-up on the first round of accession states by adopting a strategy of integrating all the *acquis communautaire* without negotiating opt outs or concessions which would delay the process.³⁵⁰ The government believed that working towards being "the best European in the accession class"³⁵¹ would ensure membership and address all the concerns that had driven the membership application in the first place. At the same time, however, there was a growing perception amongst the political elite that the public was growing distant from the whole process of Estonian accession and so a common position on the need for holding a referendum was reached by the main political parties.³⁵² This, however, did not placate an Estonian public that grew outraged with the real impacts of the accession process. The first indication of this latent distrust of the accession process was when the European Commission confirmed that new member state farmers would initially receive only 25% of the levels of subsidies given to their Western counterparts. The "Sugar Crises of 2001" appeared to confirm the worst suspicions of farmers when EU-produced sugar was dumped on the Estonian market, collapsing the price of sugar for Estonian farmers. Compounding this, the Estonian government was fined for allowing overproduction of sugar beyond the quotas allowed by the EU negotiations.³⁵³ Despite all these developments, the Estonian government continued with the same EU negotiation policy of total application of the *acquis communautaire*. This was due to the European Commission announcing that Latvia and Lithuania had advanced quickly in accession negotiations and would be considered for membership in the next round of enlargement. The Estonian government saw its imperative as completing accession negotiations at all costs lest it be "left behind" not only by the Nordic states, but also by its Baltic neighbours. The level of Euroscepticism was dampened somewhat by the election in 2001 of the Centre Party into government and of Arnold Rüütel of the People's Union to

³⁵⁰ Mikkel and Kasekamp, 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia', pp. 300-3.

³⁵¹ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Past, Liisa and Palk, Paavo (2005). 'The Referendum Campaign: Innovation and Mobilisation' in Piret Ehin and Vello Pattai (eds.) *Choosing Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia*, Tartu: University of Tartu Press, p. 76.

the Presidency. Both represented the supposed “losers” of European integration, the urban and rural poor respectively. The Centre Party’s and Rüütel’s acceptance of the previous administration’s EU negotiation policy was key to taking public opinion back in favour of accession and reducing the fallout from the CAP implementation policies.³⁵⁴

The fourth and final period is described as *the Realisation of EU membership: 2002–Present Day*. The 2003 general election saw government parties slightly increasing their share of the vote for the first time since independence and pro-EU or EU neutral parties taking all the seats in Parliament. This was widely interpreted as a public validation of the government’s EU negotiation policy.³⁵⁵ The accession referendum on 14 September 2003 produced a resounding 66.83% to 33.17% vote in favour of membership on a turnout of 64.06%. The strength of the Yes vote and the relatively high turnout have been attributed to the almost unanimous call for a Yes vote from the political, social, cultural and economic establishment.³⁵⁶ Despite this level of support for EU accession, however, the government did not hold a referendum on membership of the Euro, as Prime Minister Andrus Ansip stated there was a general political consensus in the Riigikogu in favour of membership (Estonia formally joined the Eurozone on January 1st 2011).³⁵⁷

The main conclusion from the Estonian EU accession process was that, while it was characterised by a certain degree of political consensus in its favour, it was ultimately a political elite driven process from the beginning. This had the effect of alienating voters from the accession process, leaving them unaware and uninformed of the development of Estonia’s integration into the EU. In such a situation the space for EPM formation was obvious and its role in the elite driven accession process will be discussed in the next section. The situation whereby the Estonian public had a negative position on EU membership while the political parties had a pro-membership position or acquiesced on it, caused tremendous uncertainty as to the outcome of the referendum vote right until the final week of campaigning. The reasons for these frequent and dramatic shifts in public opinion on EU membership will be discussed next.

³⁵⁴ Mikkel and Kasekamp, ‘Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia’, pp. 302 – 3.

³⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 303-4.


³⁵⁶ Mikkel and Pridham, ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’’, p. 739.

³⁵⁷ Dennis, Neil ‘Euro falls as Estonia joins the Eurozone’, *The Financial Times*, 3rd January 2011.

4.4 Estonian Public Support for EU Accession


To fully appreciate the complex nature of Estonian public support for EU accession, Estonian public support for accession is contrasted to that of its neighbour Latvia: *Figures 4.1 and 4.2*. A cursory analysis of the two tables shows the fluctuating nature of Estonian support for EU membership against the contrast of Latvian support where both sides were constant until the referendum itself. The standard deviation of Estonian public support for accession shows it to have been over two times that of Latvia's: at 6.3 to 2.7 showing the high rate of variance in Estonian public support for EU accession in the run up to the referendum.

Figure 4.1: Support for EU accession in Estonia



Pettai, Vello (2005) 'Unfounded worries?: Euroscepticism prior to the referendum' in Piret Ehin and Vello Pettai (eds.) *Choosing Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia*, Tartu: University of Tartu Press, p. 46.

Figure 4.2: Support for EU accession in Latvia



Pettai, Vello (2005) 'Unfounded worries?: Euroscepticism prior to the referendum' in Piret Ehin and Vello Pettai (eds.) *Choosing Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia*, Tartu: University of Tartu Press, p. 47.


The two clear trends from this data are firstly that support for EU membership fluctuated significantly in Estonia and secondly that on average 40% of the population were against membership throughout the three year period covered by the data in *Figure 4.1*. In relation to the first point the Estonian public was strongly influenced by both unfurling events and elite cues. Many Estonians were wary of participation in European integration and a series of problems stemming from the application of the *acquis communautaire* reinforced this suspicion.³⁵⁸ The public were indignant about the 'sugar crises' of 2001, and the reduction in CAP payments to Estonian farmers compared to their Western counterparts.

This situation had changed completely by late 2001 when Estonia won the Eurovision song contest. While the contest had nothing to do with the EU, it symbolised for Estonians that they were appreciated by the rest of Europe at what was the nation's most

³⁵⁸ Mikkel and Kasekamp, 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia', pp. 311-3.

popular cultural outlet.³⁵⁹ The sentiment appeared to be that if Estonia can beat the big nations at the Eurovision, Estonia will be able to “punch above its weight” as an EU member. The Eurovision victory was followed by the surprise political changes of the agrarian People’s Union Party candidate, Arnold Rüütel, winning the Presidential election and the Centre Party forming a new coalition government with their right-wing adversaries the Reform Party. With Rüütel getting most of his support from the farming community and the Centre Party the urban poor, the supposed ‘losers’ of EU membership had their political representatives in senior positions in government and so trusted them to manage the accession process on their behalf. The new President in particular adopted a strong pro-EU stance, bringing many Eurosceptic and undecided rural voters to the Yes side.³⁶⁰ The ultimate passing of the accession Treaty with a 67% Yes vote, and the continued growth in support of EU membership as *Figure 4.3* shows, can be attributed to a combination of these various factors and not to any single event.

Figure 4.3 Generally speaking do you think that Estonia's membership of the EU is a ... ?




Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 54 – No. 74.

³⁵⁹ Given that the Estonian independence movement from the Soviet Union is referred to as the “Singing revolution” the importance of the Eurovision victory, while unimportant in Western Europe, is still very important in the Eastern Europe.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 302-4 and pp. 311-3.

An additional point on the volatility of Estonian public opinion on Europe was the failure of the government to educate the public on the EU, as *Figure 4.4* shows. Before accession Estonian voters considered themselves to have very little knowledge of the EU, and they were ranked as the least knowledgeable about EU affairs out of all the accession states.

Figure 4.4: Respondents who reported an EU knowledge level of only 1-4 on a series of
10



Pettai, 'Unfounded worries?', p. 49.

The lack of knowledge of even the most basic facts about the EU, as shown in *Figure 4.4*, made it difficult for Estonians to form concrete opinions on EU membership, thus leaving them more susceptible to political elite cues and events at an EU and indeed European level in the case of the Eurovision. The dramatic undulations in support for accession were partly explained by events at the national level. However, the effect of the fundamental lack of awareness of all things EU was to magnify the impact of various

Estonian political and EU related events on public support for membership. Additionally this low level of EU knowledge explains the discrepancy between public Euroscepticism and political pro-Europeanism in that an EU-ignorant public opposed what they did not understand and an executive experienced political class accepted what they believed to have been a national imperative. For EPMs this meant that a large segment of the Estonian public were open to the arguments of EPMs in their negative attitude to European integration. As will be highlighted in the next section, the formation of Estonian EPMs was driven in part by a desire to educate the public to the reality of what Estonia was giving up in the accession process, both in terms of national sovereignty and economic policy.

4.5 An Overview of Estonian–EU relations: the geopolitical ‘silent debate’

The strength and consistency of Estonian political elite support for EU membership was fundamentally different in comparison to the other case studies. This difference can be explicitly linked to the fundamentally different geopolitical context of Estonian–EU relations. The most obvious difference was that Estonia was absorbed into the Soviet Union for forty-six years, only emerging as an independent country again in 1991.³⁶¹ It is this legacy of Soviet domination that is crucial to understanding the specific nature of Estonian–EU relations. The UK joined for economic reasons, while Ireland and Denmark joined because their largest export market was the UK and they had to accede to the EU for economic necessity. The economic rationale for joining was not the primary driver behind the Estonian application to join. Geopolitical security considerations were the most pressing issue pushing the Estonian government to begin negotiations to join the EU.³⁶²

Estonia was not amongst the first former communist states to join NATO, as the organisation felt that a move to expand into a country on the Russian border that was until a few years before part of the Soviet Union, would create unnecessary tension with Russia. Successive Estonian governments throughout the 1990s and the President,

³⁶¹ Estonia first gained its independence from the Bolshevik Russian state in 1920 and remained independent until 1939 when it was absorbed into the Soviet Union, then with the 1941 Nazi invasion it became part of *Reichskommissariat Ostland*, before re-absorption into the Soviet Union in 1945.

³⁶² Mikkel and Pridham, ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’’, p. 739.

Lennart Meri, held the very strong opinion that the number one issue affecting the state was security. With NATO membership indefinitely stalled, EU membership was seen as the next best thing. If the ‘hard’ security of NATO could not be achieved, then the ‘soft’ security of the EU was the next best policy that could be realistically achieved.³⁶³ Preoccupation with NATO membership however, resulted in Estonia being left somewhat behind in the accession application to the EU compared to other Eastern European states, such as Poland and Hungary, who had already signed ‘Europe Agreements’ (they constituted a legal framework for the implementation of the accession process) in 1991 which took Estonia until 1995 to sign. This created an intolerable situation for the government and politicians whereby their geopolitical status was as unsure in 1998 as it was in 1991, with neither NATO nor EU membership guaranteed and with other Eastern European states well on the road to NATO or EU membership or both. Falling behind the other Eastern European states in the NATO and EU accession processes combined with the dramatic economic collapse of its largest trading partner, Russia in 1998, led the government to aggressively seek EU membership. The belief was that membership of the EU would strengthen the case for Estonia’s number one foreign policy objective of accession to NATO.³⁶⁴ Indeed Estonia joined NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004, linking the two in the minds of the public.

What is perhaps even more interesting to note about the geopolitical nature of the Estonian debate on the EU, is that it was held mostly within the political elite. There was a general consensus amongst pro-European and Eurosceptic activists that while the geopolitical issues discussed above were never explicitly debated in public, there was a common understanding in the public that they were in the background throughout the EU accession referendum. Only at the end of the campaign when a Yes vote was somewhat in doubt did the government make stronger analogies on the implications of a No vote on potential NATO membership and a return to Russian domination.³⁶⁵ This ‘silent debate’ looms behind the material discussed in the rest of this section.

³⁶³ Ibid, pp. 718-9.

³⁶⁴ Interview with Prof. Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 11th October, 2008.

³⁶⁵ Past and Palk, ‘The Referendum Campaign: Innovation and Mobilisation’, p.81.

The supposed hidden dominance of geopolitical factors did provide something of a riposte to Franklin's argument that European referendums and elections are 'second order' and reflect domestic concerns.³⁶⁶ The previous case studies of Ireland and the UK showed that domestic factors are key drivers of electoral support or rejection of European integration. The Estonian case was an example of where the public ignored their own domestically rooted Euroscepticism and having analysed the geopolitical effects of rejecting EU membership, voted Yes. Estonia represented a potential case of an electorate choosing European integration on the grounds of explicitly geopolitical considerations rather than the economic utility of membership.

Analysing Estonia provides a fuller understanding of how contemporary electorates may vote Yes or No on EU referendums due to geopolitical factors, overriding their domestic Euroscepticism. The example of Estonian EPMs' formation on national level issues in a debate focused on the international level reinforces the argument of this study that EPM formation and activity need to be seen as national level developments.

4.6 Estonia in the East European Context

The Estonian referendum did not take place in a political vacuum. There was a very conscious awareness of the other referendums taking place across the East European states and the momentous historical context that this represented. National leaders spoke of a collective "return to Europe" by Eastern Europe away from the legacy of forty-five years of Communist rule. The Eastern European public at large was well aware of the wider implications of accession and held a long-term historic view of the referendums.³⁶⁷ In actively seeking to play the EU accession referendum in terms of the country's move from totalitarianism to liberal democracy that was part of a similar pattern across Eastern Europe, the accession referendum was not focused around the utilitarian issues that have tended to dominate Western European referendums on European integration. Both Yes and No sides instead based their arguments around differing interpretations of what constituted the best path for securing the fledgling independent Estonian nation.

³⁶⁶ Franklin, 'Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government'.

³⁶⁷ Fowler, Brigid (2005). 'Hungary: Unpicking the permissive consensus', Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) *EU Enlargement and Referendums*, Oxford: Routledge, p. 77.

This was a unique political situation, whereby the governments across the former communist states in Eastern Europe were united behind a single political project. There was active behind the scenes coordination of the referendum between the government and opposition. In the Estonian case the government was actively aware of the strong Eurosceptic opinion of its electorate and so actively sought agreement with other states that Estonia should be one of the last states to hold a referendum. The Estonian government believed that holding the accession referendum after Slovakia and Lithuania, where a Yes vote was believed to be a formality, would lead to a “cascade effect”³⁶⁸ and encourage the electorate not to leave Estonia out of the EU on its own and without an international alliance to protect them from Russia.³⁶⁹

By purposely holding the referendum at the end of the other twelve, the Estonian referendum campaign was not only exposing itself to the impact of presumed Yes votes of other nations but unseen factors that arose over the course of the accession referendum process. Szczerbiak and Taggart point out that the most pressing issue for governments to emerge across the referendums was that of voter turnout that was far below expected levels. While the predicted Yes votes were achieved with strong majorities, the legitimacy of the whole accession process was put into question by a succession of turnouts in the low 50% range of the electorate.³⁷⁰ With some states having minimum thresholds for referendums to be passed, No campaigners were arguing that abstention was the most effective form of defeating referendums. Strongly pro-EU countries such as Slovakia came within several thousand votes of missing thresholds. This scared the Estonian government, as even though it required no threshold for ratification, a low turnout could swing the outcome in favour of the No side, given the ambivalence of the Estonian public towards the EU. A low turnout would additionally have the potential to de-legitimise a Yes vote in the eyes of the Estonian public and the EU.³⁷¹ These ‘outside’

³⁶⁸ Szczerbiak and Taggart, ‘The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout’, p. 6.

³⁶⁹ Mikkel, Evald and Pridham, Geoffrey (2005). ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’: The Referendum on EU Accession in Estonia and Latvia’, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) *EU Enlargement and Referendums*, Oxford: Routledge, pp. 173-4.

³⁷⁰ Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2005). ‘Conclusion: Towards a Model of (European) Referendums’, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) *EU Enlargement and Referendums*, Oxford: Routledge, p. 7.

³⁷¹ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

factors forced the Estonian government's hand into launching a lengthy, widespread and expensive Yes campaign. This had a twofold effect of firstly pushing EU accession right to the top of national agenda, just below that of NATO membership, and secondly of pushing Estonian EPMs into the national media spotlight as they sought to bring a counterbalance to the government's pervasive Yes campaign. Estonian EPMs thus gained a national public platform denied to most No campaigners in other Eastern European states. This level of activity of the government campaign forced the EPMs to 'up their game' and campaign harder, in order to overcome the limit of their resources compared to the Yes campaign's largesse.³⁷²

Section Two: Euroscepticism in Estonia

4.7 Overview of Estonian Euroscepticism and EPMs

From an analysis of the continually evolving literature on Estonian-EU relations and more specifically Estonian Euroscepticism, this study proposed that opposition to the EU in Estonia can be placed into a typology of three forms.

The first was the pro-communist/Russian bloc, which saw EU membership as a further disintegration of the country's links with Russia. Their supporters were a small minority of the ethnic Russian population made up mostly of pensioners. Indeed the most interesting aspect of minority-based Euroscepticism in Estonia was how it was not effective in either visibility, votes or at the party political level. This section will seek to understand why ethnic Russians did not form on the EU issue in Estonia as examples of non-EPM formation were just as relevant to this study as are EPMs themselves.

The second group was hard-line Estonian nationalists, based around the Independence Party, which was based on anti-Russian, quasi-fascist rhetoric but received only 0.4% of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections.³⁷³ Another element of this

³⁷² Interview with Igor Gräzin, co-director Research Centre Free Europe and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008. Interview with Prof. Ivar Räig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008. Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

³⁷³ Mikkel and Kasekamp. 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia', pp. 309-10.

was nationalist members of mainstream political parties who broke party ranks to oppose the referendum. The Yes vote in the referendum and subsequent surge in support for the EU amongst the Estonian electorate forced nationalist Eurosceptics to accept EU membership as an irrevocable part of Estonia's political future, lest they ended up "in the political wilderness like the Independence Party".³⁷⁴

Finally, the third form of Euroscepticism was that of economic liberalism. In the immediate post-soviet period the Estonian government, directed by Prime Minister Maart Laar, specifically followed policies diametrically opposed to communism, which were strongly influenced by those policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as they had taken the lead in calling for the end of Soviet domination of the Baltic states.³⁷⁵ Thus, the intellectual direction of independent Estonian political culture has been towards increased liberalisation in economic, and to a lesser degree social and political life. The arguments of the most prominent Estonian Eurosceptics were based on economic liberalism, specifically the negative impact of the *acquis communautaire* on Estonia's liberal economic policies.

4.7.1 The Dominance of Economically Liberal Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism based on economic liberalism existed several years before the accession referendum and was still active up to the 2011 parliamentary elections. The most high-profile anti-accession campaigners were Professors Ivar Räig and Igor Gräzin of the EPM; the *Research Centre Free Europe*.³⁷⁶ They were given a high profile by the media as Räig was a former minister and Department of Foreign Affairs civil servant, and Gräzin was an academic and MP for the Reform Party.³⁷⁷ Similarly to the other case studies, Euroscepticism became associated with several individuals and the ideological basis of their opposition to European integration became the default arguments against the EU in Estonia. This high media and public profile played a significant role in encouraging these two individuals to form an EPM. Despite the personality clashes and

³⁷⁴ Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

³⁷⁵ Mikkel and Kasekamp, 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia', pp. 298-9.

³⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 313.

³⁷⁷ Gräzin was elected an MEP for the Reform Party in 2004 and was drawn into controversy as he was listed by Declan Ganley as a signature in the registration of his Libertas Party for the 2009 EP elections. Gräzin denied this until the document with this signature on it was shown to him and he subsequently withdrew his support causing him to lose significant political standing in Estonia.

differing attitudes to the desired extent of Estonian participation in European integration, cooperation between them was possible due to their shared libertarian values and recognition of some form of EU membership for Estonia.³⁷⁸ This gave them a significant advantage over the nationalists and pro-Russians who opposed membership outright and were portrayed as isolationists who were damaging Estonia's chance of joining NATO and the EU to the benefit of Russia.³⁷⁹ This element of Estonian Euroscepticism was soft, as in the Szczerbiak and Taggart model, in that its opposition to European integration was to the protectionist sections of the *acquis communautaire* but it accepted the principle of membership as an important bulwark against Russian influence in Estonia.

The particular nature of Estonian Euroscepticism and the relative failure of more typical forms of Euroscepticism, based on national sovereignty and socialist critiques of the single market, were based on the recent history of Estonian independence. Estonia engaged in the 'shock' therapy of economic liberalisation almost immediately after seceding from the Soviet Union and the independence movement of the country was framed in terms of moving as far away as ideologically possible from the communist system. Thus Estonians began to see themselves and their national identity as liberal and embracing of modern telecommunications, specifically the internet.³⁸⁰ The immediate post-Soviet period saw intense economic hardship as the economy shifted to a capitalist model and inefficient industries and farmers were left to fail by the *laissez faire* policies of the government. After these six to seven years of hardship the economy adapted successfully to capitalism and the early governmental investment in internet and telecommunications technology created the foundations for soaring economic growth of an average of 8.3% from 2000-2004.³⁸¹ During this period the government initiated accession talks with the EU after being turned down amongst the first group of applicants in 1998. As discussed earlier, the Estonian government coalition of centre right parties under Juhan Parts was anxious to accede to the EU as quickly as possible for two reasons.

³⁷⁸ Rääg, Ivar. 'Freedom Yes, Europe No', *These Tides*, Winter 2004/5 (These Tides was a magazine produced by David Wilkinson in conjunction with Research Centre Free Europe seeking to communicate pan-European Euroscepticism).

³⁷⁹ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

³⁸⁰ Runnel, Pille et. al. (2009). 'The Estonian Tiger Leap From Post-Communism to the Information Society: From Policy to Practice', *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40: 1, pp. 29-30.

³⁸¹ From Estonian Government statistics office <http://www.stat.ee/29958>, accessed 25 November, 2008.

Firstly, it did not want to be left behind as Latvia and Lithuania were also beginning negotiations to join. Secondly it sought to use EU membership as a step on the ladder towards their ultimate goal of NATO membership. Negotiations were not, however, going well by 2002.³⁸² The thinking of the government of Parts at the time was that if the ‘hard’ geopolitical security of NATO was not attainable for the foreseeable future then the ‘soft’ security of the EU would have to suffice to protect Estonia from Russian influence.³⁸³

Thus, the dynamics of the Estonian-EU debate prior to membership are apparent. On the one hand, the Estonian public was starting to benefit after several years of extreme hardship from a dynamic, independent Estonian economy, and on the other hand, the Estonian government was anxious to secure the country’s long term geo-political security by firmly allying the country to EU institutions. The EU accession referendum would create tensions between the belief that Estonia was doing fine on its own, as justified by the booming liberalised economy and stagnant over-regulated EU economy, and the concern of the country’s political elite that Estonia needed to join the EU immediately lest it be drawn into the Russian sphere of influence yet again. How these international- and domestic-level factors combined to influence EPM formation will be discussed in the next section as well as how civil society based Euroscepticism in Estonia came to be so effective compared to party-based Euroscepticism in other EU accession states. Examining such a question is important in explaining EPM formation, as in this case it provides interesting conclusions on the importance of the open policy process and media propositions in this regard, as well as to the wider area of civil society development in former Soviet states.

4.8 Two Dominant EPMs: the *Research Centre Free Europe and Movement No to the EU*

The analysis of Estonian EPMs proceeds slightly differently to that of the other case studies in that it only offers a brief description of the EPMs before going on to test them against the explanatory factors. This is because the two EPMs were only active for

³⁸² Lauristin, Marju and Vihalemm, Peeter (2009) ‘The Political Agenda During Different Periods of Estonian Transformation: External and Internal Factors’, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40: 1, pp. 12-15.

³⁸³ Ibid, p. 16.

a handful of years and there were only two of them. Quite simply the story of Estonian EPMS is so short that there is little to discuss in comparison to the other case studies. In contrast, there is much to discuss in relation to how and why they were formed and so this section will mostly focus on this element.

4.8.1 The *Research Centre Free Europe*

The *Research Centre Free Europe* was founded originally as a think-tank in 2001 by Prof. Ivar Räig, a former Reform Party MP, Foreign Ministry official and university economics lecturer along with Prof. Igor Gräzin, a Reform Party MP and former university lecturer. Their main critique of EU integration was an economically liberal one, where they viewed tariffs, the CAP and EU regulations as an unbearable hindrance to the economic development of Estonia. They argued that the Estonian government had been complicit in this as officials did not secure enough opt outs or conditions in the negotiating process, thereby putting Estonia at a distinct disadvantage.³⁸⁴ For the referendum campaign the *Research Centre Free Europe* did not oppose membership *per se* but did oppose membership on the terms negotiated and at the time agreed. Joining in 2004 with the terms in question would have a negative effect on the Estonian economy, which was the fastest growing in Europe at the time. The group developed strong links with the *Bruges Group* and the Conservative Party in the UK mostly due to common economic policies and mutual admiration of Margaret Thatcher.³⁸⁵ While the Estonians in the group focused on economic and policy criticisms, UK nationals ran the *Research Centre Free Europe's* magazine, *These Tides*, and adopted a much harder Eurosceptic, more sovereignty orientated stance that attempted to create a common sphere of discourse between UK, Scandinavian and Estonian Eurosceptics.³⁸⁶ In the wake of the passing of the EU accession referendum the magazine folded and the UK elements left, leaving the Estonian members to change the *Research Centre Free Europe* back to its original form,

³⁸⁴ Interview with Igor Gräzin, co-director Research Centre Free Europe and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008. Interview with Prof. Ivar Räig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008. Räig.

³⁸⁵ Räig, Ivar (2004). *New Atlantic: Great Britain and the Future of a New Europe*, Tallinn: Research Centre Free Europe Publications; Interview with Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June 2010.

³⁸⁶ Wilkinson, David. 'These Tides from Tallinn', *These Tides*, March, 2004.

a Eurosceptic think-tank that opposed certain elements of European integration, in this case EU economic and trade policy.

Räig maintained that the original motivations behind his founding of the *Research Centre Free Europe* stem from his time as a civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participating in EU accession negotiations. His superiors informed him that negotiations should proceed with all haste lest Estonia be left behind the other accession states, which had started negotiations to join the EU several years before Estonia. As such, he stated that he was told to agree to all conditions imposed by the EU negotiators and not hold up the accession process by trying to agree “opt outs” or “special conditions” for specific Estonian interests.³⁸⁷ When he tried to raise this matter, he was posted elsewhere and so he quit the civil service to pursue his criticism of the government’s EU policy. Having been an MP for seven years, he believed that the party system was endemically pro-EU and that he had no other option but to found the *Research Centre Free Europe* with Gräzin.³⁸⁸ This reasoning of Räig for forming the EPM was interesting as he was an intimate part of the policy formation process but decided to leave that process and challenge it from an ideological position in civil society. None of the other EPMs in this study were founded by individuals who had such a close relationship to the political opportunity structure of their country.

While originally founded as a think-tank for the referendum on accession, the *Research Centre Free Europe* became active in its contestation of Estonian membership of the EU. A key element of this move from a think-tank to an EPM was the placing of the *Research Centre Free Europe* as leading opponents of EU membership by the media and political parties. Taking the opportunity of this publicity and access to the policy-making process, the *Research Centre Free Europe* moved toward more active contestation of EU membership.³⁸⁹ Their protest took the form of engaging in media- and town hall-style debates with national politicians over the accession.³⁹⁰ They undertook limited forms of advertising in national newspapers and dissemination of pamphlets but this clear practice of actively engaging in contesting the EU issue with pro-

³⁸⁷ Räig, Ivar. ‘A Brief Introduction to UKVE’, *These Tides*, March 2004.

³⁸⁸ Interview with Prof. Ivar Räig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008

³⁸⁹ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

³⁹⁰ Interview with Prof. Ivar Räig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008

membership politicians comfortably fits into the definition of protest outlined in the first chapter. Moreover, conscious of the need to expand their campaign of information dissemination against EU membership, they actively recruited volunteers and sought to increase membership to meet the challenge of the referendum campaign. In this process they quite clearly became an EPM, the reason for which, according to themselves, was a desire to fill the almost complete vacuum of opposition towards accession.³⁹¹

4.8.2 The *Movement No to the EU*

This EPM was founded by Uno Silberg, a local councillor for the People's Union Party, in opposition to the widespread pro-European sentiment of both his political party and the party system at large. He was joined in this campaign by several other local councillors, but crucially by no parliamentarians, from other political parties. The group attracted many volunteers, many more than the *Research Centre Free Europe* (though Silberg refused to put a number on the amount). Their main argument was that accession to the EU violated Article One of the Estonian constitution, "The independence and sovereignty of Estonia are timeless and inalienable"³⁹². They used '§1' as a common symbol to make reference to the article, and placed it on campaign material across the whole No movement, such as posters, leaflets, t-shirts and balloons.³⁹³

The factors underlying Silberg's formation of *Movement No to the EU* were relatively straightforward. For the People's Union as a nationalist party, membership of the supranationalist EU obviously compromises the sovereignty of the Estonian nation. However, as the party was in government at the time of the referendum, the party leadership and MPs supported the Yes campaign. This left nationalists like Silberg without an opportunity to express their strongly felt Euroscepticism. Any move by Eurosceptics within the party to split and form a Eurosceptic party would have resulted in local politicians who supported Silberg losing the support base of the party's parliamentary representatives and national support structure and all the resources that brought. As almost a wholly-rural based party this proposed new party would have been

³⁹¹ Interview with Igor Gräzin, co-director Research Centre Free Europe and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008.

³⁹² Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

³⁹³ Helme, Mart. 'The Estonia Campaign', *These Tides*, March 2004.

in stiff competition to compete for the small rural vote with a nationally known, financed and relatively historic party.³⁹⁴ The obvious decision was to create a civil society vehicle to allow them to act on their opposition to EU accession. Party officials gave tacit approval to this group, as it played well with the party's rural base which was wary of European integration, whilst also maintaining the party's responsibilities in government.³⁹⁵

Given that the *Movement No to the EU* was made up of local councillors with limited access to resources, their campaign was weak and divided. The rural base of the membership made coordination difficult and the campaign found themselves unable to effectively organize itself to reach out to the urban population centres. Their main forms of campaigning were posterage, handing out pamphlets and holding presentations in front of local and workplace associations. Silberg was explicit in stating that they were under no illusions as to the symbolic nature of their protest campaign against membership³⁹⁶. This was further compounded when the Estonian government launched a specific pro-accession campaign in rural Estonia specifically designed to allay the fears of farmers and the elderly. Campaign buses, posters, billboard advertising and blanket media coverage involving national politicians and the popular President Rüütel were employed in this campaign.³⁹⁷ Competing against such a large budget and organisation made it very difficult for the *Movement No to the EU's* campaign to succeed but the EPM was driven by the desire to offer some form of opposition to EU membership. They were acutely aware of the depth of the challenge (in securing a No vote) that they faced. The additional external factors that impacted upon their decision to form are analysed in the following section.

4.8.3 Explaining the Importance of Economic Liberal Euroscepticism in EPM formation

Why did EPMs emerge in Estonia due to the low level of Euroscepticism in the Estonian party system but not in other Eastern European states? In the EU referendums

³⁹⁴ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

³⁹⁵ Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

³⁹⁷ Past and Palk, 'The Referendum Campaign: Innovation and Mobilisation', p.81.

in the other Eastern European states, civil society was sorely missing from the No side. The principal reason for this was the obvious communist legacy of regimes that outlawed independent civil society activities. Eurosceptics in the former communist states, without any history of civil society campaigns, found it difficult to organise themselves into a coherent campaign against the institutions of the state.³⁹⁸ We can contrast this to Eurosceptic campaigners in referendums in the Nordic states of Norway, Denmark and Sweden, where civil society campaigns have been more effective than those of the government.³⁹⁹

Thus, Estonia presented itself as a deviant case of civil society activity in the former communist states in that the most effective opposition to European integration was organised from civil society, a pattern seen more in Scandinavian countries. We must control for this apparent discrepancy, however, with several variables. First of all is size. Given the population of Estonia (1.34 million) and the urban concentration of this small population (the two main cities Tallinn and Tartu make up almost half the population), the barrier for reaching a national audience were significantly lower than Poland and Romania, for example, where the populations are widely dispersed and rural. Therefore the barriers to entry of civil-society groups were lower. Ivar Rääig, the de-facto figurehead of the Estonian No campaign, pointed out that all he had to do was have an opinion piece published in the *Postimees* newspaper and he could reach 50% of the electorate or appear on the nightly news programme (*Aktuaalne kaamera*) and reach 75% of it.⁴⁰⁰ However the same could be said of Latvia, which had a similarly small population (2.2 million) and a small geographic area, but which was even more urbanised, with over 50% of the population living in Riga alone. Yet no effective civil society movement against European membership occurred there. Galbreath has touched on the subject in his 2004 comparative study of civil society in the Baltic states by pointing out that while absolute numbers of civil society groups were fairly evenly spread throughout all three Baltic states, Estonia had a disproportionate number of political

³⁹⁸ Hanley, Séan (2003). 'A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum 13-14 June 2003', *West European Politics*, 27: 4, pp. 704-6.

³⁹⁹ Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and European Union'; Sitter, 'Opposing Europe'; Siune, 'The Danes Said No the Maastricht Treaty'.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Prof. Ivar Rääig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008.

activist civil society groups.⁴⁰¹ His study does not proffer any in depth reasons for this aberration but instead offers the generalisation that it was a reflection of the relative stability and ideological uniformity that has characterised Estonia since independence. This in turn led to the development of Estonian civil society towards a Western European model. The ideological uniformity of post-independence Estonia provided those opposed to European integration with a strong ideological template for Eurosceptic mobilisation; that of economic liberalism mixed with post-communist nationalism. Additionally, given that these arguments resonated with the Estonian public, Eurosceptics were able to bring them to the national level EU debate. The importance of the issue framing environment is stressed in the literature on social movements.⁴⁰² In comparison to the other Eastern European states Estonia had developed a distinct national identity around economic liberalism, and the *Research Centre Free Europe* were able to frame this issue as being negatively affected by the centralising force of European integration. Given Estonia's history of foreign domination and only recent re-emergence as an independent state, the national sovereignty issue of the *Movement No to the EU* should apparently have gained a lot more traction in the electorate than it did. It was not as potentially successful, because the issue environment was charged by the government's tying together of EU and NATO membership to guarantee national security. The issue-framing environment played an important role in accentuating EPM formation on certain issues and not on others that perhaps would have been more expected.

Secondly, there was the effect of five decades of Estonia's membership as an integral part of the Soviet Union and the denial of even token independence that was the case with other former communist states. Additionally, there was the substantial shift in population over the course of the Soviet era, with Estonians making up 95% of the population in 1938 but 65% in 2006. Both these points mark out Estonia as having a different 'experience' under communism compared to the other former communist states, which was relevant as Estonia would be far more likely to join the EU to prevent another threat to its independence, as had happened in 1940 by the Soviet Union, 1941 by Nazi

⁴⁰¹ Galbreath, 'The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia', pp. 50-2.

⁴⁰² Snow and Benford, 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest'.

Germany and then again by the Soviet Union in 1944.⁴⁰³ Again, however, both Lithuania and Latvia were subsumed into the Soviet Union and Latvia itself experienced a far greater population transfer during Soviet occupation, with the proportion of ethnic Latvians as part of the total population declining from 75% in 1939 to 59% by 2006. Therefore the Estonian experience under communism was not exceptional and thus does not explain its divergence from the other former communist states' non-development of civil society-based Euroscepticism.

The example of EPM formation in Estonia was not only exceptional in the Eastern European context but also in the Baltic states context as well. Following on from this chapter's analysis of the Estonian party system and Europe, there was the issue of the ideological critique of EU integration. Estonian party politics has been characterised as lacking an even moderately left-wing party.⁴⁰⁴ Political discourse was supportive of continuous government policies to reduce the flat-tax rate and remove the government from the economy. Here was where Estonia did appear to be unique amongst the Eastern European states, where in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, for example, left-wing or populist parties were swept into power on the back of reactions against such liberal economic policies and promises to restore certain elements of the social spending of communist times. This was not the case in Estonia, where liberal policies had widespread public support and the populace was proud of the nation's adage as the most economically free of the former communist states. To a significant degree Estonian national and political identity became linked to the ideology of economic liberalism and the resultant success of the Estonian economy.

Taggart points out that Euroscepticism frequently manifests itself around a "touchstone issue of dissent",⁴⁰⁵ where a specific issue that resonates with the public is chosen as the basis for Eurosceptic activity by a group or political party who portray themselves as the 'defenders' of that issue. In Latvia no single clear issue emerged to unify a potentially deep seam of public opposition to European integration into active campaigning but in Estonia the belief in liberalism as a national ideology was able to do

⁴⁰³ Ehin and Pattai, 'Introduction', pp. 7-9.

⁴⁰⁴ Mikkel, 'Patterns of Party Formation in Estonia', p. 29.

⁴⁰⁵ Taggart, 'A Touchstone Issue of Dissent', p. 363.

so.⁴⁰⁶ At the time of accession Latvia was struggling for a clear national direction amidst unending upheaval at a national political level, where nationalists, conservatives, liberals, reformed communists and ecologists all led governments. The uniformity of the direction of the Estonian economy and society gave Eurosceptic campaigners there a “touchstone issue of dissent” appreciated and understood by the public which they could frame their opposition to EU membership around. In the *Research Centre Free Europe’s* magazine, Rääg made explicit reference to the high levels of economic freedom that Estonia had achieved since independence and the social prosperity and advance of the nation as a whole that came from this. EU membership, according to the *Research Centre Free Europe*, would lead to a “regulatory monopoly” causing economic stagnation in Estonia by stifling the innovation and enterprise that they stated was the “pride of the Estonian nation”.⁴⁰⁷

It appears then that the relative stability (in an Eastern European context) and overarching liberal ideology of the Estonian party system were important causal factors of EPM formation in Estonia but not in the very similar state of Latvia. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this was that Latvia, with a dramatically fluid party system and society, did not have the stable domestic environment to promulgate ideas of active opposition to EU membership in civil society as Estonia was able to.

4.8.4 Explaining the lack of a Russian based EPM

The focus of this chapter on Estonian EPMs dealt with formation by economic libertarians and Estonian nationalists on the EU issue. Ethnic Russians were identified as another source of Euroscepticism in Estonia, yet they did not form an EPM as these other two sections of society did. Investigating why ethnic Russians failed to do so further confirms the paucity of civil society in the former Soviet Union amongst ethnic minorities but also reveals a degree of interaction with the propositions of this study.

In the context of EU support Galbreath has discussed the impact of Estonia’s ethnic Russian population on Estonian–EU relations and has isolated two strands within

⁴⁰⁶ Mikkil and Pridham, ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’’, p. 734.

⁴⁰⁷ Rääg, Ivar, ‘Europe Yes/Freedom No’, *These Tides*, Winter 2004/2005.

the Estonian Russian community.⁴⁰⁸ Firstly, one that was pro-EU, as EU membership enhanced their rights as a minority with *acquis communautaire*-enforced, equal rights legislation; additionally EU membership eased travel for them across the rest of the EU, which brought with it increased opportunities within the single market. Secondly, there was an opposition strand that opposed EU membership on the grounds that it created a further barrier between Estonia and Russia. This made it harder for them to maintain familial, cultural, religious and business ties to their ethnic ‘motherland’.

Estonia’s Russian population were moderately in favour of EU membership, due in large part to Brussels’ insistence on the removal of perceived discriminatory legislation against ethnic Russians during the negotiation process. However, in the concluding phase of the campaign a worried government played the ‘Soviet’ card and produced posters claiming the “USSR” would come back and “invade” Estonia again should EU accession be rejected. As discussed, the issue of Russian aggression towards Estonia was hidden with the euphemism of “geopolitical security” but this development brought ethnic Russians out on to the streets protesting against EU membership.⁴⁰⁹

There are two clear factors behind the failure of ethnic Russians to organise themselves in opposition to the referendum. Firstly, and most importantly there was the primacy of the Centre Party in representing the interests of ethnic Russians. While the Party never had an official No campaign, party members and elected officials were free to campaign according to their own opinions, with a majority joining the No side but a not insignificant amount moving to the Yes camp. Ethnic Russian politicians were campaigning, though without a party banner and in a quite low-key manner, on the same points that ordinary ethnic Russians were concerned about. These were mainly in relation to their outrage at the Yes side’s damaging of Estonian–Russian relations with their overly nationalistic rhetoric.

Secondly, there was the issue of ‘apathy’ (lack of mobilisation) amongst the ethnic Russian population. There was a widespread dislocation of ethnic Russians from Estonian society in general, which threw into severe doubt whether they would act on their Eurosceptic opinions and actively campaign against the EU. This segregation

⁴⁰⁸ Galbreath, ‘The Politics of European Integration and Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia’.

⁴⁰⁹ Mikkel and Pridham, ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’’, p741.

between ethnic Russians and the Estonian state was emphasised by only 35% of the some 343,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia (or about 120,000) holding Estonian passports and the right to vote. The low level of social movement formation in Estonian society in general combined with this level of apathy towards Estonian politics helps to explain the failure of ethnic Russians in Estonia to form EPMs in opposition to accession to the EU. Ethnic Russians failed to access the policy-making process themselves through forming an ethnically based political party. Instead, they relied on the ethnically Estonian led Centre Party to represent them. Given their failure, indeed for many their inability, to form a political party in the relatively open Estonian political system, it is not surprising that ethnic Russians failed to form an EPM. Moreover, given that the two positions on European integration clouded the issue environment and the Centre Party sent them ambiguous cues as to their position on accession, ethnic Russians were unsure of what position they should hold. All of these factors combined to negate ethnic Russian formation on the EU issue.

Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors

Though there was less contextual information on the activities of Estonian EPMs in comparison to those of the other case studies, this was only to be expected given the short term of the period of Estonian negotiations to join and membership of the EU, let alone its independence as a sovereign state. While this meant in effect that the ‘story’ of Estonian EPMs was far shorter than that of other EPMs, their relationship to the propositions was far more explicit. This section will therefore explore these relationships in more detail than the other case studies, as there are many important and fascinating conclusions to be made with regard to Estonia emerging as an original example of EPM formation amongst the former communist states.

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

In contrast to the Irish case, and similarly to the UK case, the Estonian Eurosceptics all agreed that the Estonian media was biased against their case but there

was disagreement as to the opportunity of getting their arguments across. Erkki Bahovski of the *Postimees* newspaper (the newspaper of record of Estonia), argued that the Estonian media had a tradition of offering political advertising at a highly discounted rate to all legally registered political parties. The EU accession referendum was no different, with the situation being much like the Irish one as regards an equal sharing of resources between both Yes and No sides by the national media.⁴¹⁰

Gräzin and Räig of the *Research Centre Free Europe* were taken seriously by the media due to their background in politics and the civil service.⁴¹¹ Silberg and the *Movement No to the EU* felt that they were not taken seriously by the mainstream media and were denied access to it. The group claimed that the media was part of an elite campaign to take the EU off the Estonian political agenda and remove it from the public sphere altogether. As proof of this, they pointed to the government's announcement that they planned on Estonia joining the Eurozone in 2013, despite not holding a referendum on the issue as both Denmark and Sweden had.⁴¹²

In the cases of the *Research Centre Free Europe's* and the *Movement No to the EU* both believed that the media was part of a pro-European elite that stifled debate on the EU. The *Research Centre Free Europe*, however, was more engaged with the media and was able to participate in the arena of contestation on the accession issue that the media represented due mostly to the qualifications of its members as academics, politicians and former senior civil servants. The *Movement No to the EU* disengaged from the media and rejected it as a pawn of the political elite. Both viewed the media as pro-European but only one of them considered their views to be somewhat accepted by the media.

⁴¹⁰ Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with *Postimees* newspaper, 7th November, 2008.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008. As discussed earlier Estonia went on to join the Euro in 2011 without a referendum.

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The only relevant political party⁴¹³ to come close to advocating a No vote in the referendum was the Centre Party of Edgar Savisaar, the largest party in parliament, which called on members to vote according to their conscience (which was largely to vote No, as witnessed at the party's special congress on the matter). The reason for the failure of party based Euroscepticism to develop was twofold.⁴¹⁴ Firstly, there was political elite consensus on the long-term geopolitical interests of the country being best served by EU membership. Events, such as the 1999 collapse of the Estonian stock market due to the Russian currency crisis and the long drawn out process of NATO membership, further reinforced this consensus that Estonia had to join the EU to fundamentally shift its orientation away from an economically and politically unstable Russia to the West.⁴¹⁵ Secondly, post-independence Estonian politics had been exceptionally dynamic and fluid. Parties emerged and dissipated, changed names, and reinvented themselves with equal rapidity; politicians fell in and out of favour and shifted alliances repeatedly, with parties losing elections by landslides before winning them again at the next election and returning to government. The result of such political tumultuousness was that the vast majority of Estonian parties and politicians had experience of government. As the literature on Euroscepticism has emphasised, it has a strong government/opposition dynamic. A party of government of either an EU member state or a candidate for membership is rarely critical of that country's membership/proposed membership, as the national interest supersedes party-political concerns.⁴¹⁶ In the Estonian case, given that all the main parties had at one time been part of a coalition government, they became ingrained in the established political culture of the necessity of membership for Estonian's independent future. It is, however, interesting to note that the only EU-critical party, the Centre party, drew its support from the urban and rural poor and ethnic Russians. These were the groups in Estonian society that had suffered and lost the most

⁴¹³ Several smaller political parties (without electoral representation even at the local level), the Independence Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and the Russian Party in Estonia, all advocated No votes but had no elected representation in Parliament.

⁴¹⁴ Mikkel and Kasekamp, 'Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia', pp. 306-10.

⁴¹⁵ Ehin and Pattai, 'Introduction', pp. 16-8.

⁴¹⁶ Sitter, 'Opposing Europe': The exception to this is the UK Conservatives.

from the end of communism and who perceived themselves as being the most vulnerable should Estonia join the EU.⁴¹⁷ The Centre Party was widely believed by other parties and their supporters to have strong clandestine links to Moscow and that its charismatic leader, Savisaar, was Moscow's man in Tallinn. His ambivalence towards the EU and his party's open criticism of the EU project encouraged other political parties to advocate a Yes vote to EU accession even if they were not wholly convinced themselves. This was because mainstream parties automatically took the opposite position to him on any issue, such as the perception of his close links with the Russian government.

The referendum campaign of mainstream political parties was largely negative, emphasising what Estonia would lose by not being an EU member rather than what it would gain by joining. Only the leading members of the cabinet and the Prime Minister campaigned, while ordinary backbenchers were somewhat ambivalent.⁴¹⁸ Such an elite level campaign opened space for civil society based opposition to EU membership to emerge. Pro-accession arguments went unchallenged at the national political level despite a degree of uncertainty amongst ordinary politicians that was mirrored in public opinion. There was a clear gap between the elite level discourse on EU accession and the opinion of many Estonians on it. Estonian political parties made a conscious decision to ignore the concerns of party members and the public about accession, to either campaign for accession or to stand on the sidelines. This left significant space for EPMs to emerge to contest the accession referendum. Moreover, the participation of almost every political party in EU accession negotiations from the mid-1990s on meant that non-government parties could not publically criticise a process they had been intimately involved in. Again, this left space for an EPM to form to contest these negotiations as the party system was not doing so.

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The two EPMs differed in the impact of referendums on their formation. For the *Research Centre Free Europe*, the group was founded in 2001 not specifically to

⁴¹⁷ Past and Palk, 'The Referendum Campaign', pp. 84-5.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

campaign against any forthcoming accession treaty but to provide “detailed critiques of current government EU negotiations policy”.⁴¹⁹ Chairman Ivar Rääg intended to carry on the group’s activities regardless of accession. This was because the group did not reject membership of the EU outright, but rather was critical of the terms on which membership was negotiated and the timing of membership; their main argument was “not now, later”.⁴²⁰ We can see from the case of the *Research Centre Free Europe* that the lack of a referendum on the EU in Estonia would not have prevented the emergence of an EPM, as the *Research Centre Free Europe* emerged in the late 1990s to raise public awareness of the terms of accession, not to contest accession in a referendum on EU membership.

Uno Silberg of the *Movement No to the EU*, formed the group specifically to oppose accession. His membership included members and supporters of government parties who opposed joining the EU. He was adamant that once the referendum passed, the government parked the EU issue and forcibly kept it off the media and political agenda. The EPM he led “now exists in name only”, with the group resigned to the fact that the government will not hold another referendum on the EU.⁴²¹

Thus, we can see that Estonia had two EPMs representing two different sides of the EPM formation coin. The *Research Centre Free Europe* would have formed regardless of whether a referendum was being held or not. The *Movement No to the EU*, on the other hand, was formed by disgruntled members of mainstream political parties upset at the perceived abandoning of fledgling Estonian independence with accession. The accession referendum provided them with the opportunity to mobilise and contest EU membership that otherwise would not have been available to them.

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

The Estonian case is an example of civil society being brought into the national political opportunity structure by the institutions of the state. In the other cases EPM

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Igor Gräzin, co-director Research Centre Free Europe and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008.

⁴²⁰ Helme, Mart. ‘A Brief Introduction to the UKVE’, *These Tides*, March 2004.

⁴²¹ Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

resources came mostly from private donations and sales of paraphernalia, books and pamphlets. With Estonia, however, EPMs received financial resources from both the state and from institutional NGOs for the purposes of campaigning (this will be discussed in greater detail in the next point). Additionally the government changed broadcast laws so that both Yes and No sides were awarded equal coverage in the media. The purpose behind this was to include a No voice in the referendum campaign, and hence give it legitimacy not only in the perception of the public but also in that of the EU. With no major political parties coming out uniformly against accession and a broad consensus across business, the media and the intellectual elite, the Estonian government deemed it necessary to include EPMs in the political opportunity structure.

For Estonian EPMs there was no recourse to contest European integration through the court system or to exploit tensions within government coalitions. The Estonian constitution allowed for the giving up of national sovereignty in the form of international treaties by referendum, while government coalitions were unstable on many issues, but accession to the EU was one of the very few policies that all parties in government agreed on. In effect, Estonian EPMs did not need an open policy process to the same extent that those of the other case studies did. The small size of the country and openness of the media to the arguments of certain Eurosceptics meant that any EPM formation received a degree of profile and access to the national political discourse that only occurred in other case studies due to access to specific areas of the policy process in those countries.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

There were several interesting factors that mark the Estonian experience of resources as different from those of its Irish, UK and Danish contemporaries. The first was that Estonian EPMs received funds from both Danish and UK EPMs. Secondly, they received funds from the Estonian government and NGOs with the explicit purpose of providing a No side to the campaign⁴²². Thirdly, EPM activists concluded that the level of resources they received was ultimately irrelevant as the government was determined to pass the referendum and would have spent a multiple of the money the No side spent, be

⁴²² Past and Palk, 'The Referendum Campaign', pp. 77-9.

that the two million Kroons the No side did spend, or even if it had been able to match the Yes side's twenty million Kroons campaign, the impression was that the Yes side was always going to outspend.⁴²³

A fund was organised for the *Research Centre Free Europe* by the *Bruges Group* (discussed in the UK section). This money was contributed by Eurosceptic members of the Conservative Party but was also collected by UK EPMs and distributed to the *Research Centre Free Europe* by the *Bruges Group*.⁴²⁴ Ivar Rääg of the *Research Centre Free Europe* presented the Estonian case to the *Bruges Group* several times after being invited, and argued the case for receiving funds from their members on the grounds of both groups' shared affinity for the policies of Margaret Thatcher and the strong chance of an upset, given the strong Eurosceptic leaning of the Estonian electorate.⁴²⁵ Twenty-five percent of the money was spent on advertising costs, nine percent on printing referendum materials and the rest on various administrative expenses.⁴²⁶

The legacy of an undeveloped civil society from the Soviet era proved a tremendous burden to the activities of the Estonian EPMs. They had nowhere near enough volunteers to engage in widespread canvassing, leaflet drops and posterings that were common in Denmark, Ireland and the UK. The two most high profile EPMs were essentially elite-driven projects that when in receipt of resources, used these to develop their arguments further through professionally acquired research to be communicated to the public through media campaigns and town hall-style meetings. There was no spontaneous emergence of concerned ordinary citizens who volunteered to campaign against the accession referendum. It was various groups of ex-, minor and failed politicians and their supporting organisations. Such groups were set up by individuals with other responsibilities, who simply did not have the time to canvass the Estonian public. This led them to focus their campaigning through the media. At first they did not arrange meetings throughout the country. Instead, local organisations prompted them to take this approach by asking them to appear to present the No argument to an electorate hungry for both sides of the debate. Whereas for most Irish and UK EPMs, the

⁴²³ Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

⁴²⁴ Helme, 'The Estonia Campaign'.

⁴²⁵ Interview with Prof. Ivar Rääg, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008.

⁴²⁶ Interview with Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June 2010.

information meeting was a crucial component of their campaigning, organising such meetings did not register with the Estonian EPMs. For a short period in the build-up to the accession referendum Estonian EPMs had comparatively much greater resources than were available to most Irish (with the notable exception of *Libertas*) and UK (with the exception of *Business for Sterling*) EPMs, but were incapable of using them efficiently as they were organisationally fundamentally different from those other EPMs. They were argument creators, not campaigners. There was only so much money that could have been spent on the formulation of arguments and ideas. Indeed, this took time, with the result that several hundred thousand Kroons were returned to the Open Estonia foundation unspent by the *Movement No to the EU*, as they could not spend it all.⁴²⁷

As with the Irish and UK cases there was always a presumption on behalf of the participants in any potential EPM formation that if they were willing to consider forming a group in the first place, then there must be others willing to fund them. Resources were always a secondary consideration; there was the firm belief that money for a campaign or general activities would be found somewhere. Silberg was of the conviction that resources were not the motivating factor in setting up the *Movement No to the EU*, but that he knew a Eurosceptic group would attract resources from those Estonians who identified with their cause.⁴²⁸

4.9 Main conclusions from the Estonian Case

The most important factor in the formation of Estonian EPMs with regard to the explanatory factors was that of the EPM's relationship with political parties and the level of Euroscepticism in the party system. Academics, journalists, Estonian 'observers' and even the EPM campaigners themselves agree that had the Centre Party and its leader Edvar Savisaar actively campaigned for a No vote, then the focus of the campaign would have shifted entirely to the charismatic and polarising figure of the Mayor of Tallinn. This would have left Gräzin, Räig and Silberg de-motivated, as they all believed that they could not hope to compete with the media attention and public support of Savisaar and his party. Savisaar and the Centre Party did not get involved in the campaign, however,

⁴²⁷ Interview with Prof. Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 11th October, 2008.

⁴²⁸ Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

and so a tremendous political vacuum emerged into which EPMs were drawn. In complete contrast to Kitschelt's thesis on the nature of political opportunity structures where he found that in four major Western European democracies by and large interest groups were significantly hindered from actively engaging in the policy making process, in Estonia EPMs were not so much hindered from becoming involved in the campaign on accession but were actively brought into the political opportunity structure by the institutions of the state and other 'insider' civil society organisations. Given the dearth of active Euroscepticism in the party system, there was a need for some form of Eurosceptic representation in Estonia. Lacking any efficient organisation structure made the EPMs incapable of taking advantage of this situation (unlike the Irish case, where even the presence of Sinn Féin could not prevent EPMs engaging with the media, taking the lead in organising meetings and general debate on the first Lisbon referendum), and thus they were brought into the political opportunity structure by the media as well as the government. This was achieved by providing them with funding and access to the media that forced them to develop necessary organisational competency and capacity to play a role in the Estonian EU accession debate. In this regard Estonia differs from the other case studies and other West European states more generally. It does, however, follow the stated desire of the European Commission to include civil society in the debate on European integration. The concerted effort of the Estonian government in providing resources, however limited, was due in part to the effect of Europeanisation of civil society discourse on Europe that the European Commission was heavily promoting at this time in what would become the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Kohler-Koch has questioned the success of this project but the example of EPMs in Estonia shows that it has at least been attempted.⁴²⁹

Before the referendum on accession the level of public Euroscepticism in Estonia created paranoia amongst the political elite that EU membership would be rejected. As a result the Yes campaign was more aggressive, and therefore more effective, than those in the other accession states.⁴³⁰ From the Danish and UK case studies it was shown that EPMs there were reflecting the deeply held Euroscepticism of a significant element of the

⁴²⁹ Kohler-Koch, 'Civil society and EU democracy', p. 112.

⁴³⁰ Mikkel and Pridham, 'Clinching the 'Return to Europe'', pp. 736-8.

population, with the result that EPMs there were more successful and more numerous. In Estonia the large level of public opposition to membership was not as deep-rooted as it was in Denmark and the UK. It was more a reaction to a perceived lack of information about what membership entailed than outright opposition to accession to the EU. Once the government and the party system engaged in a substantial information campaign, the tide of public opinion turned decisively in favour of membership. This, combined with organisational deficiencies, meant that Estonian EPMs did not attract a wider level of public involvement in their activities. Rather, they noted that their most successful and commonplace form of campaigning was in town hall-style meetings across the country, organised by various vocational and voluntary organisations. This does, however, reveal the degree of democratic development of the Estonian populace and civil society in that they actively sought to engage with both sides of a vital national issue rather than accept without question the cues of the government and party system.

Aligned with the successful government pro-membership campaign was the movement towards joining NATO. The legacy of Soviet occupation and Estonia's position as a military zone during the Soviet era (the last Russian soldiers left in 1994), meant that the question of EU membership was tightly bound to a desire to protect Estonia from Russian aggression. In effect EU membership became seen as *soft* protection against Russia in unison with NATO membership providing *hard* protection. Understanding how different the Estonian relationship with the EU was in relation to not only the Western European member states but also to other Eastern European states is key to appreciating why EPMs based around nationalism failed to develop much traction. The obvious proviso was that civil society in the former communist countries was underdeveloped. The relevance of this to nationalism in Estonia was debatable, however, as Estonia was part of the 'Singing Revolution' in 1989 whereby civil society actors mobilised effective opposition to the Soviet government. The *Movement No to the EU* was mobilised by local politicians, with limited involvement from national politicians. Estonian EPMs were thereby greatly inhibited in their formation by wider geo-political factors that were not present in the other case studies. These findings have potentially interesting implications for the study of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe. The most influential study on this topic, that of Kopécký and Mudde, found that ideology was the

main determinant of Euroscepticism in political parties in Eastern Europe.⁴³¹ The evidence from Estonia corresponds quite neatly to this conclusion and also extends it by detailing why this clearly present Euroscepticism did not manifest itself. Collective political elite fears over the security of the Estonian state pushed aside concerns such as the threat to national sovereignty and economic effects on farmers and pensioners. Kopécky and Mudde argue that strategic concerns play a role, though far less than ideology, in positions on Europe.⁴³² The example of political parties in Estonia shows that at times of heightened awareness of the EU issue, such as referendums, strategic concerns can reach beyond the government/opposition party dynamic and into the perceived national interest. While the Estonian case showed there to be much commonality between Euroscepticism there and in the other case studies, the highly specific nature of the geopolitical situation there greatly impacted on Eurosceptic mobilisation both in the party system and civil society.

There was one group within Estonian society which potentially could have been mobilised against EU accession by the government's discourse of the importance of EU membership for security against Russian aggression, the ethnic Russian minority. Due in part to their high level of social exclusion, ethnic Russians failed to mobilise against EU membership. There was also the conflict between the utilitarian benefit of greater economic and social opportunities they would attain as EU citizens, and the psychological and practical implications of the border with Russia turning into an external EU border. Russian-Estonians therefore had strong reasons to support both a Yes and a No vote. But due to the lack of a decisive cue on accession from their representatives in the party system, the Centre Party, they were reluctant to make a decision and did not vote let alone mobilise to oppose membership.

⁴³¹ Kopécky and Mudde, 'The two sides of Euroscepticism', p. 320.

⁴³² Ibid, pp. 320-1.

Chapter Five: The Danish Case

5.1 Introduction

This chapter on Denmark is different from the other case studies in that the two EPMs, the *People's Movement No to the EU (People's Movement)* and *June Movement*, that formed to contest European referendums, went on to contest European Parliament elections as well. They have been included in this study, as not only did they originate as civil society based movements but they continued to define themselves as movements run by members of political parties who saw their involvement with these EPMs as no contradiction to their party political affiliation. The Danish case is highly relevant not just for the study of EPMs, but also for that of social movements in general, in that it details how social movements can successfully make the transition to contesting elections whilst retaining their original members, supporters and ethos.

The Danish voter's relationship with Europe has been used as the example from which rival theories of public support for European integration, particularly in referendums, have been developed by Franklin et. al.⁴³³ and Svensson.⁴³⁴ Denmark was used as a perfect example of domestic Euroscepticism due to three factors which form the backbone of this chapter. Firstly, Denmark had a history of strong public opposition to European integration going back to accession in the early 1970s. This public sentiment against EU membership increased through the 1970s and 1980s, providing public support for the formation and activities of Danish EPMs. While the level of Euroscepticism in the party system and multiple referendums on Europe played additional roles in EPM formation, the large and sustained Euroscepticism of the Danish electorate needs to be appreciated before the impact of the party system and referendums can be analysed. From the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 Danish voters maintained two different party systems⁴³⁵ at the European and national levels. At the European Parliament level EPMs received up to 25% of the vote, yet they never contested national elections. The conclusion reached by this chapter is that Europe

⁴³³ Franklin, et. al., 'Attitudes toward Europe and referendum votes', pp. 117–21.

⁴³⁴ Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union.

⁴³⁵ Bille, Lars (2006). 'Political Data in 2005: Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 7, pp. 1087-8.

became a contested issue at European Parliament elections largely due to the failure of the party system to deal with the Euroscepticism of its members, which was concentrated in the Social Democratic and Social Liberal parties. Toleration of their members and supporters participating in EPMs allowed mainstream parties to avoid internal party conflict but it also allowed the two party systems to persist and the EPMs to remain influential in the Danish European debate. This influence was articulated most explicitly in the six EU referendums held in Denmark between 1972 and 2000. Not only did the EPMs play significant roles in the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and EMU membership but they also played a role in the establishing of referendums as the default method of ratification of EU treaties in the Danish political system during that time period. Examining the Danish EU referendums in chronological order will illustrate how EPMs were formed and sustained by public opposition to Europe that was expressed in these referendums, and facilitated by the party system.

The second section focuses on the *People's Movement* and *June Movement*. The *People's Movement* was the first to emerge as a non party political 'brand', founded to campaign against Danish accession to the EU in 1972. After accession was ratified, it was disbanded by its radical left founders, who went back to their domestic parties, but in 1979 it was reformed to contest European Parliament elections, as members of mainstream parties had grown unhappy with their parties' support for EU membership and sought to contest this at the European Parliament level. Immediately they became the second largest party in Danish European Parliament elections and held this position until the emergence of the *June Movement* in 1992. The *June Movement* formed after a split from the *People's Movement* by the majority of its MEPs, who felt that the *Movement's* anti-membership platform and radical left policies were out of touch with the electorate. Instead they supported a pre-Maastricht form of European cooperation that they believed better reflected Danish public opinion. These groups labelled themselves as 'movements', despite contesting elections, as they sought to attract a widespread base of support from functionaries, members and elected officials of national parties by labelling themselves as a civil society based movement. At the zenith of their success in 1994 both EPMs took 25.5% of the vote. In the 2009 election, however, they managed just 9.6% of the vote and the June Movement folded three months afterwards. The

Danish relationship with the EU has been of much interest to political science scholars and Danish referendums on the EU have been the focus of the majority of academic enquiry into EU referendums, but the truly exceptional nature of the Danish EU relationship has been the willingness and the ability of Danish Eurosceptics to mobilise effectively on the issue.⁴³⁶ Examining how EPMs came to play such a prominent role in the EU debate in Denmark will isolate what factors specific to Denmark allowed them to do so, and in turn what factors missing from other case studies prevent such successful EPM mobilisation.

First Section: Overview of Danish Politics and EU Relations

5.2 Danish Public Opinion and EU Integration

Tracing the development of public opinion on European integration is vitally important in understanding the emergence of EPMs in Denmark. As *Figure 5.1* shows, support for EU membership was low in the immediate post-accession period and despite a rise in positive sentiment further declined in the mid 1980s. It began a steady rise in the late 1980s, however, that continued to the early 2000s so that support for Danish EU membership increased by over 30% to 65% from its lowest point of 35% in 1981. The implications of this shift in the formation and functioning of EPMs are highlighted in this section and discussed in greater depth in the section on EPMs.


Before 1972 the European issue did not resonate with the public due to the long drawn out nature of Danish accession, which began in 1962 and only began to come to fruition by 1970. Only when accession negotiations were being finalised and the prospect of membership became a reality did a notable rise in opposition to membership take place. From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s opposition towards membership of the EU grew even further. By late 1985 38% had a positive and 44% had a negative view of membership, as *Figure 5.1* shows. This was in contrast to the 63% Yes vote in the accession referendum.⁴³⁷ This steady growth in Euroscepticism, which was put down to

⁴³⁶ See: Siune, 'The Danes Said No the Maastricht Treaty'; Franklin et. al., 'Attitudes toward Europe and referendum votes'; Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union'; Hobolt, 'Choosing Europe'.

⁴³⁷ Worre, 'The Danish Euro-Party System', pp. 85-7.

‘disappointment’ with membership by the public, is important in understanding the push by the *People’s Movement* and party factions towards holding a referendum on the SEA.⁴³⁸ The argument of Eurosceptics was that increasing public disillusionment to membership was not being articulated at the national political level and that a referendum was the only means by which this public opinion could be articulated. It was in 1979 that members and supporters of mainstream parties, in particular the Social Democrats and Social Liberals, met with the original founders of the *People’s Movement* to reform it and take advantage of this declining support for the EU by contesting the EP elections of that year.⁴³⁹ Further falls in the level of pro-European public sentiment followed the *People’s Movement’s* success in those elections and allowed the movement to claim that they were articulating a popular position ignored by the mainstream political parties.

Figure 5.1: Do you think that Denmark’s membership of the EU is a good thing?



Source: McLaren, Laruen (2006). *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 23; and Eurobarometer (Note that data for ‘Disagree, bad thing’ not available before 1978).

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

Referring back to *Figure 5.1*, the dramatic rise in pro-EU sentiment post 1987 was obvious. It appeared that the main outcome of the 1986 SEA referendum was nothing to do with the impact of the SEA itself but more with a dramatic change in the Danish–EU relationship. The *People’s Movement* had campaigned strongly, not so much against the Treaty itself but more as a means of securing Danish withdrawal from the EU, a policy they believed had wide support. The outcome took Danish withdrawal from the EEC off the agenda for all the parties in the parliament. So the *People’s Movement* and the Red-Green Alliance were left as the only elected political entities in Denmark advocating withdrawal. Public support for EU membership continued to increase in the post-SEA period and only began to decline in 1992 at the time of the Maastricht Treaty. This levelling off was interpreted as a rejection of the direction of European integration as represented by Maastricht but crucially not against membership, however.⁴⁴⁰

International events also played a role in increased Danish public support for EEC membership. The collapse of communism and the application of Norway, Sweden and Finland for membership, removed alternatives to membership from the national debate and gradually acceptance of membership became prevalent.⁴⁴¹ Given that the radical left had been one of the strongest critics of EU membership, the collapse of communism was a significant factor in the radical left Socialist People’s Party’s re-evaluation of their European policy.⁴⁴² It was in the Maastricht period that the *June Movement* emerged. Unlike the *People’s Movement*, the *June Movement* accepted Danish participation in European integration but in a pre-Maastricht form. Their European Parliament electoral success from this policy position can be understood from the increase in support for EU membership post SEA but the rejection by the electorate of Danish participation in EMU and a common European citizenship that were the issues driving the No to Maastricht vote. Public opinion on Europe at the time of Maastricht saw 80% of voters in favour of membership, but 80% opposed to any further cession of sovereignty. The type of Europe

⁴⁴⁰ McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p. 23.

⁴⁴¹ Hansen, Lene (2002). ‘Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe’, Hansen et. al. (eds.) *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, London: Routledge, p. 51.

⁴⁴² Interview with Holger K. Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People’s Party 1991 – 2005, 15th September 2009.

proposed in the Maastricht Treaty was therefore unacceptable to them, given the explicit creation of political institutions by the Treaty.⁴⁴³ This did not mean that the Danish people wanted to leave the EU. Instead, the great majority preferred an “intergovernmental community”.⁴⁴⁴ This was the form of European integration that the *June Movement* offered. The extent to which this policy was driven by public opinion or genuine ideological factors will be discussed in the section dealing with the *June Movement*.

The clear message from the literature on the Danish relationship with Europe was that it was a unique one.⁴⁴⁵ The data shows that while the Danish public were conscious and supportive of the benefits of economic co-operation, they were highly sceptical of the benefits of political integration. A more nuanced analysis of the Danish public debate on Maastricht views it not as one where a sceptical electorate rejected all of Europe outright, but one where a public sceptical of political and monetary union demanded, and received, a less political and more social relationship with Europe⁴⁴⁶. *The June Movement* sought to exploit this shift in public opinion away from the rejectionist *People’s Movement* position by articulating a form of Euroscepticism more critical than the pro-integrationist mainstream party position but accepting of public support for membership.⁴⁴⁷ They did this by putting forward to the public a strong critique of political and economic integration but also, as will be discussed, a call for cooperation in the fields of environment and international development, and support for the single market.

In the post-Maastricht period there were several strong discrepancies between Danish public opinion towards the EU, found in Eurobarometer surveys, and their voting behaviour at national and European elections and at European referendums. Firstly, there was the belief in the benefits of EU membership for Denmark which historically was well

⁴⁴³ Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, p. 84.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 79.


⁴⁴⁵ See: McLaren, *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, p. 27; Hansen, *European Integration and National Identity*, pp. 51-2.

⁴⁴⁶ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009; Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People’s Movement, 10th September 2009; Interview with Holger K. Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People’s Party 1991 – 2005, 15th September 2009.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

above the EU average (see *Figure 5.2*).⁴⁴⁸ Secondly, Danes believed that their own voices and those of their government and of the Danish interest more generally were heard in the EU at levels well above the EU average. Taking a snapshot from the 2010 Eurobarometer data, this sentiment fed into levels of trust in the EU institutions, where the Danish public showed support for the EU 10-15% above the EU average and trust in the EU at 58%. When compared to the UN however, there was far more trust in the UN at 75%, compared to the EU at 58%.⁴⁴⁹

Figure 5.2: On the whole do you think that Denmark has benefitted from EU membership? % Agree



Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 62 – No. 74.

Looking at the public opinion data presented in *Figure 5.1* and *Figure 5.2*, a clear difference can be seen in the post-accession values as opposed to those of the post-Maastricht period. The post-accession period saw a rise in opposition to membership and a sustained decline in public solidarity with the concept of European integration. There was thus significant support amongst the Danish electorate for an EPM like the *People's*

⁴⁴⁸Standard Eurobarometer (2009). *Eurobarometer 71 Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels: European Commission.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

Movement that articulated their opposition to membership and a return to the pre-accession situation. In the post-Maastricht period, membership of the EU was accepted by the public but European integration was not embraced. This called for a new form of Eurosceptic mobilisation, taken up by the *June Movement* that formed to represent this pro-Europe but anti-Maastricht public sentiment. The final set of public opinion data showed that the pro-integration trend increased to well above the EU 27 average, a trend that represented the widespread acceptance by the Danish public of participation in European integration.

Changes in public opinion towards European integration created the necessary conditions for the *People's Movement* and the *June Movement* to mobilise. Anti-EU sentiment amongst the Danish electorate led to the *People's Movement's* success in the 1979 EP elections, and the successful emergence of the *June Movement* in the 1994 EP elections. Public opinion was only one segment of the overall picture, however, as the majority of member states had rates of opposition to European integration similar to those of Denmark. Other factors were also important to their emergence, and one of the most important of those was the Danish party system's relationship with the European issue. High levels of public Euroscepticism fed into opposition to established parties pro-EU position from their own members. The following section examines how these factors played a role in EPM formation.

5.3 The Danish Political System and Europe

There were several key features of the Danish political system that collectively created an opportunity that allowed opposition to European integration to be present at the national level. Firstly, Denmark has a multi-party system (with the effective number of political parties being 5.6⁴⁵⁰) with coalition governments the norm, and indeed since 1992 minority governments being the norm. This gave significant political power to minority parties who became 'king makers' after every election. Danish voters traditionally used the small centre parties (Social Liberals, Conservative People's Party, the Centre Party) as a moderating force by voting for them in the event of the big centre-left party (Social Democrats) or centre-right party (Liberals) holding an overall

⁴⁵⁰ Bille, Lars (2008). 'Political Data in 2007: Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research*, 47: 7, p. 953.

majority.⁴⁵¹ As Szczerbiak and Taggart point out,⁴⁵² Euroscepticism often exists at the extremities of the political system and Denmark was no exception, with small parties on the radical left, centre-left and far-right holding explicitly Eurosceptic, or at least non-committal, positions on Europe. Their positions on Europe had to be accommodated in any programs for government coalitions.⁴⁵³

Secondly, the powerful European Affairs Committee of the Danish parliament gave Eurosceptics additional power, as it had by convention been composed of as wide as possible membership from across the political spectrum. The Committee had the power to overrule government policy on Europe, and more importantly perhaps, the government needed to have Committee approval on any negotiations agreed at the European Council level. Having such an institutional brake was designed to provide a consensual, uncontroversial European policy.⁴⁵⁴ Compromise was obviously at the heart of Danish party politics, with the institutional political system and political culture designed to create common policy positions to aid both government creation and government policy execution.

Thirdly, this emphasis on compromise at the national political level failed in relation to the creation of a European policy with cross-party support. As will be discussed, shifting party positions on European integration forced a series of referendums on Europe to be held, despite the fact that constitutional provisions existed for European treaties to be passed by parliament. With regard to foreign treaties that impact on the Danish Constitution, the Constitution itself states that they can be passed either by a 5/6th majority in the Folketinget (Danish Parliament) or if this is unachievable, by referendum. This was caused partly by government–opposition tensions, where opposition parties sought to gain politically by embarrassing the government through the loss of a referendum or the loss of a parliamentary vote on a European treaty. The main factor driving the political pressure for the holding of these referendums however was the depth

⁴⁵¹ Bille, 'Political Data in 2005: Denmark', pp. 1087-8.

⁴⁵² Taggart and Szczerbiak, 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe', p. 5.
European Institute: Brighton, p. 5.

⁴⁵³ See Appendix VI for a table on Danish election results in % vote and seat numbers from 1973 on, that illustrates these significant shifts in the party system.

⁴⁵⁴ Bergman, Torbjörn, (1997). 'National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical variation and competing explanations', *European Journal of Public Policy*, 4: 3, p. 378.

of anti-European feeling among the membership and supporters of Danish political parties. Danish parties, in particular those on the left and centre left were riven by internal party divisions on Europe from the mid-1970s and were unable to resolve them until the 2000s. Understanding the failures of the party system to resolve the European issue is necessary in understanding how EPMs in Denmark were formed and endured for so long.

5.4 The Impact of National Politics on EU Party Positions

The most important trend in the Danish party system over the 1990s and 2000s was the collapse in support for the small centrist parties: the Centre party, Social Liberals, and the Conservative People's Party.⁴⁵⁵ The Liberals and far-right Danish People's Party were the main beneficiaries of this and increased their representation in the Folketinget. This had the effect of successive Danish governments since 2001 being of a right-wing orientation. This development was important, as in contrast to previous centre-right administrations, these governments did not need the 'calming' votes of centre- or left-wing parties to get laws passed. The Liberal-led post-2001 governments relied on the votes of the non-government Danish People's Party to get legislation passed. Such legislation included increased restriction on immigration and the rights of asylum seekers, in addition to the first programme of sustained tax cuts in modern Danish history. Parties of the left and centre left were placed in a position where they had very little say in how policy was formed, a most unusual situation in post-war Danish politics and for these parties in particular. Europe was one of the few policy areas where the left wing opposition still had a say in government policy.⁴⁵⁶ Parliamentary consensus on Danish relations with Europe was exemplified by the powerful European Affairs Committee. One of the most powerful committees in EU Parliaments, it had the power to dictate EU negotiating positions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.⁴⁵⁷ The committee had been given these powers so that European policy would be formed in a consensual manner, to

⁴⁵⁵ Bille, 'Political Data in 2005: Denmark', p. 1088.

⁴⁵⁶ The other being the powerful Finance committee, which oversees the budget.

⁴⁵⁷ Bergman, 'National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees', p. 378.

jointly confer legitimacy on it and also (perhaps more importantly) to calm internal party dissent on Europe given, that Eurosceptic voices had a say in policy formation.⁴⁵⁸

These developments at the national level had forced the left in Denmark to re-evaluate their European policy. Two former party leaders, Holger K. Nielsen of the Socialist People's Party and Mogens Lykketoft of the Social Democrats, helped to direct their parties to a more pro-EU position by arguing to party members and officials that the consensus policy of the EU was the only restraining force on a right-wing Danish government.⁴⁵⁹ For left-wing parties it made no sense to argue in favour of more sovereignty for the national government, as the government was instituting a series of policies diametrically opposed to left-wing interests. For the Socialist People's Party and Social Democrats in particular, common EU policies on asylum-seekers' rights and workers' rights were to the left of what the Danish government was proposing. Closer Danish co-operation with the EU in this area was put forward as a 'calming' influence on the 'extreme' right-wing policies of the government. With the dramatic shift in the Danish electorate to right-wing parties, the traditional Danish government model of policy consensus across the political spectrum disappeared. For left-wing parties, the only way for them to achieve influence on policy was to increase Danish participation in the EU, as they believed it would force the Danish government into holding more moderate positions.

Electoral shifts were replicated at the European Parliament level also as voters moved away from the Eurosceptic *June Movement* and *People's Movement*, as shown in *Table 5.1*. The combined vote share of the two was at its highest in 1994, with 25% of all European Parliament votes, but fell to 14% in 2009. This left the *June Movement* without an MEP (in September 2009 it was wound up) and the *People's Movement* with one MEP.⁴⁶⁰ This compares with the increasing vote share for the pro-EU Socialist People's Party (up from one seat in 1999 to two in 2009) and the Social Democrats (up from three

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009; Interview with Mogens Lykketoft, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 2000-1 and leader of the Social Democrats 2002-5, 15th September 2009.

⁴⁶⁰ European Parliament, EP Elections Results 2009.

in 1999 to four in 2009).⁴⁶¹ The pro-European left was not the only beneficiary of these shifts in voting patterns, as the largest Eurosceptic party at European Parliament 2009 elections became the Danish People's Party with two seats. By 2009 the most successful form of Euroscepticism in Denmark came to be associated with the far right and not the hard left as represented by the electoral decline of the *People's Movement* and the dissolution of the *June Movement* showed.⁴⁶²

Table 5.1 Danish European parliamentary results by % vote and seat numbers

	Social Dem's	Liberals	Con.	SPP	Social Liberals	Centre Dem's	Progress Party	DPP	Peoples' Move't	June Move't
2009	22%/4	20%/3	13%/1	16%/2	4%/0	N/A	N/A	15%/2	7%/1	2%/1
2004	33%/5	19%/3	11%/1	8%/1	6%/1	N/A	N/A	7%/1	5%/1	9%/1
1999	17%/3	23%/5	9%/1	7%/1	9%/1	4%	1%	6%/1	7%/1	16%/3
1994	16%/3	19%/4	18%/4	9%/1	9%/1	1%/0	3%/0	N/A	10%/2	15%/2
1989	23%/4	17%/3	13%/2	9%/1	2.8%/0	8%/2	5.3%/0	N/A	19%/4	N/A
1984	20%/3	12%/2	21%/4	9%/1	3.1%/0	7%/1	3.5%/0	N/A	21%/4	N/A
1979	22%/3	14%/3	14%/2	5%/1	3.3%/0	6%/1	6%/1	N/A	21%/4	N/A

Source: Statistic Denmark <http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1191212/valgpg/valgpgHL.htm> - accessed 6th June 2010. N/A, refers to party not being in existence at the time of election.

The shift in the party system from centrist to right partly explains this situation. As Euroscepticism became associated with the radical right in Danish politics, Socialist People's Party and Social Democrat members drifted away from the *People's Movement* and the *June Movement* as their parties dealt with the European issue. As with the UK case in Chapter Three, Denmark confirms the Hooghe-Marks model in the evolution of Euroscepticism from being based in the political left to the right in line with the progress of European integration. The specificities of the Danish party system with regard to European integration meant that the changes affected by this shift were more dramatic

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² Interview with Margarethe Auken, MEP for the Socialist People's Party, 13th September 2009.

than those in the UK. Hooghe and Marks were unsure of how this change would affect domestic party competition but in the Danish case its effect was to removed the support for the two EPMs.⁴⁶³

5.5 Two Different Party Systems Start to Merge Into One

Since the first elections to the European Parliament in 1979 there has been a split in the Danish party system between voting patterns at national and European level.⁴⁶⁴ At the national level there was a multi-party system of parties from across the spectrum of radical left to populist right. At the European level, however, since the first European elections in 1979 self-labelled EPMs took up to 25%. These movements were successful in attracting so many votes, as they were not so much political parties as they were political brands with wide appeal. While the leadership of both movements maintained that they were inclusive of all political beliefs, it was clear that both attracted the majority of their support from Eurosceptic Social Democrat and Social Liberal voters.⁴⁶⁵ The 1979 and 1984 European elections showed that the European Parliament votes of the centre-right parties correlated fairly closely with those of general elections. The European Parliament votes of the Social Democrats in particular were up to 18% less than in general elections. The votes for the two other largest parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, either increased or decreased by just over 2%.⁴⁶⁶ This trend continued throughout the 1980s until the 2004 EP election, where the Social Democrats came closer to matching their national election results to their European results, while the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* lost substantial support. The position of the Social Democrats on Europe has therefore had an important effect on Danish EPMs. Moreover, how the party dealt with the European issue helps to explain why so many of its supporters founded and continued to be involved with the two EPMs.

During the various European referendum campaigns the Social Democrats allowed party members and several high profile elected officials to participate in the

⁴⁶³ Hooghe et al., 'Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?', p. 985-6.

⁴⁶⁴ Bille, Lars (2005). 'Political Data in 2004: Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research*, 44: 7, p. 997.

⁴⁶⁵ This will be discussed in greater depth in the next section.

⁴⁶⁶ Worre, 'The Danish Euro-Party System', p. 87.

People's Movement. This was done so as to prevent a split in the party over the European issue. The section on public opinion discussed how popular opposition to European integration grew at an accelerated rate in the post-accession period. This opposition was concentrated in the working-class and trade-union base of the Social Democrats. As the realities of EU membership sunk in and the promised economic benefits failed to materialise, these groups began to voice strong internal opposition to Danish membership.⁴⁶⁷ The party leadership had committed itself totally to participation in European integration,⁴⁶⁸ but at the same time they could not ignore their members' and supporters' anti-European position. Allowing the anti-European faction in the party to be active in the *People's Movement* acted as a vent, sending Euroscepticism into the European level away from the national level. The European issue did not 'contaminate' the domestic party system, by causing the formation of new parties or splits over it, as party leaders came to a tacit agreement with their Eurosceptic members to keep their Eurosceptic activities to European Parliament elections and European referendums. It was indeed surprising that, given the level of public opposition to the EU in the 1970s and 1980s, there was not more of an impact on domestic Danish politics. This impact failed to materialise, as votes in European Parliament elections became viewed as 'mini-referendums' on the European issue, allowing Eurosceptic party members to become involved with the EPMs and voters to vote for them. Mainstream party leaders were happy for this to happen and even facilitated, it as it allowed for the frustration of Eurosceptic members and supporters to be taken out on the party at the European Parliamentary level, where they believed there was no real political power, but at the same time retaining them for far more important national elections.⁴⁶⁹ Events in Danish politics were therefore key to understanding the origin of EPMs but just as important was the mobilising force of the referendum in EPM formation. Referendums acted as a triangulation between EPMs, political parties and the EU.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Krag, the leader and PM at the time of accession, considered it his most important achievement in politics, and so he would not consider changing position to oppose membership

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with Mogens Lykketoft, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 2000-1 and leader of the Social Democrats 2002-5, 15th September 2009; ⁴⁶⁹ Interview with Margarethe Auken, MEP for the Socialist People's Party, 13th September 2009; ⁴⁶⁹ Interview with Holger K. Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People's Party 1991 – 2005, 15th September 2009.

5.6 Danish Referendums on Europe

An important distinction of the use of referendums in Danish politics was that they were most frequently used as a means of consultation, rather than as a vehicle for drawing the public into the policy decision-making process. While a handful of referendums were held on purely constitutionally issues, such as voting age, the vast majority were consultative and six were held specifically on Europe as *Table 5.2* shows.⁴⁷⁰ For accession to the EEC in 1972 the Social Democrat-led government decided to hold a referendum even if they succeeded in gaining the 5/6th Folketinget majority needed to ratify a foreign treaty by parliament only.⁴⁷¹ This approach was adopted so as to confer public legitimacy on membership, given the divisions created in Danish society over the prospect of membership.⁴⁷²

Table 5.2: List of European referendums in Denmark

Referendum	Turnout	%	Yes	%	No	%	Result
Accession (1972)	3,080,150	90.1		63.4		36.6	Yes
Single European Act (1986)	2,897,824	75.4		56.2		43.8	Yes
Maastricht (1992)	3,962,005	83.1	1,606,442	49.3	1,653,289	50.7	No
Maastricht II (1993)	3,974,672	86.5	1,930,391	56.7	1,471,914	43.3	Yes
Amsterdam (1998)	3,996,333	76.2	1,647,692	55.1	1,342,595	44.9	Yes
EMU (2000)	3,999,325	87.6	1,620,353	46.8	1,842,814	53.2	No

From: Svensson 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union'; and Worre 'The Danish Euro Party System'.

⁴⁷⁰ Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union', p. 743. The number of Danish referendums in total post World War II up to 2011 is thirteen.

⁴⁷¹ Worre, 'Denmark at the Crossroads', p. 370.

⁴⁷² Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union', p. 744.

Not only did the Constitutional provision for referendums envisage them as a tool for public consultation but also as a safeguard for parliamentary minorities against legislation being forced through by a majority government.⁴⁷³ A parliamentary minority may demand that a bill passed by parliament must be passed by referendum as well for it to become law. Thus majority governments would be required to take into account public opinion if they decided to force through law without wider consensus: given that majority governments were rare in Danish politics, such a measure was never used by a minority opposition. It was, however, used by a minority *government* during the ratification process of the SEA in 1986. The SEA referendum was unusual not just for the political crisis surrounding it but for the employment of a referendum by the government as a means to proceed with the ratification process. Conservative PM Schlüter found his minority centre-right government could not muster a majority in parliament to pass the SEA and so put ratification before the Danish electorate. If he had allowed a parliamentary defeat, then he would have had to call an election, which was not in his best interests, as his party was low in opinion polls at the time.

The two Maastricht referendums represented a major crisis for the Danish parliament as, unlike the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty was passed by a large parliamentary majority (still not more than the 5/6ths majority required), yet the public voted against the Treaty by slightly less than 50,000 votes. This dissonance between parliamentarians and the public on Europe caused much questioning of the consensual nature of European policy making in the Folketinget, as it had clearly failed to take into account the views of a majority of the Danish electorate.

The SEA referendum was crucial in establishing the use of a referendum as a means of de-facto direct democracy on European issues.⁴⁷⁴ This precedence was followed by first and second votes on Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the rejected referendum on membership of EMU in 2000. This convention was ended in 2008 as the Folketinget voted to pass the Lisbon Treaty by more than the 5/6th required, with just the Danish People's Party and the hard left Left/Green Alliance voting

⁴⁷³ Worre, 'Denmark at the Crossroads', p. 370.

⁴⁷⁴ Bille, Lars (2001) 'Political Data in 2000: Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research*, 40: 7, p. 285.

against.⁴⁷⁵ After the French and Dutch No to the European Constitution, and the No to the Euro in 2000 the Danish government was not going to risk another referendum.⁴⁷⁶ Coupled with the move of the Social Democrats and Socialist People's Party to a more pro-EU position (as outlined above) the Treaty passed with a strong majority in parliament, the first to do so since the Treaty of Accession in 1972.⁴⁷⁷

Looking at each Danish referendum on Europe will therefore help to trace the evolution of the Danish relationship with Europe, and the role of referendums in sustaining EPM formation in Denmark. Due to the strong feeling of the Danish public on the European issue in particular, a referendum was an opportunity to make an impact on the European policy for individuals who would otherwise be outside the political process. The repeated use of referendums lends itself to the establishment of a permanent group, one that exists to campaign in the likely event of another referendum to challenge European integration. All of these factors will now be discussed in the context of EPM formation.

5.6.1 The 1972 Referendum on Accession

The Folketinget voted to hold a referendum on accession in 1971 regardless of whether or not the 5/6ths majority was reached or not. At this time over 5/6ths of the parliament favoured membership so there was no constitutional requirement to hold a referendum. The opposition Social Democrats called on the government to hold a decisive referendum, regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary vote, in an effort to assuage the Eurosceptic elements in their party. The Social Democrats, acutely aware of increasing opposition to membership amongst their supporters and growing support for the anti-membership Socialist People's Party, wanted to remove the membership issue from the forthcoming election. Holding a decisive referendum on accession after the election defused the issue and prevented anti-membership votes going to the Socialist People's Party. The centre-right and right-wing parties reluctantly came to accept the

⁴⁷⁵ Bille, 'Political Data in 2008: Denmark', p. 949.

⁴⁷⁶ Bille, 'Political Data in 2000: Denmark', p. 286.

⁴⁷⁷ Bille, 'Political Data in 2008: Denmark', p. 949.

decision to hold a referendum but it was clear that the Social Democrats were the main drivers behind the decision to hold it.⁴⁷⁸

This tactic worked well for the Social Democrats as they went into a minority government with support from the Socialist People's Party in late 1971 and the referendum was passed in June 1972. This same negative public sentiment that pushed the Social Democrats into demanding a referendum was still evident in the outcome, despite the two to one vote in favour of membership.⁴⁷⁹ Support for membership was conditional on utilitarian benefits that trumped the widely held mistrust of European integration amongst the Danish electorate. As many as 25% of Yes voters, acted against their opposition to membership and voted Yes, due to the greater appeal of the "tangible benefits" of integration and their identification with pro-membership parties.⁴⁸⁰

Economics was emphasised as almost the sole reason for Danish membership, despite the presence of numerous other issues in the debate.⁴⁸¹ Denmark first applied for membership in 1961 along with the UK and Ireland, as the UK was the most important market for its large agricultural export industry and so Denmark was forced to follow the UK in seeking membership. The "long and torturous" negotiation process largely bypassed the attention of the Danish public, as it was ongoing for so long with no end result. No mention was made of federalism or political union in the public discourse leading up to membership, so there was no public support for it given its low salience. Indeed, from 1973 to 1976 Danish support for political integration decreased significantly, while it remained steady in the other member states (as *Figure 5.1* shows).⁴⁸² Negative public sentiment towards political integration was reinforced by No campaigners, who put forward the argument that membership would start off as purely economic, but would inevitably lead to political integration, regardless of the promises of the Yes side. This focus on the "intangibles" of sovereignty and self-determination did not resonate with voters, compared to the explicit economic arguments made by the Yes side. It did, however, set the parameters of the Danish EU relationship that continued to

⁴⁷⁸ Petersen, Nikolaj and Elkitt, Jorgen (1973). 'Denmark Enters the European Communities', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 8: 1, pp. 201-2.

⁴⁷⁹ Petersen, Nikolaj (1978). 'Attitudes towards European Integration and the Danish Common Market Referendum', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 1: 1, p. 23.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid. p. 24.

⁴⁸² Ibid, p. 30.

exist up to and beyond the 2000 Euro referendum— that the relationship was purely economic and participation in political union was not, and never was, an option for Denmark.

It was in the period of 1971-2 that there was a huge surge in opposition to accession, as the public realised that membership would soon be a reality for Denmark. Given that the major political parties, and all the main social groups and media outlets, supported membership, opposition to membership became indelibly linked to “mistrust in Danish officialdom”⁴⁸³. On the No side were radical left parties, two small trade unions, and conservative nationalists. These groups came together under the umbrella *People’s Movement*, which additionally attracted prominent intellectuals and activists from the Social Liberals and Social Democrats, to represent the No campaign in the mainstream media.⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸⁵ As will be discussed in the following section, the *People’s Movement* was a reaction by these groups to a perceived ostracisation of anti-accession arguments by the media and mainstream political parties. The umbrella organisation, *People’s Movement*, was seen as a means by which a broad coalition of groups could force themselves into the national debate on the referendum, as they believed themselves to be “untouchable” by the mainstream media and would not get any coverage in separate campaigns. The use of the *People’s Movement* brand was as much to gain widespread support as it was to overcome perceived media bias against radical-left groups. This focus on “branding” of the EPM shows that the founders were indeed conscious of the media interpretation of their campaign and so sought to avoid it pre-emptively with the ditching of their domestic party identities and formation of the *People’s Movement*. Despite this wide-ranging No campaign, membership was ratified by a 63.4% majority.

The accession referendum in many ways set the agenda for Denmark’s relationship with Europe. The pro-integrationists emphasised the economic benefits of participation, anti-integrationists argued that this was a Trojan horse for political union.

⁴⁸³ Worre, Torben (1995). ‘First No then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33: 2, p. 249.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

⁴⁸⁵ At this time anti-immigrationism was not a major issue in Denmark and so conservative nationalists had no policies wholly objectionable to left wing activists.

5.6.2 The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) Referendum

Whereas the opposition to the membership referendum was based in grassroots movements, and political parties on the radical left and right, opposition to the SEA took the additional form of factions in mainstream political parties. These factions were most concentrated and active in the Social Democrats and Social Liberals. It was these Eurosceptic factions that caused the crisis (the SEA referendum vote) over the ratification of the SEA, fourteen years after there was apparently no such opposition in these same parties during the accession process. To control these factions these parties openly allowed elected officials and party members to campaign with the *People's Movement*, so as to prevent splits and defections.⁴⁸⁶ Instead of the factions being expelled from ostensibly pro-European parties, they were allowed to stay and cultivate their own candidates, with reciprocal advantages in securing parliamentary resources and national political and media outlets for Eurosceptic arguments.

The impetus for the pressure to have a referendum on the SEA came from these factions. The Social Democrats threatened Prime Minister Schlüter that they would vote against the Treaty in parliament should it be presented before them. Their intention for doing this according to Worre, was that the Treaty was too much of an advance of the EEC into a political union.⁴⁸⁷ With a 5/6^{ths} majority needed for the passing of any foreign treaty before Parliament, and defeat on such a matter meaning resignation for his government, Schlüter called a referendum, and referred the issue to the electorate and away from parliament.

The main motivating factor for Yes voters was that rejection of the Treaty would lead to a negative economic situation in Denmark. This was a strong perception even amongst centre-left and left-wing voters. The key to the Yes victory was the 41% of Social Democrat voters who ignored party cues, due to concerns about economic damage and Denmark leaving the Community, and voted Yes.⁴⁸⁸ While the Eurosceptic factions won out in forcing the referendum on the SEA Social Democrat supporters were not wholly behind them, showing the depth of the party division over the EU issue.

⁴⁸⁶ Worre, 'Denmark at the Crossroads', p. 364.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 361-2.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 375.

The dramatic victory for the Yes side came against a sustained rise in public opposition to membership from the year of accession onwards (see *Table 5.1* above). This public opposition began to manifest itself in the party system where factions of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals not only forced the holding of the referendum in the first place but then left their parties to campaign with the *People's Movement*. The *People's Movement* was thus able to expand its support beyond 'outsiders' of the political system and into institutional party 'insiders' with the 'political opportunity' to force the government to call referendums.

5.6.3 The 1992 Maastricht Referendums

While at the time of the first Maastricht referendum Danish public support for EU membership was in a clear majority, this did not signify a wider embrace of full Danish participation in European integration. The rejection of Maastricht by a margin of 1.4% could be more correctly interpreted as an inevitable national dialogue about the extent of Danish participation in the European project.⁴⁸⁹ The Danish public were unsure of what participation in European integration would mean in the new 'European Union' created by the Maastricht Treaty.

The public wanted to withdraw from cooperation on any policy that would lead to political union, in this case from monetary union, tax harmonisation and foreign policy.⁴⁹⁰ These three policy areas were frequently identified with national sovereignty. The Edinburgh Compromise negotiated Danish opt-outs in these three policy areas from the Maastricht Treaty with the other member states. The most extensive opt out was from the creation of a common European citizenship: here, Denmark negotiated a position whereby any proposed rights granted to member state citizens must always refer to Danish law, and an explicit reference to the primacy of national citizenship was made. The Protocol on EMU membership took Denmark out of the third stage, which was membership of the Euro currency. These protocols were obviously sufficiently acceptable for the Danish public as parameters for the Danish relationship with the post-

⁴⁸⁹ Worre, 'First No then Yes', p. 249.

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Holger K. Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People's Party 1991 – 2005, 15th September 2009.

Maastricht EU, given the 56.7% Yes vote in the referendum re-run. The Edinburgh Compromise represented a move back to a more consensual style of policy, as the government was willing to facilitate the policy proposals of Eurosceptic opposition parties to deal with the apparently insurmountable situation of an EU unwilling to renegotiate and a Danish government unwilling to leave the EU.⁴⁹¹

With their involvement in the Edinburgh compromise the Socialist People's Party leadership moved to a pro-EU position. Their membership, however, did not. Socialist People's Party voters still overwhelmingly voted No, with just 16% voting Yes, an increase of just 5%, thus leaving 84% of party members opposed to European integration.⁴⁹² While the leadership of both the SPP and the Social Democrats made moves to be more actively pro-European, as they had accepted the national importance of full Danish involvement in the EU, a majority of their members had not. This was shown in the strong No vote in both referendums. The move of the party system towards a more pro-European stance and the shift in public opinion towards acceptance of Danish membership of the EU, amongst other points to be discussed later, caused a split in the *People's Movement*. Three of the party's four MEPs left to form the June Movement. Essentially, while the new *June Movement* campaigned against the Maastricht Treaty, they were supportive of Danish membership of a pre-Maastricht Europe, a position that was more in line with the Danish public than outright rejection of membership.

5.6.4 The 1998 Amsterdam Referendum

On this occasion the Socialist People's Party split amicably, with Yes advocates forming New Europe to campaign for a Yes vote. The Social Democrats continued to let members campaign with the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* though they did not provide them with resources as with the SEA and Maastricht referendums. The 55.1% Yes vote was not taken as a victory for the Yes side, as they sounded a conciliatory note in promising to take the views of No voters on board in future EU policy. This reaction was evidence of the divisive nature of the EU issue, and particularly of the Yes side always being on the defensive, seeking compromise and never calling the result as an end

⁴⁹¹ Ibid, p. 242.

⁴⁹² Worre, 'First No then Yes', p. 247.

to the EU question in Denmark.⁴⁹³ The Social Democrat-led government refused to use the result to drive out Eurosceptics from the party, as the power of the factions was still too strong for them to take this action at this stage.

People's Movement and *June Movement* campaigners took considerable succour from the amount of No votes, particularly as the referendum came two months after a very closely fought general election, with media coverage of the referendum substantially reduced in comparison to the heated public debate of the Maastricht campaigns.⁴⁹⁴ The deference shown to them and to No voters by the government and Yes campaigners gave the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* relevance to voters by showing that their arguments were taken seriously by the government.⁴⁹⁵ This provided much-needed psychological support in the wake of the split in the *People's Movement* in 1992 and the gradual strengthening of mainstream party support for the EU.

5.6.5 The 2000 Referendum on Euro

One of the Danish opt-outs from Maastricht was on participation in the third stage of European Monetary Union (EMU). The pressure to reverse this stance through a referendum was threefold: firstly, from the successful launch of the Euro; secondly, from Danish business groups; and thirdly, from the staunchly pro-EU Liberals and Christian People's Party. The Social Democrat-led government was very wary about holding a referendum, as the party was still split on the issue of EMU membership. Although Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen was in favour, and public opinion was slightly in favour, he needed a long consultation period with ordinary party members before he could hold a referendum and campaign for a Yes vote. At a party conference members who were active in the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* were offered a platform. In an open party vote 486 out of 500 delegates voted to support a Yes vote in the

⁴⁹³ Bille, Lars (1999). 'Political Data in 1998: Denmark', *European Journal of Political Research*, 40: 7, p. 379.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People's Movement, 10th September 2009; Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

referendum. The party leadership successfully resolved internal party dissent and removed an important base of support for the *People's Movement* and *June Movement*.⁴⁹⁶

The crux of the referendum campaign fell on the word of the Danish Economic Council (DEC), who concluded that EMU would have a negligible effect on the Danish economy, neither good nor bad. The DEC, as an independent statutory body, was charged by the government with compiling a report on the effect of Eurozone membership on the Danish economy.⁴⁹⁷ As a widely respected economic authority, their conclusion was all the more damning to the Yes campaign. This undermined the Yes argument of the economic imperative of a Yes vote, while strengthening the No claim that it was more political than economic. The clear No vote of 53.2% was given great legitimacy with the 87.6% turnout, the second highest for a European referendum. This was a serious defeat for the political establishment, given their explicit support for a Yes vote, and that just 47% of supporters of pro-Euro parties voted Yes.⁴⁹⁸ After the Maastricht referendums the Danish EPMs were seen as the big winners, who went on to receive an extra 200,000 more votes in the 1994 European Parliament elections than the 1989 elections. From the post-Euro referendum analysis, however, it can be seen that support for the Danish EPMs declined and the link between support for them and votes in European referendums was broken. The resolution of the European issue in the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party, coupled with the rise of the Danish People's Party, attacked the Danish EPMs support base from the left and the right causing their vote to decline by 200,000 in the 2004 EP elections.⁴⁹⁹ After the Euro referendum Danish voters no longer felt that the *People's Movement* and the *June Movement* articulated opposition to aspects of European integration in the form that they, in large numbers, clearly wanted expressed at the national political level.

⁴⁹⁶ Aylott, Nicholas (2002). 'Let's Discuss this Later: Party Responses to Euro-Division in Scandinavia, *Party Politics*, 8: 4, p. 455.

⁴⁹⁷ <http://www.dors.dk/sw403.asp> - The Danish Economic Council, accessed 19/4/2010.

⁴⁹⁸ Bille, 'Political Data in 2000: Denmark', p. 288.

⁴⁹⁹ Bille, 'Political Data in 2004: Denmark', p. 995.

5.6.6 Referendums as vital to EPM mobilisation

The successful strategy of Danish EPMs was of campaigning for referendums to be held, as they argued that this was the only means by which the true voice of the people on the European issue could be heard. This tactic worked successfully with the SEA referendum, where *People's Movement* members in the Social Democrats and Social Liberals pushed their parties to challenge the government on holding a referendum. The threat of a repeat action led the government to do the same for the Maastricht and Amsterdam referendums.

Referendums were therefore important to the Danish EPMs, as not only did they focus activity around a specific event, but in campaigning for them to be held in the first place, they provided legitimacy for their actions, as they claimed to be fighting for the “right of the people to decide”. In successfully establishing the precedents for referendums to be held on European treaties, the EPMs were able to label themselves as “*defenders* of the right of the people to decide”, as opposed to mainstream pro-Treaty parties that they labelled as elitist for wanting European issues decided at the parliamentary level only.⁵⁰⁰ As the number of referendums from the SEA increased to four by 2000, the claims of the EPMs to be defending the rights of the public against the elite were contradicted. As the public opinion data showed, it became a widespread belief amongst the Danish electorate that their view on Europe mattered and was taken into account. Once the public came to appreciate that the government and the EU would listen to their views via a referendum, a key policy of the EPMs was removed. Originally referendums were a source of mobilisation and of promotional strength for Danish EPMs. As the number of referendums increased, and the electorate voted No in two of them, thereby securing significant concessions on the Maastricht Treaty and preventing membership of the Euro, referendums became symbols of a responsive EU and political elite that was willing to negotiate with the EU to secure what the Danish public wanted. Such a situation dramatically reduced the relevance of the EPMs.

The repeated use of referendums to ratify Danish participation in European integration allowed Danish EPMs to put forward their arguments to the public and

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

mobilise support. Party factionalism over Europe and intense domestic party competition that came to the fore at these referendums created additional opportunities for the EPMs to draw membership and support from experienced political functionaries. The role of referendums was therefore highly important in the formation and presence of EPMs. The repeated use of referendums as a means of legitimising government EU policy was at odds with the *People's Movement's* and *June Movement's* argument that only a vote for them would allow the true voice of the Danish people on Europe to be heard. Just as repeated referendums became a source for EPM formation, they eventually served to undermine the activities of the EPMs. As a consequence of so many European referendums, by the 2000s the majority of Danish voters believed that the EU listened to them. Without a sense of alienation from the EU, and with a political elite apparently compliant with the electorate's wishes on European integration, the level of public support available to EPMs declined significantly.

Section Two: EPMs in Denmark

5.7 Overview of Danish EPMs

Euroscepticism in Denmark was synonymous with the *People's Movement* and the *June Movement* and their success in European Parliament elections (as *Table 5.1* shows) and in organising campaigns against European Treaties at referendums. They are referred to as EPMs throughout this chapter, despite both of them contesting European elections for several reasons. Firstly, they referred to themselves as movements, with supporters, functionaries and elected officials seeing the EPMs as extensions of civil society based campaigning that was not in conflict with their contestation of European Parliament elections. Secondly, the *People's Movement's* first appearance was as a movement that encompassed the Left Socialists' Party, the Communist Party of Denmark, the Socialist Workers Party and smaller anti-nuclear, ecologist and left wing grassroots groups in the early 1970s. Finally, they did not contest national parliamentary elections as they did not seek to govern. Only with the first European Parliament elections in 1979 was the move to contesting elections made. They retained much of the

appearance of the umbrella movement they started out, as due to the continued participation of a series of youth movements, socialist and ecological groups in supporting the *People's Movement*. While the *June Movement* was begun by European Parliament members, it too acted as an umbrella organisation for several trade unions and youth movements. Labelling both as EPMs therefore takes into consideration their self-taxonomy, their organisational structure, their focus on singular contestation of Europe and their acceptance of both elected and ordinary members of political parties into their ranks.

In addition to looking at the mobilising factors for the EPMs, this section will look at the factors that caused them to move to contest European Parliament elections, and it will also look at the factors that led to their dramatic decline (and in the case of the *June Movement* their dissolution). The Danish case was indeed interesting, for it saw EPMs achieve tremendous electoral success. Only in Denmark did EPMs move to contest European elections, not in the other case studies, or in any other member states. Locating the causal factors for the formation of the EPMs enables an understanding to be formed as to why they progressed to contest European Parliament elections. This is a question that has been posed by Mair and Thomassen in their analysis of representation and European integration.⁵⁰¹ Looking at the Danish EPMs is therefore highly relevant to this debate.

5.7.1 The People's Movement No to the EU

The *People's Movement* represented an example of opponents to European integration overcoming their domestic political differences and uniting successfully to campaign firstly against membership and successive referendums, and secondly for their movement to win election to the European Parliament. In 1973 they represented far left parties, the Communist Party of Denmark, Left Socialists, and Socialist Workers Party, but also civil society movements such as Danish CND, several small trade unions and environmentalist groups. In the post-accession period members of the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals, and the whole of the Socialist People's Party, met with former

⁵⁰¹ Mair and Thomassen, 'Political representation and government in the European Union', p. 29.

People's Movement members to discuss re-launching the *People's Movement* to contest the European Parliament elections. Thus the *People's Movement* broadened out its membership from the hard left to the centre left and centre. The desire to challenge Danish participation in European integration at the accession referendum and European Parliament elections proved to be a strong enough force to bind these individuals to the *People's Movement*.

To the members of political parties there was no conflict in supporting their party in local and domestic elections, and then campaigning against them at European Parliament elections. They held the genuine belief that they were involved in a movement, not a political party, that the domestic and European policies of their parties could be separated. When factionalism within the party system over Europe was at its height in the 1980s and early 1990s, political parties facilitated the involvement of their members with the EPMs by tacitly condoning their participation and, in the case of the Social Democrats, providing them with the resources to campaign against Europe from within the party itself. As the European issue dissipated in salience in the 1990s, the parties began to act more decisively against members who were still involved in the EPMs. While this did not involve the ultimate action of expulsion, more subtle and effective forms were employed. The main method was the placing of candidates, who were still involved in the EPMs, down the party list thereby making it very difficult for them to be elected, a process that was used in both local and European elections, thus ensuring that elected party members followed the party line on Europe (used in particular by the Social Liberals). The Social Democrats' leadership forced a vote on their European policy at an Emergency General Meeting on the Euro referendum, which the Eurosceptics lost in a landslide, and hence the party considered Eurosceptics removed as an effective faction in the party.

People's Movement supporters placed their membership and participation with the EPM in the specific sphere of European and foreign affairs. They considered this fundamentally different from their involvement in their national parties, which was in relation to their domestic policy concerns.⁵⁰² Such an explicit display of party disloyalty

⁵⁰² Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the *People's Movement*, 10th September 2009; Interview with Rune Kristensen, former leader of the Young Conservatives, 14th September 2009.

effectively went unpunished by parties during the 1970, 1980s and into the early 1990s, as the sentiment of members on the European issue was so strong that party leaderships could not risk damaging splits over Europe. The *People's Movement* therefore became a safety valve for parties, primarily the Social Democrats and Social Liberals, for venting member dissatisfaction on their party's position on Europe. If the *People's Movement* had gone on to challenge these same parties at the national level, this tacit acceptance of their activities would have been reversed and the valve of support shut off.

From this history of the *People's Movement* its left-wing origins are obvious. It was founded as left-wing activists needed a non-party vehicle that would attract both the party politically- and non-party politically-aligned in opposition to the membership referendum in 1972. Party political-based campaigning would have been too divisive and would have alienated Social Democrat members and supporters, who were a potentially large source of support. Danish voting patterns in European Parliament elections, as the radical left parties who partly composed the *People's Movement* obtained no more than 15% of votes in national elections at the time.⁵⁰³

“The People's Movement is not a political party, and the European election is not a party affair, but an opportunity to demonstrate the people's attitude to EC. It is important to underline that the Folketing today does not represent the people's attitude to EC.’ The purpose was, thus, to transform the Euro-election into a new referendum for or against EC-membership”.⁵⁰⁴

By 1979 it was not clear whether or not Denmark would have another referendum on Europe. The European issue was still not settled in the party system and so European Parliamentary elections became the obvious focus for the EPMs. There was no plan for what would happen should they be successful and eventually force Denmark out, the *People's Movement* was too diverse a coalition for such a policy to be formulated, the intention being that their success alone would force the government into alternative plans against which they could then react.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰³ Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, p. 83.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 84.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

Aside from the determination to contest EU membership at the European Parliament level, the more functional factors of resource allocation and media exposure added to the decision to contest European Parliamentary elections. Constant campaigning against Danish participation in European integration required significant resources. Obtaining the resources available to MEPs would provide badly needed funds for the creation of a full time office and staff to ‘keep the flame of resistance’ to Danish EU membership alive.⁵⁰⁶ Additionally, receiving an electoral mandate and elected office was envisaged to provide significant legitimacy amongst the media and public alike with regard to press releases and participation in public debates.⁵⁰⁷ The success of the *People’s Movement* ‘brand’ was shown when the Communists were unable to win seats in the Folketinget but two of their candidates won MEP seats under the *People’s Movement* list in 1979 as *Table 5.1* shows.⁵⁰⁸

The movement label was important to members of the *People’s Movement*, as the majority of them were active members of other political parties, both pro- and anti-European parties.⁵⁰⁹ Adopting such a label was not just important for attracting voters, they argued, but had important organisational and tactical implications. Firstly, as a movement they refused to seek election to the Danish parliament, as this would have led to divisions amongst their members. It would have also suggested that the party sought to govern Denmark with a specific policy agenda.⁵¹⁰ Secondly, as a movement and not a political party, they focused on the single *raison d’être* of the movement, that of Danish membership of the EU, and did not need to broaden their appeal into other policy issues as a political party, such as UKIP, would need to do to stay electorally relevant. Broadening their policy positions would have been difficult for members, as the potential for an ideological clash was high given that members ranged from communist to conservative.⁵¹¹ NATO membership was one of the most controversial issues for the movement. As a result, the *People’s Movement* did not have a position on Danish NATO

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009; Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People’s Movement, 10th September 2009.

⁵⁰⁸ Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, p. 84.

⁵⁰⁹ Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People’s Movement, 10th September 2009.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

membership.⁵¹² Finally, as a movement, the *People's Movement's* leadership believed they had an advantage over political parties in that they could tap into ordinary citizens' goodwill towards civil society movements and exploit their cynicism toward political parties. Rebranding themselves into a political party, they believed, would have had a negative impact, not only on their membership, but on the Danish public's perception of them.

The organisation of the *People's Movement* further differentiated itself from political parties especially with regard to contesting European treaties in referendum campaigns; the executive board point out that their organisational structure was the "backbone of the movement".⁵¹³ The *People's Movement* had over 100 local branches organised throughout the country, in particular on the small islands of the Danish archipelago and the rural areas of the Jutland peninsula. Given the isolated nature of these areas, few political organisations were represented there, thus giving a distinct advantage to the group. These local branches usually revolved around a single person, who kept "the flame burning"⁵¹⁴ for the *People's Movement* by writing letters to local newspapers and handing out copies of their newsletter.⁵¹⁵ Before referendums and European elections, local branches elected committees to campaign and distribute material from the *People's Movement's* head office.

As discussed earlier, given the self-applied label of 'movement', these local branches held a distinct advantage over political parties, especially in relation to European referendums. These branches had individual canvassers on the ground from an early period in the campaign with extensive EU specific literature, in areas where the mainstream political parties had little or no local presence. Similarly to the Irish Eurosceptic campaign strategy, the *People's Movement* used posters to get their arguments into the public discourse on Europe/the EU referendum in question, despite lacking in mainstream media exposure or the resources to hold press conferences. The *People's Movement* engaged in the extensive use of posters, specifically using bus stops, train stations and other public areas across the country, with local organisations picking

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

out the locations and suitability of each poster for the area in question.⁵¹⁶ The practical campaigning of the EPM easily fits into the parameters of collective action as undertaken by a social movement from the established literature detailed in Section 1.4.3.

This dissonance between the *People's Movement* as civil society-based campaigner against European treaties and their contesting of European elections came to a head by the time of the 2000 referendum on Euro membership. Despite organising an effective campaign against membership, support for the *People's Movement* at the following European elections in 2004 had collapsed by some 15% from its peak in 1979. In Section 5.6 on Danish EU referendums it was shown that the two major sources of support for the *People's Movement*, the Socialist People's Party and Eurosceptic members of the Social Democrats, came under pressure from party leadership to resolve the EU issue once and for all. By the 2004 European Parliamentary elections this had largely been achieved. Thus, the *People's Movement* was left effectively as the European Parliament branch of the Red-Green Alliance. Its role as an umbrella movement for Eurosceptic activists to contest elections at the European level had effectively ended. What did not end however, were their protest movement actions. In contesting the Lisbon Treaty the *People's Movement* organised themselves to campaign for a referendum. When the Treaty was passed in the Folketinget, members lodged an unsuccessful constitutional challenge in the court system to force the government to hold a referendum.⁵¹⁷ While their strategy of contesting European integration through the European Parliament received a severe setback, their ability to form and contest the EU through civil society remained intact.

5.7.2 The June Movement

On September 5th 2010 the *June Movement* held an extraordinary general meeting, the purpose of which was to wind up the movement.⁵¹⁸ This decision came in

⁵¹⁶ People's Movement campaign literature for proposed referendum on EU Constitutional Treaty, including posters, pamphlets and flyers.

⁵¹⁷ Marckmann-Andreassen, Andreas, 'Danish MPs vote against EU treaty referendum', *The EU Observer*, 12th December, 2007.

⁵¹⁸ Announcement by the June Movement - http://j.dk/nyheder/kommentar/junibevaegelsen_er_nedlagt/ accessed 9th September 2009.

the wake of their electoral collapse in the European Parliamentary elections of June 2009, when their vote was reduced from 9.1% to 2.4% and they lost their sole MEP (see *Table 5.1*). During the 1990s the *June Movement* received the third largest amount of votes in European Parliamentary elections, coming only a few thousand behind the Social Democrats and significantly ahead of the *People's Movement*. How the *June Movement* came to dominate Danish Euroscepticism in the 1990s but then went on to collapse by 2009 is illustrative of the dynamic factors that can cause EPM formation, yet also lead to their dissolution.

The *June Movement* originated as a split by three of the MEPs of the *People's Movement*, Jens Peter Bonde, Birgit Bjørnvig and Ulla Sandbæk from the *People's Movement*. They took this decision due to differences over what they believed the *People's Movement's* policy on participation in European integration should be. Compounding this was a personality clash between the three individuals who organised themselves around Bonde and the other MEP Karup who had the support of the *Movement's* leadership.⁵¹⁹ Their experience of working in the European Parliament led the founders of the *June Movement* to believe that although they were hostile to European integration, with certain reforms and a more democratic structure a deeply reformed EU could play an important role in organising international cooperation to solve a range of issues important to them. This position was untenable to the *People's Movement* leadership, as firstly this would undermine the movement's unifying policy of Danish withdrawal from the EU, and secondly it came into conflict with the *People's Movement's* socialist critique of European integration as a project driven by the capitalist interests of larger member states.⁵²⁰

Tensions rose during the first Maastricht referendum in 1992, and in the wake of the successful No campaign Bonde and the others took the opportunity of high national interest in the European issue to launch the *June Movement*. The name was a reference to the first Maastricht referendum having been held in the month of June. They chose as their symbol a strawberry, a fruit synonymous with June in Denmark and a vivid emblem for use in campaigns. The three MEPs were joined by veteran anti-European

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

⁵²⁰ Buch and Hansen. 'The Danes and Europe', pp. 5-6.

campaigners Drude Dahlerup and Niels Meyer.⁵²¹ Using funds available from their MEP positions, the *June Movement* campaigned against the second Maastricht referendum but placed Dahlerup and Meyer as their representatives in media debates and campaign literature, as they sought to emphasise that they were a movement with strong roots among civil society activists.⁵²²

Despite the Yes outcome of the second referendum in 1993, the *June Movement* were satisfied with their contestation, as they believed that they were well positioned to take advantage of the shift in public opinion towards membership that had occurred after the Maastricht referendums. The *June Movement* sought to portray themselves as pragmatic Eurosceptics who, while having vigorously opposed the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh compromise, recognised the will of the electorate in supporting a limited form of European integration. This was in contrast to the *People's Movement* who appeared totally wedded to their commitment to end Danish membership of the EU against popular sentiment and almost the whole of the party system.⁵²³ This positioning paid significant dividends for the *June Movement* in the 1994 European Parliament elections the following year, where they received 15.2% of the vote and two European Parliament seats (see *Table 5.1*). In doing so, they not only took votes from the *People's Movement* but votes from the Centre Democrats and Social Democrats, showing the wide appeal of the movement relative to the smaller vote (10.3%) of the *People's Movement*.⁵²⁴

The *June Movement* sought to attract support and membership from two main sections – ordinary members of Trade Unions and members of the Social Democrats.⁵²⁵ The *June Movement* found particular support during the 2000 Euro referendum in the unskilled labour union FFF⁵²⁶, the largest Danish trade unions, where local branches donated money, volunteers and organised meetings. Leading members of the movement identified distaste among trade union members for the union's leadership in sharing the same platform with business and employer representatives in support of Euro

⁵²¹ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Worre, 'First No then Yes', p. 242.

⁵²⁴ Buch and Kasper, 'The Danes and Europe', pp. 5-6.

⁵²⁵ Buch and Kasper, 'The Danes and Europe', pp. 5-6.

⁵²⁶ United Federation of Danish Workers.

membership.⁵²⁷ Given that there were some 100+ trade unions in Denmark there was substantial scope for the *June Movement* to attract support from centre-left trade unions alienated by the hard-left *People's Movement* and the pro-European leadership of the Social Democrats and Socialist People's Party.

The *June Movement's* policy was based on a 'reformist' critique of European integration. Though they sat with the secessionist UKIP in the European Parliament, their common cause was 'transparency and democracy'. It was a marriage of anti-European convenience, with UKIP using the term Eurosceptic and the *June Movement* insisting on the term 'Eurorealist'. This term, Eurorealist, was arrived at as a response to accusations that they were anti-European and Eurosceptic. The *June Movement* countered that they accepted both Danish public support for and the *reality* of European integration. Their argument against claims that they were Eurosceptic was that they believed that the EU should be reformed to be more democratic, with a focus on issues that could only be dealt with at the European level. Their policies were grouped in two broad areas: firstly, democracy in the EU with specific emphasis on transparency and subsidiarity, and secondly, the development of a new form of European-level co-operation in dealing with genetically modified foods, the environment, and workers' rights.

The slogan of the *June Movement* that "we don't want Denmark out of Europe, we want the EU out of Europe",⁵²⁸ sought to encapsulate a new paradigm of Danish opposition to European integration, one that was accepting towards membership but sceptical towards the then current trajectory of European integration. In relation to the functioning of the EU they proposed that all budgets, decision making, and lobbying should be in the open in full public view. This emphasis on transparency was shared by Eurosceptics, such as UKIP, and co-operation on these issues, in particular on the EU budget, was a major component in them forming the 'Independence and Democracy' European Parliament group with them. Where they differed from UKIP was in their call for a form of European cooperation that allowed for "political decisions [to] be taken at

⁵²⁷ Buch and Kasper, 'The Danes and Europe', pp. 17-20.

⁵²⁸ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

the lowest possible level at which effective decision-making can occur”.⁵²⁹ On European cooperation their argument was that “[a] flexible form of European cooperation, where it is possible for a country to participate in selected areas of cooperation while not participating in others, would also help us to distance ourselves from the formation of a unitary EU State, which is only the next step from a supranational federation”.⁵³⁰ Other policies they promoted were a roll-back of EU bureaucracy and ‘sunset’ clauses for EU regulations, closer scrutiny and great powers to national parliaments in relation to the Commission, and greater use of referendums to involve the EU populace in decision making.⁵³¹

In addition to the specific alternative European policies to the EU, the *June Movement* highlighted more general issues of concern but not to the same extent as their democratic critique. These policies were based on ecological concerns over the imposition of genetically modified foods through the CAP where they argued for an explicit total ban on GM foods in the EU. Additionally they put forward a traditional left-wing defence of public healthcare that they believed was under threat from the proposed EU services directive.

A significant obstacle for the *June Movement* to overcome was the labelling of them as extremist and xenophobic by the pro-EU campaigners. Their main policy platform of subsidiarity as a necessity for the EU to be truly democratic was used to counter the extremist label, as they sought to portray themselves as defenders of the Danish tradition of grassroots democracy. In campaigning their argument was that the mainstream pro-EU parties were overseeing the transfer of Danish sovereignty to Brussels, and that only they could provide a voice to a Danish public that was used to “direct contact with politicians” and was now on the receiving end of decisions from the EU “with no one to talk to” about them.⁵³² Former senior *June Movement* officials conceded that they never truly succeeded in overcoming the extremist label that their opposition to European integration brought them. This was exemplified during the Euro referendum campaign where they found significant problems in getting their arguments

⁵²⁹ EUDemocrats, *Alliance for a Europe of Democracies*.

⁵³⁰ June Movement 2009 European Parliamentary Elections Manifesto.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

covered in the Danish media. While the broadcast media had specific guidelines about allotting equal coverage to both sides, the print media did not. The *June Movement* believed that political pressure was put on the media not to cover their campaign. In retaliation they held an international press conference about how the Danish media was not covering their campaign, whereupon the Danish media covered the international media coverage of the *June Movement's* campaign.⁵³³

The *June Movement* continued this success into the 1999 European Parliament elections where they slightly increased their vote by 0.9% and managed to secure an extra seat at the expense of the *People's Movement*. Building on this success, the *June Movement* campaigned against Euro membership in the 2000 referendum.⁵³⁴ Again Dahlerup was placed as the movement's main public representative, and not the more high profile MEPs, as part of a loose coalition of trade unionists and academic economists but not with the Danish People's Party and *People's Movement* who led their own individual campaigns. EMU membership was rejected with a 53.2% No vote, but this outcome did not prove beneficial to the long-term success of the *June Movement*. As discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Euroscepticism in Denmark had changed significantly from the time of the Maastricht Treaty. The Social Democrats were no longer indecisive on their European policy and the continued electoral success of the Danish People's Party signalled that the form of Euroscepticism espoused by the *June Movement* no longer resonated with the Danish electorate. In the 2004 European Parliamentary elections *June Movement* lost two of its seats in a more competitive election environment, as Denmark's representation was reduced by two seats, to the resurgent, Eurosceptic faction free, Social Democrats.⁵³⁵ Finally, in the 2009 European Parliament election the *June Movement's* vote collapsed to just 2.4%, with *Table 5.1* illustrating this steady decline in support.

The *June Movement* can be viewed similarly to the *People's Movement* in that they sought to balance out their role as a civil society movement and their participation in European integration. Unlike the *People's Movement*, they could not achieve a balance that allowed them to survive their European Parliamentary electoral meltdown, and so,

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ Bille, 'Political Data in 1999', p. 367.

⁵³⁵ Bille, 'Political Data in 2004' p. 995.

devoid of a relevant base in civil society from which to continue their contestation of European integration as a social movement, they ended.

5.7.3 Inter-Eurosceptic Electoral Rivalry

The difference between the two EPMs was that the *People's Movement* wanted Denmark to leave the EU and the *June Movement* wanted to revert to a pre-Maastricht form of European integration. The *People's Movement's* goal was for Denmark to withdraw from the EU and adopt a relationship with the EU that most closely resembled that of Swiss–EU relations.⁵³⁶ For the *June Movement*, withdrawal was not a consideration. Instead they sought to roll back the advance of the Maastricht Treaty on Danish sovereignty, and seek to re-establish a pre-Maastricht Danish relationship with the EU. The *People's Movement* became a totemic symbol of opposition to the EU for left-wing voters, whose national parties had oscillated for and against various EU treaties, despite their opposition to European integration remaining constant.⁵³⁷

The *June Movement's* Bonde, on the other hand, was quite well known outside of Denmark. They made a conscientious effort to disseminate their specific criticisms of EU integration beyond Denmark across the member states and candidate countries through the TEAM⁵³⁸ network. They represented a less ideologically constrained criticism of the EU, one more focused on sovereignty, EU reform and specific post-materialist issues, such as healthcare and the environment.⁵³⁹ Bonde moved towards a 'Eurorealist' critique of European integration in the post-1989 Maastricht period. His skill in using the media for self-promotion made him the 'face' of Danish Euroscepticism. What made Bonde stand out amongst other Eurosceptics, not just in Denmark but across the EU, was his success in creating a wider, non-ideological critique of European integration that was used by EPMs such as the *Bruges Group*, the Irish *National Platform*, the Irish *People's Movement* and the Estonian *Research Centre Free*

⁵³⁶ Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People's Movement, 10th September 2009. People's Movement 2009 European Parliamentary Elections material.

⁵³⁷ Worre, 'The Danish Euro-Party System', p. 87.

⁵³⁸ The European Alliance of EU Critical Movements, or as it was then founded The European Anti-Maastricht network.

⁵³⁹ June Movement 2009 European Parliamentary Elections material.

Europe amongst others.⁵⁴⁰ Whereas members of the *People's Movement* kept their activities to their hard left EP GUE/NGL⁵⁴¹ group, Bonde sought to promote himself as the intellectual leader of the form of Euroscepticism he labelled 'Eurorealism' by promoting his arguments to both left-wing and right-wing opponents of European integration.⁵⁴²

These key differences between the *People's Movement* and the *June Movement* could be generally classified around personality, ideology and finally nationalism versus internationalism. What role these issues played in the formation of the EPMs will now be discussed and their relevance evaluated. In addition, the question as to why only two EPMs emerged will be addressed.

Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors

Over the course of this chapter the relationship between the focus of the thesis as a whole, what causes the formation of EPMs, to that of the propositions was touched on and highlighted, where appropriate. This final section will now draw from the rest of the chapter and locate the main factors impacting on the relevance of each proposition.

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The media played an important role in the formation of the *People's Movement*. Founder members were angered by the lack of exposure anti-EU arguments were getting in the national print media and the negative light in which they were portrayed in the national public broadcast media. As with the other cases, however, it represented an element of an overall confirmation that they were 'outsiders' from the main political system. It did not cause formation but it helped create the environment in which an EPM was the most effective means of campaigning. The founders of the *People's Movement*

⁵⁴⁰ Interview with Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, UK; Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, Ireland; Interview with Frank Keoghan, Executive Committee Member, the People's Movement, Ireland; Interview with Ivar Raig, Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, Estonia.

⁵⁴¹ European United Left/Nordic Green Left.

⁵⁴² Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009. . EUDemocrats (2005) *Alliance for a Europe of Democracies: Political Platform*, Brussels: EUDemocrats.

as members of radical-left political parties knew that they needed an effective political, non-ideological ‘brand’ to put forward a Eurosceptic argument in the media. A non-political, civil society-based movement would receive more neutral coverage in the media than a political party-based one, as it would come largely unencumbered with domestic political baggage. Therefore, considerations of media coverage played a role in deciding to form the *People’s Movement* EPM, ahead of a purely political party-based campaign against the accession referendum.

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The most important impact of the role of the level of Euroscepticism in the party system was in not only sustaining EPM formation but in also facilitating its growth and increased importance in the Danish political system. Danish Euroscepticism in the 1970s, 1980s and into the early 1990s was spread out amongst voters in greatest numbers on the hard left but in significant numbers on centre left, centre and radical right. The leaders of mainstream centre parties and the Social Democrats were unsure of how to deal with the level of Euroscepticism amongst their supporters, given the pro-European leanings of their respective leaderships, and so they took neutral positions. Frustration at this impasse mobilised supporters and functionaries of these parties to re-form the *People’s Movement* to participate in the first European Parliament elections in 1979 as a means of expressing their opposition to Danish membership of the EU.

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

Referendums were the main causal factor behind the original formation of Danish EPMs. Once government negotiations were concluded and a referendum on membership proposed, the *People’s Movement* was launched to campaign against the accession referendum in 1972. Beyond this, referendums played a role in sustaining EPMs as they provided a locus by which they could mobilise support in opposition to Europe and provided them with media exposure as the leading opponents of European integration. The Maastricht Treaty played a significant role in the formation of the *June Movement*, as

it allowed Eurosceptics who favoured some, but not full, cooperation with Europe a framing point to present an alternative to the then trajectory of European integration. Their alternative was for a pre-Maastricht Europe, which allowed for European-level cooperation on the single market and on environmental policy but left key policies in the competencies of national governments. More importantly, the passing of the second Maastricht referendum made a policy of withdrawal from the EU out of step with public opinion and thus created political space for the *June Movement* to emerge.

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

Radically different voter behaviour at national and European elections allowed both movements to form. The open nature of a single national constituency for European Parliamentary elections allowed for issues of national importance (e.g. Europe) to take precedence over local issues. The *People's Movement* were fully conscious of this benefit when they decided to re-form and contest the first European Parliamentary elections in 1979. This gave confidence to the founders of the *June Movement*, in that they knew they could take the risk of forming their new movement and compete successfully in European Parliamentary elections. Additionally, judicial rulings on equal coverage for both No and Yes sides in the public broadcast media meant that the EPMs knew they would have a public platform from which to put forward their arguments.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

The availability of human resources played a central role in the formation of the *People's Movement*. The sheer number of trade unionists, mainstream party members and individual citizens who wanted to actively contest European integration through a protest movement was a key driver in the formation of the *People's Movement*. Additionally, financial resources did play a role in their decision to move from civil-society, grassroots campaigning to contesting European elections. It did not have a

mobilisation effect but more of an evolutionary effect. The promise of monetary and organisational support from holding a European Parliamentary seat was one of the reasons why the *People's Movement* re-formed to contest European elections in 1979. Their plan was to use these resources to increase their campaigning against Danish EU membership.

5.8 Main Conclusions from the Danish Case

Danish EPMs were a fascinating study in how EPM formation and development reflects national relationships with European integration. The *People's Movement* first originated as an umbrella movement of left-wing groups and political parties to contest the accession Treaty. Following on from that, the People's Movement was re-formed to contest the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 in order to keep resistance to European integration in the public sphere and a live political issue.

The *People's Movement* was allowed to do this, because of the political space ceded to them due to the clumsy handling of the European issue by domestic political parties. EPMs in Denmark evolved with the Danish relationship with European integration. The *June Movement* was formed in a split from the *People's Movement* from a personality clash but also to represent a different form of Euroscepticism, Eurorealism, a position which accepted public support for a form of European integration but rejected 'European Union'. Once domestic parties resolved their positions on Europe, almost wholly in favour, and began to send single unified cues to their voters, then the electoral support for both movements was eroded. Danish politics finally came to terms with its post-Maastricht situation by the early 2000s, as parties with significant Eurosceptic factions articulated European policies that were acceptable to anti- and pro-European members alike. Added to the rise of the Danish People's Party on the right, and pro-European unity on the left, there were no more disgruntled centre-left and centre-right voters to support either group. Only the *People's Movement* survived as the proxy of the Red-Green Alliance.

While the depth of public opposition to European integration was obvious, the explanatory factors used in this study were important in explaining how this opposition came to be mobilised as EPMs. The level of Euroscepticism in the party system played a

crucial role in EPM formation. Opposition to European integration increased amongst the public post accession but the level of Euroscepticism in the party system did not. Ordinary members of mainstream parties and of civil-society groups closely aligned to mainstream parties (such as trade unions) formed EPMs to represent their views on the EU at the national political level. An open policy process, whereby mainstream party members, both ordinary and elected, were not openly punished for the involvement in EPMs, facilitated the formation of EPMs to contest European Parliamentary elections successfully. With the repeated use of referendums to pass European treaties, EPMs were formed to take advantage of the opportunity to contest, again successfully, European integration. The Danish case therefore conforms strongly to the political opportunity model of social movement formation, with resources being unimportant in explaining their origin. With regard to issue framing, however, a different picture emerges. Here, Danish EPMs fall into the grievance model, as they were formed as a reaction to the shifting nature of Danish public opinion on European integration. The *June Movement* sought to develop a frame alignment with their Eurorealist critique of European integration but the fundamental nature of the Danish relationship with the EU had changed and it failed for them. As mentioned in the first chapter, *Section 1.5.3*, the Danish relationship with European integration has been the basis for some of the key theories of how political parties, voters and referendums respectively interact with European integration.

This chapter has shown that a wide degree of nuance is needed when seeking to understand Euroscepticism in a particular state. The complexities of the Danish case, with its two party systems at the national and European level, multiple referendums on European integration, and dynamic public opinion toward the EU, makes it problematic to tease out generalisable points in relation to Euroscepticism from it: hence Franklin and Svensson hold diametrical opinions on support for European integration in Denmark.⁵⁴³ The one clear lesson that does emerge, however, is that Euroscepticism can be a very dynamic phenomenon. What constitutes opposition to European integration can change in tandem with other dynamics, such as the emergence of new political parties on either

⁵⁴³ Franklin, 'Learning from the Danish case'; Svensson, Palle (2003). 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union'.

side of the political spectrum, who articulate a new Eurosceptic narrative. The entry of European integration into new post-materialist areas of competency can turn Eurosceptics into pro-integrationists to a degree. In this respect the evolution of Euroscepticism in Denmark followed along the lines of the Hooghe-Marks model with the left/right divide being based not simply around economic issues but also along environmental and immigration issues as well. The fate of the *People's Movement* and *June Movement* offers a possible answer to a residual question from the Hooghe-Marks model about the effects on domestic party competition when Euroscepticism shifts from left to right.⁵⁴⁴ In Denmark such changes allowed the Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party and Social Liberals to both reabsorb factions and supporters that formed EPMs back into their party, and take their votes at European Parliamentary elections.

⁵⁴⁴ Hooghe, 'Does left/right structure party positions on European integration'.

Chapter Six: Explaining EPM Formation Across the Four Case Studies

6.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters focused on the four individual case studies and identified various different factors that caused EPMs to form in each. This chapter concludes the study by providing generalisations on the wider factors that cause EPM formation that are common across several, if not all, case studies. This study began with the assumption that all of the explanatory factors chosen had the potential to be relevant to EPM formation. Just as importantly the lack of relevance of any of the explanatory factors is also discussed. Where the explanatory factors were not of use, this was most commonly due to the case-specific nature of each example, which in itself provides information as to the specificities of the case in question and its relationship to the EU.

The following analysis proceeds thematically, factor by factor, with an evaluation of each one made with reference to its influence in the case studies examined. Finally, a conclusion on the factors is made as to their overall validity, based on the number of EPMs in each case study. This chapter concludes by proposing a list of factors, both from and beyond this thesis, which would lead to an ‘ideal type’ case of EPM formation. The example of Spain is also discussed as a case of non-occurrence where no EPMs were present, despite the explanatory factors being in evidence.

6.2 Testing the Conclusions from the Four Case Studies against the Explanatory Factors

This section provides a brief conclusion on the points from each case study on each explanatory factor and then identifies the effectiveness of each proposition in predicting EPM formation. It goes on to discuss why the propositions were or were not effective with reference to the case studies and to suggest how the explanatory factors aid in the understanding of wider issues in relation to European integration: namely, EU referendums, party politics and the EU.

The focus of this study is EPM formation, with the explanatory factors being employed to understand why individuals formed EPMs. In this regard, the study measured EPM formation in each case study by the number of EPMs formed. In relation to EPM formation the case studies were characterised as being high, medium or low. As outlined in Section 1.6, this approach was taken on the basis of the social movement literature that assumes that the more favourable an environment for EPM formation, the more EPMs there will be, and so the actual number of EPMs can be used to measure the favourability of a country for EPM formation. This thesis sought to question the relevancy of this approach by also looking at policy outcomes in each of the case studies. As will be discussed throughout this chapter the answer was ambiguous and highly case specific. The UK saw extremely high EPM formation with some important policy outcomes, though EPMs there were not an overtly influential force in the UK–EU debate. Estonian EPMs were also not overtly influential either in the EU debate or in the policy process in Estonia. The *People's Movement* in Denmark, as the only relevant EPM there for a substantial period of time, was able to exert considerable influence over Danish EU policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Irish EPMs on the other hand represented a mid-point between the linkage of EPM numbers to policy influence. Though the numbers of EPMs was nowhere near as high as that of the UK, as they increased they began to exert an influence over policy comparable to that of the Danish *People's Movement*. What this chapter will stress as the key to understanding both the increased incidence of EPM formation and policy influence, is the make-up of the political opportunity structure (POS) in each case study.

The literature on Euroscepticism outlined in the first chapter focused on political parties and public opinion amongst other issues. This study has sought to extend this work by asking, why did social movements emerge from civil society to contest European integration? And, why were more conventional means of opposition, such as through the party system, not pursued? All of these underlying questions inform the analysis of each proposition and form the basis of the conclusions reached in this chapter and the next.

EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.

What was being measured with this explanatory factor was the impact of the perception of the pro-European bias of the media on the decision of EPM activists to form their EPM. As has been discussed throughout this study, the media was highlighted repeatedly as a key area of contestation for EPMs. This follows the literature on social movements, which emphasises the significance of raising awareness of issues in the media as a key factor in formation for many domestic social movements, as it allows them influence without having to expend conventional resources.⁵⁴⁵ The key to understanding the media as a factor in the formation of EPMs is to understand that the emphasis is on the *perception* of the media as pro-European by EPMs. Moreover, “the mass media arena is *the* major site of contests over meaning, because all of the players in the policy process assume its pervasive influence”.⁵⁴⁶ It is clear that EPMs were formed to contest the media sphere over European integration just as much as they were to contest the EU issue in referendums and with political parties. This study contrasted the case studies against this assumption and identified if EPMs followed typical social movement behaviour as regards their interaction with the media.

Denmark

The media played an important role in the formation of the *People's Movement*. Founder members were angered by the lack of exposure that anti-EU accession arguments were getting in the national print media and the negative light in which they were portrayed in the national public broadcast media. As with the other cases, however, it represented an element of an overall confirmation that they were ‘outsiders’ of the main political system. This did not cause EPM formation but it helped create the environment in which an EPM was the most effective means of campaigning. The founders of the *People's Movement*, as members of radical-left political parties, knew that they needed an effective, political, non-ideological ‘brand’ to put forward a Eurosceptic argument in the media. A non-political, civil society-based movement would receive more neutral

⁵⁴⁵ Ganson, ‘Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media’, p. 254.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

coverage in the media than a political party-based one, as it would come largely unencumbered with domestic political baggage. Therefore, considerations of media coverage played a role in deciding to form the *People's Movement* EPM, ahead of a purely political party-based campaign against the accession referendum. The *June Movement*, as a split from the *People's Movement*, followed the same line of thinking.

Estonia

In contrast to the Irish case, and similarly to the UK case, the Estonian Eurosceptics all agreed that the Estonian media was biased against them but there was disagreement as to the opportunity of getting their arguments across. The *Research Centre Free Europe* and the *No to the EU Movement* both believed that the media was part of a pro-European elite that stifled debate on the EU. Their belief that the media was pro-European did encourage them to form EPMs but it was not a decisive factor.

Ireland

For Irish EPMs, gaining access to the media was not a problem. Coverage was given to their press launches and they had occasional articles published in the main newspapers. They all believed, however, that the media editorialised against them, and were strongly biased in favour of the pro-EU/pro-treaty side. There were strong similarities with the Danish case, where ostensibly the media gave coverage to EPM campaigners but EPMs were of the strong opinion that editorials urged Yes votes, criticised No arguments and gave far more coverage to Yes campaigns. A perception of pervasive pro-EU coverage in the media did indeed play a role in the formation of Irish EPMs. In a similar manner to UK EPMs, they felt that the real facts of the impact of European integration in Ireland – workers' rights, ECJ rulings, the reduction of Irish neutrality, Franco-German dominance of the EU – were not reported in the Irish media, and that they had a duty to inform the Irish people of what they saw as the negative reality of Irish EU membership.

UK

Those UK EPMs (*Business for Sterling*) that operated at the *Elite* level saw certain sections of the media as being open to their arguments and supportive of their campaigns. They were sceptical as to whether the BBC was impartial but they accepted that to be taken seriously by the BBC and the financial press, they had to put forward well researched arguments. The right-wing press were accommodative of their press releases and opinion articles, as they were perceived to be ‘on the same side’. UK EPMs operating at the *grassroots* level (*Campaign for a Referendum*) believed that the entirety of the mainstream media was inherently biased against them. They based this on the fact that withdrawal was not put forward as a legitimate policy goal for the UK government. Instead they focused on local media through letter writing campaigns and local protests, because it was much easier to access. *Business for Sterling* were not mobilised by opposition to a pro-European media, their campaign was actually facilitated by certain sections of the media. *Campaign for a Referendum*, on the other hand, was mobilised in part at the perceived failure of the media to provide detailed information to the public on the true negative impact of the EU on UK sovereignty. A clear distinction was drawn between the broadcast media, which was perceived by both sides to be pro-European, and the print media, which was broadly seen by the majority of EPMs as more accommodative of Eurosceptic arguments but still with a degree of pro-EU bias. When the EPMs discussed the media, they were roundly dismissive of broadcast media and focused almost exclusively on the print media, as they believed that this was both the main arena of contestation on the EU issue and their best opportunity to affect public opinion on the EU. For these two issues in particular the desire to challenge a perceived pro-EU narrative in the media was a key factor explaining the formation of UK EPMs.

Conclusion

The explanatory factor has proven to be quite accurate in relation to the evidence from the case studies. The majority of the EPMs studied across all of the case studies believed the media to be wholly biased against them and their arguments (*Business for Sterling* being the notable exception). The pervasive feeling was that the media reflected

an inherent, elite, pro-EU, political bias and refused to countenance alternatives to the current trajectory of European integration. Even the supposedly strongly Eurosceptic UK media was criticised by some EPM activists for being pro-EU in failing to question national membership of the EU itself.

Despite the belief in a bias against their arguments, many of the EPMs had access to the media itself. Therefore, EPM relations with the media can be characterised on two levels, actual *physical access* to the media in terms of coverage and publishing and secondly, on the perceived overall *editorial stance* of the media towards their arguments. Estonian and Irish EPMs believed that they were not on the receiving end of a coverage blackout, as Danish EPMs did, in their respective national media but that, seen in the overall context of the editorial narrative of the media, their arguments were highlighted in a negative manner. They believed that their campaigns were presented as “fringe” and “off the wall”, and labelled coverage of their events as tokenism.⁵⁴⁷ In Estonia this was not so disadvantageous as, given the small media market, an article in the national newspaper of record, *Postimees*, and visual coverage in the nightly news programme *Aktuaalne kaamera* meant that their arguments would reach at least 60% of the population. Despite the negative editorial line against their arguments, the Estonian EPMs were pleased that they at least had access to the media. In Ireland the perception was far more negative. Though access was still granted, they believed this was grudgingly so due to a court case won by EPM campaigners (albeit on an unrelated issue) forcing the national broadcaster to allot equal airtime to No arguments. In Denmark the belief among EPM activists was that the media was wholesale against them, both the print and national broadcast media. This was not the case at the beginning of Danish membership where significant sections of the media came out against membership. As Euroscepticism grew in Denmark, so did a determined pro-EU line from the major media outlets with only small regional newspapers providing EU-critical coverage. The two fed into each other, as Eurosceptic activists saw themselves as outsiders to a political, economic and media elite that was pro-EU. In the UK the strongly Eurosceptic print media was a boon to those EPMs that had the connections and resources to access it.

⁵⁴⁷ Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

Those EPMs – the overwhelming majority – that did not have such access believed the UK media to have a pro-EU bias, as they did not actively advocate withdrawal as a legitimate option for the UK.

The key to understanding the impact of this explanatory factor is in utilising the social movement literature. This body of work emphasises the media as a vital arena of contestation that has a strong say over the issue environment in which the EPM operates. All of the EPMs in this thesis engaged with the media almost all with the aim of changing the issue environment. In this respect the explanatory factor closely follows social movement interaction with the media. For an issue such as European integration, which offers little in the way of avenues of contestation for a civil society-based protest movement, media engagement on the issue was one of the means by which the perceived elite pro-European position could be challenged. EPMs, though, had differing interpretations of the importance of contesting European integration in the media. Irish and Estonian EPMs had good access to the media but were more motivated to form by contesting the EU through other channels. In Denmark there was a strong link between EPM formation and a view of the media as pro-European. This view formed part of a wider perception of an overarching, pro-EU, elite bias in Denmark that led to the formation of the *People's Movement*. In the UK the *Campaign for a Referendum* was mobilised in part as a reaction against the supposed failure of the media to effectively put forward withdrawal from the EU as a legitimate option and to communicate what they believed as the 'truth' of the negative impact of EU membership on the UK. In Denmark and the UK, therefore, the factor was found to be relevant to EPM formation, as the media was a key component of contesting the issue-framing environment in both cases.

EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that EPMs will form.

What was being measured in this explanatory factor was the extent to which EPMs were influenced by the articulation of Euroscepticism in the party system in their decision to form. The literature on Euroscepticism is dominated by analysis of party systems, and how Euroscepticism is missing in the mainstream but present on the

extremities. This gives the appearance of Euroscepticism having little or no traction in national politics. Correspondingly, research into social movements emphasises that they form when support for party politics is low or when specific issues are ignored by the party system. Both literatures appear to converge on the proposition that a low level of Euroscepticism in the party system will be a strong determining factor in the formation of EPMs. Each case study was examined in turn against this argument and conclusions drawn on the differences and similarities of EPMs to other social movements in this regard.

Denmark

The level of Euroscepticism in the party system facilitated the growth and increased the importance of EPMs in the Danish political system. Activities in Danish EPMs in the 1970s, 80s and into the early 90s was concentrated amongst voters on the radical left but also in significant numbers on the centre left and radical right. The leaderships of the centrist Social Liberal party and the Social Democrats were unsure of how to deal with the level of Euroscepticism amongst their supporters, due to the contradiction with their own pro-European policy, so they took neutral positions. Frustration at this impasse mobilised supporters and functionaries of these parties to reform the *People's Movement* to participate in the first EP elections in 1979 as a means of expressing their opposition to Danish membership of the EU. This situation continued right up until the mid-2000s when the Social Democrats and Social Liberals finally confronted the EU issue at party congresses and took unequivocal pro-EU positions. The ambiguity surrounding parties' positions on the EU in Denmark led to EPMs being mobilised, as party members wanted to take effective action and did not wait for their party to resolve its EU position to do so. The evidence supported the proposition in the Danish case but to rephrase it slightly to take into account the specificities of the case: 'a low level of *unambiguous* Euroscepticism in the party system is likely to encourage EPM formation'.

Estonia

There were extremely low levels of Euroscepticism in the Estonian party system. The only party to come close to being Eurosceptic was the Centre Party. This party's perceived strong links to Russia meant that Estonian nationalists opposed to European integration did not have an 'acceptable' form of Euroscepticism in the party system. Other Eurosceptic parties were far too marginal (not even having local authority representation) to be considered as a party-political vehicle for Euroscepticism. The formation of Estonian EPMs was driven almost exclusively by former and present members of political parties, who opposed EU membership and the terms of the accession negotiations, both of which were silenced in the party system. The Estonian case gives positive evidence to the proposition. While indeed there was a lack of Euroscepticism in the party system, more specifically there was a lack of 'acceptable' Euroscepticism. The party-based Euroscepticism on offer was ideologically unacceptable to the Estonian nationalists and economic liberals who made up the bulk of opposition to Estonian membership of the EU. While a low level of Euroscepticism did indeed lead to the formation of Estonian EPMs, a more correct interpretation would have the proposition rephrased as "a low level of *acceptable* Euroscepticism".

Ireland

Irish EPMs emerged despite the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system. As that party-based Euroscepticism declined, they became increasingly influential, to such an extent that smaller Eurosceptic political parties associated themselves with EPMs, such as the *No to Nice* campaign. As the number of Eurosceptic parties in parliament declined further, with the Greens no longer advocating a No vote, the number of EPMs increased reciprocally. This showed a clear relationship between EPM formation in Ireland and the level of Euroscepticism in the party system. As the elites of formerly anti-EU parties took pro-EU treaty stances they failed to take a significant proportion of their members and voters with them. These members and voters, who perceived themselves to be negatively affected by European integration, became involved in Eurosceptic circles providing increasing levels of resources, both financial and

manpower, that made EPM formation more feasible and their campaigns more successful. At the beginning of the Irish accession process EPMs were mobilised despite the presence of Labour, a large mainstream Eurosceptic party. But by the time of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties a reduced level of party-based Euroscepticism led to EPMs such as *Libertas* and the *People's Movement* mobilising. In the Irish case the proposition can be seen to be generally supported. Looking at EPMs at the time of accession it was not supported by the evidence, but looking at more recent EPM formation from the 1990s on, it can be seen that the proposition was correct for this time frame. In Ireland the evidence leads to the conclusion that 'a low level of Euroscepticism in the *mainstream* party system is likely to encourage increased EPM formation'.

UK

In contrast to the other case studies the UK clearly had a high level of Euroscepticism in the party system throughout the entire period of its membership. This did not, however, dampen the formation effect of EPMs in the UK. The presence of Eurosceptic parties, in fact, was a causal factor in EPM formation. This appears contradictory, given that hard and soft Euroscepticism are clearly represented in two electorally successful political parties. What the examples of *Business for Sterling* and *Campaign for a Referendum* show was that it was not so much the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system but the perception of the *effectiveness* of that party based Euroscepticism in contesting European integration that had an effect on EPM formation. Members of both EPMs were convinced of the Eurosceptic bona fides of the Conservatives and UKIP but were less convinced of their ability to successfully challenge what they perceived as a pro-EU government and defeat a referendum on European integration. From the UK data the proposition might be amended to read 'the perceived *effectiveness* of Euroscepticism in the party system is likely to encourage EPM formation'.

Conclusion

The Estonian and Irish cases reveal that, while there was most definitely a low level of Euroscepticism in the party system, even if those Eurosceptic parties had had greater representation, EPMs would still have been founded, due to the ideologically unacceptable nature of the party-based Euroscepticism. As discussed in the first chapter, the literature on Euroscepticism in political parties locates the phenomenon almost exclusively in those who hold radical positions, on both the left and right of the party system. The lack of mainstream parties holding Eurosceptic positions, as Ray has discussed,⁵⁴⁸ and the dominance of the Eurosceptic issue by radical parties, was perhaps the most influential explanatory factor in understanding EPM formation. In the Estonian and Irish cases despite the presence of Eurosceptic parties or parties with Eurosceptic leanings, EPMs were formed. This was because Eurosceptic parties in both countries held extreme positions on issues outside of European integration, making them unacceptable vehicles for disparate groups in civil society to channel their Euroscepticism. In the case of Estonia it was explicit links between the Centre Party and the Russian government. In Ireland it was the radical left socio-economic policies of the Socialist Party, the Workers' Party and Sinn Féin's explicit links to the IRA. In the UK case, not only was Euroscepticism present in the party system but it was also of an ideologically acceptable form to those who formed EPMs. Opposition to European integration, being over-represented on the right side of the ideological spectrum, saw liberal economic and national sovereignty critiques of UK membership of the EU present in the party system in the Conservatives and UKIP. This however, did not prevent EPM formation, as this party-based Euroscepticism was not deemed to be effectively challenging European integration. In Denmark there was a limited presence of Euroscepticism in the party system but the largest and most influential party, the Social Democrats, failed to resolve internal party divisions on the issue and so remained ambiguous on European integration. It was supporters and functionaries of the Social Democrats that joined with other smaller left-wing parties to form the *People's Movement* as a reaction to the Social Democrats' hesitation on the EU issue. The Danish

⁵⁴⁸ Ray, 'Mainstream Euroscepticism'.

case shows that Euroscepticism in the party system needs to be decisive if it is to act as an acceptable channel for wider anti-EU public sentiment.

The broad range of the case studies provides some useful data on the ‘level of Euroscepticism in the party system’ proposition. The UK case showed that it can have low relevance to EPM formation, the Estonian case showed it to be strongly relevant to the EPM formation, but taken together all cases showed that it was necessary to look beyond categorizing a party system as having either high or low levels of Euroscepticism. From this research it is apparent that to channel popular opposition to European integration into the party system and to prevent EPMs from forming, party-based Euroscepticism must firstly be ideologically compatible with the dominant forms of public Euroscepticism and not be ‘tainted’ with any extreme position. Secondly, this Euroscepticism must be seen to be effective in both challenging European integration, at either the national or European level. Thirdly, it must be decisive, in that parties cannot ‘flip-flop’ on the issue for electoral advantage and/or government efficacy.

While these assertions on the nature of party-based Euroscepticism are driven by the case-specific exceptions of this thesis, a brief examination of the Dutch case suggests that they have potentially wider applicability. In the Netherlands, the Socialist Party and the Freedom Party represented a possible case for the level of Euroscepticism in the party system working against EPM formation. They represent the dominant strains of Euroscepticism in the country, radical-left and radical-right; they effected successful opposition to the EU, with both playing strong roles in the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty, and their Euroscepticism remained unequivocal. Thus, the expert survey on EPM formation across Europe conducted in the first chapter found that there were no EPMs in the Netherlands. Applying these conclusions to the UK, typically characterised as the archetypal example of a party system with a high level of Euroscepticism, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the UK party system as having a high level of Euroscepticism but a low level of *effective* Euroscepticism. This would go some way towards explaining the high number of EPMs that have emerged in the UK despite the presence of the Conservatives and UKIP. From the example of the Netherlands it is clear that the level of Euroscepticism in the party system does indeed affect rates of EPM formation, but not for the simple presence or lack of a large number

of parties. There are more case-specific reasons for this, as the case studies discussed here show.

The level of effective Euroscepticism in the party system proved to be an important explanatory factor, as it contributed significantly toward EPM formation in Denmark and the UK. It showed the difference between political parties' and their supporters' positions on Europe. The slight, yet important, difference between the UK and Danish cases was that Danish EPM activists were dissatisfied, not with party action, or lack thereof, on European integration, but more with the variable nature of it. These were perhaps solid examples of May's law of curvilinear disparity in that the difference between the 'middle actors' of the Danish Social Democrats and UK Conservatives and party officials was so great that they formed EPMs to actively challenge their own party on the EU issue.⁵⁴⁹ Unfortunately testing May's law against the evidence present in this study was beyond its scope. Nevertheless, the experience of the *People's Movement*, *Business for Sterling* and the *Campaign for a Referendum* could provide a basis for testing the hypothesis of May's law in a future study.

In conclusion, the level of Euroscepticism in the party system explanatory factor plays a role in the case studies but the various nuances discussed need to be taken into account to appreciate the true explanatory effect of the proposition to EPM formation.

EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will form.

Given that each of the case studies was a unitary state political opportunities were at their most relevant at the national level. National-level political opportunities, as Kitschelt has well documented, are typically the most difficult to access for social movements. As a referendum provides a unique opportunity to challenge the political elite on the EU issue at the national level, it should obviously strongly encourage EPM formation. It follows on logically that there should be a corresponding increase in EPM formation with the number of EU referendums. This explanatory factor measured this

⁵⁴⁹ May, John D. (1973), 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity', *Political Studies*, 21: 2, pp. 135-51.

assumption; that more EU referendums meant more EPMs. Given that Ireland and Denmark held numerous referendums on European integration, while Estonia and the UK held just one each, comparing all the case studies provided some evidence to test the explanatory factor.

Denmark

Referendums were the main causal factor behind the formation of Danish EPMs. Once government negotiations were concluded and a referendum on membership proposed, the *People's Movement* was launched to campaign against accession in 1972. Beyond this initial formation, referendums played a role in sustaining EPMs as they provided a locus by which they could mobilise support in opposition to Europe and provided them with media exposure as the leading opponents of European integration. The Maastricht referendum played a significant role in the formation of the *June Movement*, as it allowed Eurosceptics who favoured some but not full cooperation with Europe an alternative to the then present form of European integration: i.e. a pre-Maastricht Europe. But more importantly the passing of the second Maastricht referendum made a policy of withdrawal from the EU out of step with public opinion and thus created political space for the *June Movement* to emerge.

Estonia

The *Research Centre Free Europe* would have formed regardless of whether a referendum was held or not, as it was formed to contest the context of Estonian accession negotiations with the EU. The main motivation for its formation was the belief of its founders that the Estonian government's negotiating position with the EU was deeply flawed and needed to change fundamentally. It was not opposed to membership per se, as it was aware of the geopolitical necessity for Estonian membership. The lack of a referendum on the EU in Estonia would not have prevented the emergence of the *Research Centre Free Europe*, as it emerged in the late 1990s to raise public awareness of the terms of accession, and not to campaign for a No vote in the 2003 referendum. The *Movement No to the EU*, on the other hand, was formed by disgruntled members of mainstream political parties upset at the perceived abandoning of fledgling Estonian

independence. Uno Silberg of the *Movement No to the EU*, formed the group specifically to oppose accession by campaigning for a No vote in the referendum. When accession was passed, he wound the group up. Given that Estonia has only had one referendum on the EU, in 2003, it was difficult to draw a comparison with the other case studies. But in the space of time between Estonia beginning accession negotiations, and holding a referendum, two EPMs were formed. One was formed in response to the negotiations and the other to contest the referendum itself. The explanatory factor found a degree of confirmation in understanding EPM formation in Estonia.

Ireland

The history of Irish-EU relations was dominated by the eight referendums on the EU. Referendums had foremost relevance in the formation of EPMs in Ireland. EPMs were first mobilised to contest the onset of negotiations between Ireland and the EU, and then to campaign for a No vote in the accession referendum. When it became apparent that the then government was going to pass the SEA without holding a referendum, an EPM was formed to challenge the government and force the holding of a referendum. This was similar to the UK case, where not only the EU, but also the holding of a referendum itself, became an issue of EPM formation. Since then, EPMs were formed to contest specific referendums and after the vote they disbanded, only for the same individuals to come together for the following referendum and form a new EPM to contest European integration. As with the other case studies, some EPMs would have been formed regardless of whether referendums were held or not, but given their preponderance in Ireland, the presence of referendums led to many more being mobilised.

UK:

The lack of referendums in the UK should have reduced their ability to mobilise and the overall number of EPMs there. In the UK the mobilising issue became the campaign to hold a referendum in the first place as with *Campaign for a Referendum*. This works for the opposite position as well with *Business for Sterling*, showing that EPMs could be mobilised to prevent a referendum where there was a strong chance that the outcome would have been in favour of further European integration. The collective

understanding of the role of referendums in mobilising social movements needs to be re-examined in the light of this evidence, as campaigns to hold referendums and to get them off the political agenda appear to have as important an effect on formation as a campaign to defeat/win one. The activities of both EPMs followed from that of the Referendum Party of the mid- to late-1990s, showing the long-term centrality of referendums to the UK relationship with Europe, despite only one being held in 1975. Moreover, the UK EPMs showed the centrality of referendums and direct democracy to both civil society and political party-based Euroscepticism, despite the country's sole EU referendum being held well in the past, in 1975.

Conclusion

The presence of referendums and their repeated use to decide on national policy towards European integration were predicted to be an important, if not the most important, explanatory factor in EPM formation from the literature review on Euroscepticism. This was confirmed in the case studies, where the presence of referendums was one of the most important causal factors in the formation of EPMs. Looking beyond EU referendums and EPMs, the testing of the proposition also shed light on a number of issues involving European integration and referendums that will be discussed later.

Each of the case studies saw the formation of EPMs to contest referendums on accession or on confirming membership, as in the case of the UK. This tells us just as much about the nature of referendums on European integration as it does on EPM formation. In Denmark, Estonia and Ireland those EPMs formed to contest membership referendums were largely made up of fringe political and social activists, but in the UK they were made up of members and elected officials of the Labour party, and to a lesser extent the Conservatives. The UK example was replicated in the post-accession period in Denmark, where opposition to European integration surged, so that by the time of the SEA in 1986 members and elected officials of the Social Democrats were clamouring for a referendum to express their Euroscepticism. Forming EPMs allowed party members and officials to contest the referendum and reduce the risk of splitting their party over the EU issue. In the cases of Denmark and the UK the presence of referendums allowed for

the formation of EPMs that acted as a vent for internal mainstream party divisions over Europe. Even in a multi-party state with a proportional representation electoral system, such as Denmark, the EU issue was not salient enough for party members and officials to be confident that if they split and formed their own Eurosceptic party, they would be electorally successful.

The repeated use of referendums in Denmark saw increased public involvement with EPMs, as this gave public opposition to Danish EU membership an opportunity to express itself. Combined with the continued failure of the Social Democrats to establish a definite EU policy, and the Socialist People's Party and Social Liberal parties' leadership moves towards a more pro-EU position, EPMs became more powerful than when they were formed. Something similar, though not on the same scale, happened in Ireland as increased opposition by ordinary members and supporters of the Green and Labour parties to their parties' EU policy, led them to join the *Peoples' Movement*. A high number of referendums on Europe meant that those individuals in Denmark and Ireland who disagreed with their party's EU policy could form EPMs to successfully contest the EU outside of the party system, while at the same time retaining their party allegiance at all other times.

In the UK, despite the lack of referendums on the EU, members and officials of political parties, the Conservatives, UKIP and somewhat less so Labour, formed EPMs to campaign for the holding of a referendum. The role of referendums became central to the UK-EU relationship, as the evidence from the UK chapter and the existence of the Referendum Party in the mid-1990s shows. Conflict over whether the UK should join the single currency was typically highlighted as the main issue of contestation over the EU in the UK. The Euro issue was, however, largely subsumed by the question of whether an EU referendum should be held in the UK. The fact that the UK did not hold any referendums on the EU after 1975 did not deter the formation of UK EPMs on the issue of referendums. This was not just a reaction against the failure of the Labour government to follow through on its promise to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty; it was a continuation of the 1975 referendum and the campaigning of the Referendum Party. Comparing the evidence from the UK to that of Denmark and Ireland, it shows that a high number of referendums led to a high degree of EPM activity and, indeed, to

successful activity, but more importantly the UK case reveals that the establishment of a precedent of just one referendum is required for EPMs to mobilise around referendums.

In relation to the literature on referendums the evidence presented in this thesis confirms the Svensson thesis, whereby referendums on European issues are a first-order issue, as EPMs were formed to contest European integration.⁵⁵⁰ Additionally, it found strong corroborating evidence for Hobolt's hypotheses on the importance of political parties in communicating cues in referendums and the overall importance of the campaign.⁵⁵¹ Overall the evidence from this thesis extends the findings of Szczerbiak and Taggart's wide-ranging study of referendums on Europe by showing that their initial assumption was correct in that non-party actors can have an important effect on the outcomes of such referendums.⁵⁵²

This explanatory factor presented much evidence across the case studies of actors operating across different groups. Such a feature is common in social movement activism and in the literature on social movements is labelled "multi-positionality".⁵⁵³ This refers to actors who are involved in many different groups across many different "scenes".⁵⁵⁴ Multi-positionality in the social movement literature refers almost exclusively to left-wing anti-globalisation groups. Such groups were long-term and knowledgeable critics of European integration,⁵⁵⁵ and there were obvious similarities between them and Danish *Peoples' Movement* and certain Irish EPMs, that were dominated by left-wing, 'global justice' activists. This thesis has extended this body of work and shown that such activities can be seen in right-wing political parties and social movements as well. This further emphasises the specific nature of the EU as an issue of formation for social movements. With Euroscepticism there can be a certain degree of unanimity between left and right, for example on campaigning for a No vote in an EU referendum, but thereafter little consensus emerges on what should follow after a referendum defeat: the wide ideological breath of Irish EPMs and their campaign against the Lisbon Treaty are a good example of this. This made alliance formation difficult, not

⁵⁵⁰ Svensson, 'Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and European Union'.

⁵⁵¹ Hobolt, *Choosing Europe*, p. 16.

⁵⁵² Szczerbiak and Taggart, 'Conclusion: Towards a Model of (European) Referendums', pp. 211-2.

⁵⁵³ Dufour, 'The Mobilization Against the 2005 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', p. 428.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ See: Della Porta, Donatella and Mosca, Lorenzo (2005). 'Global-net for Global Movements? A Network of Networks for a Movement of Movements', *Journal of Public Policy*, 25:1, p. 21.

only because of the lack of an agreed platform but also because both sides did not want to be associated with the other. In the UK, where right-wing Euroscepticism has been dominant since the mid-1980s, active Euroscepticism amongst the left was far more muted than opinion polls for left-wing voters would suggest. Denmark, in contrast, was until the 2000s dominated by left-wing Euroscepticism and so strong alliances existed between EPMs and political parties. As right-wing Euroscepticism, embodied in the radical-right Danish Peoples' Party, grew, so the alliances among left parties and Eurosceptics decreased.

The Irish Lisbon Treaty campaigns were different to those of the other case studies in this regard. Here, EPMs of left and right ideological backgrounds were able to complement each other's campaigns without an overarching alliance structure. Despite a degree of contradictory arguments, they did not attack each other and instead presented a wide ranging critique of European integration based on arguments relevant to a broad segment of the Irish population. These referendum campaigns gave rise to a form of understanding between differing groups that has not been researched to a significant degree in other social movements. A similar pattern emerged in France for the 2005 Constitutional Treaty but here political parties on the radical left and radical right, as well as left-wing social movements, were to the fore in campaigning to reject the Treaty.⁵⁵⁶

Beyond the actual opportunity to challenge the political elite on the EU, referendums provided experience for EPM campaigners. In Denmark and Ireland EPM members made reference to the importance of participation in previous referendum campaigns that allowed them to hone their communication skills that enabled them to play an influential role in referendum defeats in 1992 and 2000 in Denmark and 2001 and 2008 in Ireland. Multiple referendums on Europe meant that mobilising an EPM became a worthwhile endeavour, as even if the referendum was passed, the contacts and skills developed formed the basis for the next referendum campaign. EPMs in Ireland were able to avail themselves of the knowledge of seasoned Eurosceptic campaigners and prepare months in advance of referendums on EU treaties that they knew would have to be held. In comparison, the *No to the EU Movement* in Estonia immediately disbanded

⁵⁵⁶ Dufour, 'The Mobilization Against the 2005 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe', p. 439.

after the accession referendum, as they believed that the government would never hold another referendum on Europe. Had Estonia the convention of holding EU referendums like Ireland, or a constitutional provision to hold referendums on matters of foreign policy that a parliamentary vote could not reach like Denmark, then Estonian EPM activists would have put their movement on hold, ready to mobilise again for a referendum on, for example, Estonian membership of the Euro.

The evidence from the case studies showed the explanatory factor to be very useful in explaining EPM formation. Furthermore the evidence from the UK shows that once a referendum is held, EPMs mobilise around the issue of holding a referendum despite several decades passing since its use. The Estonia case proved itself to be very different from the UK case in that post accession the *No to the EU Movement* disbanded itself, as the Estonian government announced that it would hold no more referendums on European integration, as any further changes, such as adoption of the Euro, were covered by the accession Treaty. The contrast between the two cases shows the lower level of civil society formation in Eastern Europe as, though the UK government faced a similar EU legal situation on accepting Treaty changes, EPM activists increased their demands for a referendum. Referendums were not always needed to mobilise EPMs, however, as in both the Irish and the Estonian cases EPMs were set up before accession referendums had been agreed. In this regard the focus of the *National Platform* and the *Research Centre Free Europe* was to critique the negotiation strategy of their respective governments. Overall, the conclusion is that referendums were important to the formation of EPMs but they were not the sole reason for them. A high number of EU referendums does seem to lead to a high number of EPMs, but as the UK example shows, this was not always the case.

EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form.

While the presence of EU referendums and the level of Euroscepticism in the party system proved to be vital in understanding EPM formation, it was vitally important to examine other aspects of the policy-making process, as such an approach forms the methodological bedrock of political science research into social movements. An open

policy process was taken from Kitschelt to mean “the capacity of political systems to convert demands into public policy”⁵⁵⁷. Specifically this explanatory factor took on board a mixture of areas, such as party discipline, government strength, legislature/executive independence, coalition building capacity, electoral systems, pluralist style of interest intermediation, a written constitution, the centralisation of state apparatus, government control over resources of participation and the independence and authority of the judiciary, all of which were detailed in Section 1.6. These issues were more subtle than those of referendums and the party system but they were part of a long-established literature on the wider “political context” in which social movements form and operate.⁵⁵⁸ As this explanatory factor measured elements which are typical for social movement formation it provided insights into the similarities between Euroscepticism as an issue of social movement formation to that of more common issues, such as the environment and workers’ rights.

Denmark

The *People’s Movement* were confident that the more open nature of a single national constituency for European Parliament elections made it far easier for smaller single-issue parties to contest, when they decided to re-form and contest the first European Parliament elections in 1979, and their 21% share of the vote proved them right. This gave confidence to the founders of the *June Movement* in that they knew they could take the risk of forming their new movement and compete successfully in European Parliamentary elections. Constitutional provisions that compelled the holding of referendums, when 5/6ths of the Folketinget failed to pass an international treaty, provided a clear prospect for EPMs to access the political opportunity structure. This, they exercised in the SEA referendum, which was held when EPM activists in the Social Democrat party refused to vote with their party and the government to ratify the Treaty, thus forcing a referendum. Judicial rulings that forced equal coverage in publically owned media for both Yes and No sides in a referendum gave EPMs a public platform from which to put forward their arguments. A powerful Folketinget committee on

⁵⁵⁷ Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest’, pp. 62-3.

⁵⁵⁸ Kriesi et. al. ‘New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe’, p. 220.

European affairs kept opposition to the EU in the national political discourse and prevented mainstream pro-EU parties from stifling Euroscepticism as happened in Ireland. The openness of the Danish policy process most definitely did encourage EPM formation.

Estonia

The Estonian case was an example of civil society being brought into the national Political Opportunity Structure (POS) by the institutions of the state. Estonian EPMs received resources from both the state and from institutional NGOs for the purposes of campaigning. Additionally, the government changed broadcast laws so that both Yes and No sides were awarded equal coverage in the media. The purpose behind this was to include a No voice in the referendum campaign and hence give it legitimacy, not only in the perception of the public but also in that of the EU; both the institutions and the member states. With no major political parties coming out uniformly against accession and a broad consensus across business, the media and the intellectual elite, the Estonian government deemed it necessary to include EPMs in the POS and opened up the policy-making process to them. This happened, however, after they were formed. Estonian EPMs were not formed due to these actions, so the explanatory factor was not useful in this case.

Ireland

With a referendum held to ratify each EU Treaty and media laws ensuring equal coverage, the policy process in Ireland strongly favoured the activities of Irish EPMs. These processes were not opened for EPMs by the goodwill of the Irish government, as in Estonia. It was Irish EPMs themselves who used the court system and the judiciary to achieve their access to them. The courts ruled in favour of EPM activists in two very important decisions that strengthened their hand immensely. Firstly, they enabled them to contest EU policy by forcing referendums on EU treaties to be held in the first place. Secondly, they ensured that the government could not spend the full resources of the state solely on the side of a referendum vote that they agreed with, and that the state had to give equal coverage to No arguments in the public media and official government

documents on EU referendums. The contrast between the closed nature of the Dáil and the openness of the referendum system in accommodating dissenting views on the EU meant that Eurosceptic activity became channelled into contesting referendums rather than the party system. The openness of the policy process outside the Irish parliament encouraged opponents of European integration in Ireland to express their arguments in EPMs during EU referendums and not at election time in political parties. The explanatory factor therefore played quite a significant role in EPM formation in Ireland.

UK

The first past the post electoral system played a significant role in the formation of EPMs. Taken in conjunction with the rigidity of the two-party system, Eurosceptic factions in political parties appeared unwilling to split and form their own party, as the electoral and party systems would make election almost impossible. This explains why individual MPs such as Conservatives Bill Cash and John Redwood, and Labour MPs such as Austin Mitchell stayed members of their party despite their explicit opposition to their respective parties' EU policies. Forming an EPM allowed them to remain within the party and access the policy-making process, while also putting forward Eurosceptic arguments. Ordinary and elected members of political parties believed that they could not influence party leaderships over the holding of referendums, as they could in Denmark, and so they formed EPMs to place outside pressure on party leaders over the EU issue. With no constitutional provisions for the holding of a referendum over European or foreign policy matters, the court system was of no use to Eurosceptics. The depth of anti-EU feeling in the UK was so strong, that despite no access to the policy process, EPMs were still formed. The explanatory factor therefore, did not provide a useful analysis for EPM formation in the UK.

Conclusion

In comparison to the two explanatory factors shown to be the most important – the level of Euroscepticism in the party system and the presence of referendums, the openness of the policy process had a more nuanced influence on EPM formation. *Table 1.4* in Section 1.6 projected the open/closed nature of the policy-making process for each

of the case studies and the evidence from the case studies largely corroborated these assumptions. Examining the openness of the policy-making process through the framework used in this thesis allowed for these nuances to be clearly understood.

The policy process explanatory factor was not relevant in the UK, where all avenues of public policy were closed off to Eurosceptic activists. The rigid two-party political system, the first past the post electoral system and lack of a constitutional provision to deal with foreign affairs or European issues through the judiciary meant that every official avenue was closed to Eurosceptic activists. In comparison to the other case studies the total number of UK EPMs was not commensurate with their effectiveness; though *Business for Sterling* played an important role in national debate over EMU membership. This showed the importance of the explanatory factor not just to EPM formation but to EPM *effectiveness*. A rewriting of the explanatory factor in the light of this information could read that ‘an open policy process is likely to encourage EPMs to be more effective’. The UK was quite clearly closed in terms of preventing input into the policy making process with members and elected officials of political parties frustrated at their inability to influence national European policy. The output policy was weak as the UK government failed to hold promised referendums and the two main political parties gradually removed the EU issue from the national policy agenda.

The ineffectiveness of the UK EPMs can be compared with that of the effectiveness of their Irish counterparts who had a profound effect on the Irish EU relationship. Ireland had an open policy input structure, largely due to its constitution being a highly specific and far reaching document. This allowed government policy to be the subject of frequent constitutional challenges by individual citizens. EU policy was no exception, as a member of an EPM took the government to court for failing to hold a referendum over the SEA in direct conflict with the Irish Constitution’s provision for a referendum in the event of the ceding of national sovereignty over foreign policy matters to a supranational authority. Subsequent rulings secured by lawsuits from EPM activists forced the Irish media to provide equal coverage to both sides of a referendum, and ‘levelled the playing field’ between the government and EPMs significantly. Moreover, the Irish government failed to challenge the convention of the use of the referendum as the final means of ratification of EU treaties, despite the defeat of the Nice

and Lisbon Treaties. This kept the policy input structure firmly open. In contrast to Denmark, the defeat of EU treaties did not mean dramatic changes in Irish European policy outputs. Irish EPMs had the political opportunity of further referendums on European integration that allowed them to increase in influence, while their Danish counterparts, denied more referendum campaigns to raise money and their profile, withered.

The use of the judiciary to challenge the EU was also evident in Denmark where EPM activists secured a similar ruling to the Irish one. Comparable constitutional provisions relating to the ceding of foreign policy decision making to supranational bodies allowed for the holding of referendums. Danish EPMs were an important element of the campaign against the Maastricht Treaty that secured substantial policy opt-outs for Denmark from European integration, thereby showing the strength of Danish policy output structures.

The findings from Estonia in relation to the explanatory factor proved to be different from those of the other cases. Holding a referendum on Estonian accession was a mobilising factor for Estonian EPMs, but rather than prevent EPMs from participating, the Estonian government sought to actively include them in the campaign debate. In all the other case studies national governments vigorously defended themselves against court actions and public campaigns by EPMs to open up the policy process. Such a decision was taken by the Estonian government, as it was based on their desire to overcome the Soviet legacy of a poorly developed civil society. It is interesting to juxtapose the efforts of the Estonian government to bring EPMs as members of civil society into the debate on European integration and to the more established member states that sought to keep civil society out. This was not to say that the Estonian government wholeheartedly embraced EPMs, it was more that they recognised the importance of having dissenting voices in the national debate on the EU. In this regard the open/closed nature of the Estonian policy making process becomes more confused. The government opened up the policy making process for EPMs when it suited its interests, but as soon as accession was ratified, it closed the process again by not holding further referendums on European issues such as Euro membership. From this perspective the Estonian policy making process appears to have moved to a closed position but with the government retaining the ability to achieve

desired policy outputs; in the example of Estonian EPMs, civil society involvement in the EU policy-making process.

EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that EPMs will form.

That resource availability enhances the “likelihood of collective action” is one of the most widely accepted truths in relation to social movements⁵⁵⁹. The literature on social movements places specific emphasis on human time and effort in addition to money as universally applicable mainstays of resources. For resources to be effective in actual movement formation however, another resource, that of the managerial skills of coordination and strategy development, is required. Examining this explanatory factor revealed much about the nature of civil society-based Euroscepticism, as it showed whether EPMs formed on the basis of volunteer efforts could effectively contest the EU issue with professional party and other pro-European activists. Financial resources are not considered to be central to social movement formation in the literature. The examples of *Libertas* and *Business for Sterling* appear as outliers not just in the thesis but in the study of social movements themselves.

Denmark

The presence of resources did play a role in the decision of the *Peoples' Movement* to move from civil-society, grassroots campaigning to contesting European elections. Its effect was less on formation but more on the evolution of the EPMs. The promise of monetary and organisational support from holding a European Parliamentary seat was one of the reasons why the *People's Movement* re-formed to contest European elections in 1979. Their plan was to use these resources to sustain and increase their campaigning against Danish EU membership. The explanatory factor was not relevant in understanding EPM formation in the Danish case.

⁵⁵⁹ Zald, Mayer M. (1992). ‘Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Program’, Aldon D. Morris et. al. (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 326.

Estonia

There were several interesting factors that marked the Estonian experience of resources as different from those of their Danish, Irish and UK counterparts. Firstly, Estonian EPMs received significant funds from the UK. Secondly, they received funds from the Estonian government and NGOs with the explicit purpose of providing a No side to the referendum campaign. Without all these outside resources, Estonian EPM activists would have mobilised a campaign against accession regardless. The explanatory factor was not relevant in explaining EPM formation in the Estonian case.

Ireland

For the most part resources were not a factor in EPM formation in Ireland. Those EPMs who mobilised around the time of accession relied mostly on the institutional knowledge of their members as academics, economists and barristers, as their main resources. As the Eurosceptic movements in Ireland matured and more individuals became involved the main resource became the number of ordinary members. This was a key resource of the *No to Nice* EPM which – despite forming a coalition campaign with Sinn Féin, the Greens and the Socialist Party – was able to call upon thousands of volunteers to drop leaflets and place posters. The presence of a potential membership willing and able to campaign did play a role in the formation of certain EPMs. This was particularly true of the *People's Movement* for which the level of inquiry from trade union officials and Labour party members about campaigning against the EU ensured that the movement would be founded, as it had the human resources available to sustain a lengthy and competitive campaign against the next EU referendum that was to be held. While this can be seen as responding to public opinion, in the light of the proposition it can be viewed as the exploitation of an available resource. For the sheer amount of resources used no other EPM matched *Libertas*. It relied wholesale on the resources of millionaire Declan Ganley and would not have existed if he had not had the personal finances to back its expensive and extensive campaign against the Lisbon Treaty. The explanatory factor was weakened rather than strengthened by the evidence of the Irish case, where the significant financial resources of *Libertas* were the exception and not the

rule. Overall, however, other explanatory factors were far more relevant in explaining EPM formation in the Irish case.

UK

Similarly to Ireland the UK saw the formation of an EPM around private resources. *Business for Sterling* was mobilised solely by the expenditure of resources by wealthy individuals. *Campaign for a Referendum* was not influenced in their formation by the availability of resources. It was access to like minded individuals more than for material resources that led them to maintain their links with political parties, but the decision to form *Campaign for a Referendum* was not based decisively on this. The proposition was partly relevant in the UK case, where private resources formed *Business for Sterling* but it did not affect the formation of grass roots EPMs such as *Campaign for a Referendum*. As *Business for Sterling* was the only example of this in the UK case the explanatory factor was not relevant in explaining EPM formation in the UK.

Conclusion

A common theme across EPMs in all the case studies was the lament at the lack of resources that limited their ability to campaign, putting them at an overwhelming disadvantage to their pro-EU counterparts. This lack of resources did not, however, prevent the formation of EPMs. The argument of individuals involved in EPM formation was that resources were not needed to mobilise, they were needed to campaign. So the explanatory factor was not correct in a general sense. There were individual examples from the case studies that contradicted this more widely applicable conclusion. *Libertas* in Ireland and *Business for Sterling* from the UK were two EPMs that were based on the resources of wealthy individuals to campaign against European integration. They were different from the other EPM examples not just for the amount of resources at their disposal, which ran into €2.9 million in the former and over £1 million in the later, but in that they were not typical grass-roots social movements and can be more accurately described as ‘elite-level’ movements. In turn, they can be divided again as *Libertas* was a vehicle for an individual, Declan Ganley, to put forward his personal criticism of the

Lisbon Treaty. *Business for Sterling*, on the other hand, was a vehicle for a group of disgruntled Conservative donors who wanted to prevent the UK government from holding a referendum on joining the Euro. *Business for Sterling* folded as soon as it became clear that a referendum on the Euro was not going to be held, and those who founded the EPM went back to their involvement with the Conservatives. Ganley went on to disband *Libertas* after the successful rejection of Lisbon in 2008, only to re-form it in early 2009 as a political party to contest the European Parliamentary elections in each member state. Ganley's millions were the key to *Libertas* emerging as an EPM. While this does not discount the genuine ideological basis of his opposition to European integration, it states the dominant fact that he would not have been in the position to do so without the resources at his disposal. In contrast *Business for Sterling* existed solely due to the financial support of a group of individuals. The founders did none of the campaigning themselves, indeed almost their only inputs were the resources and the goal of the EPM, with professional managers and paid activists used to conduct the campaign. In addition to financial resources they were also able to use the elite insider connections of their founders to gain access to the mainstream media. For *Libertas* and *Business for Sterling* the availability of private resources did encourage their formation.

These two groups aside, the other examples discussed in the case studies had two main forms of resources: human and expertise. In the Danish and Irish examples human resources were a significant factor in the successful role of the EPMs involved in getting EU referendums rejected. In the early 1990s the *People's Movement* in Denmark could rely on thousands of volunteers to spread campaign material throughout the Danish archipelago in small towns and villages in isolated islands that played an important role in the No vote on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Significantly, mainstream pro-Maastricht parties could not mobilise this number of canvassers over such a wide geographic area and so the rural vote was not adequately contested by the pro-Treaty side. Similarly, in Ireland the *Cóir* and *People's Movement* EPMs had a network of volunteers throughout Ireland who dropped leaflets and erected posters in areas not covered by the mainstream Yes campaign. Being almost free and mobilised by an ideological opposition to European integration, volunteers were one of the most important resources of EPMs. In Ireland the EU referendum campaigns of *Cóir* and

People's Movement were largely built around making the best use of the amount of volunteers that they had.

The other resource of EPMs was that of expertise. As EPMs focused exclusively on the EU, an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the EU provided an advantage over those who did not have a similar familiarity. This resource was employed with profound effect in the Irish Nice I referendum campaign where veteran EPM activists were able to achieve significant legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the media, due to their ability to argue points of reference between existing EU law and the proposed changes of the EU Treaty with ministers in government and the then head of the Referendum Commission. The ministers in questions and the head of the Commission had to plead ignorance of the EU law the EPM activists were referring to, with the media highlighting this discrepancy between the knowledge of the two sides. Many years of campaigning over EU-related issues gave EPM activists significant institutional knowledge when debating with pro-EU actors. Frequently the pro-EU side was represented by government ministers, who may have had experience of the EU, but only in the narrow field of their ministry, and who relied on the briefing notes provided to them by civil servants. This situation became such an issue in Ireland that the Irish government created a junior ministry for European Affairs in part to provide expert government representation in public debates on the EU. EPM activists in Denmark during the Euro referendum had a similar experience, where their years of campaigning experience taught them that simple, clear arguments referenced to relevant EU treaties would win the day, as opposed to the verbose, technical, economic arguments of government officials.

Following on from the previous explanatory factor in relation to the Estonian case study, the Estonian government actively sought to provide financial resources to EPMs. These resources were provided by billionaire financier George Soros's Estonian branch of his Open Society Institute and were used to ensure that Estonia had some semblance of a balanced debate between two sides. Indeed, this was supplemented by government funding, as the Estonian government gave financial resources to EPM activists to spread their campaign. The sudden infusion of resources actually damaged the Estonian EPMs' campaign, as they squabbled over who should get the money and what it should be spent on, instead of focusing on campaigning.

Generally the evidence from the case studies shows that this explanatory factor confirmed to the social movement literature as outlined in the opening chapter that human and organizational resources would be the most important in EPM formation. The specific examples from the UK and Ireland show that financial resources could play a role in exceptional circumstances.

6.3 Conclusions on the Explanatory Factors

This study outlined five explanatory factors taken from the established literature on Euroscepticism and social movements. The literature on Euroscepticism has previously focused exclusively on two specific strands – party-based Euroscepticism and public support for European integration. Using studies from these two areas as the basis for an analysis of civil society-based protest movements was always going to be fraught with difficulty and contradictions. While the general area of Euroscepticism is still in a flux of theoretical development, this chapter has shown that the explanatory factors, while not all highly relevant, provided an excellent base to analyse the EPMs. The explanatory factors did provide an illuminating insight into the scholarly debate on social movement formation. Principally it was found that the resource opportunity theory, as in the resources and the media explanatory factors, was not widely applicable in explaining EPM formation but that the political opportunity theory – Euroscepticism in the party system, referendums and open policy process – was directly relevant. As political opportunity theory is the dominant paradigm in social movement studies, the conclusions of this thesis not only reinforce the theory but also make a conclusive case for European integration as an issue that is the basis for collective action.

There was a significant degree of variation across the explanatory factors in that, strictly applied, all bar **EF1** could be interpreted as not relevant in explaining EPM formation, but a more general interpretation made them significant. **EF2**, for example, was most definitely useful in explaining the Estonian and Irish cases but in the Danish and UK cases it was not so much the low level of Euroscepticism as the low *effectiveness* of this party-based Euroscepticism that led to EPM formation. **EF3** was important again in a more general sense as referendums themselves were strongly linked to EPM formation. A high number of referendums greatly facilitated EPM formation in Denmark

and Ireland. For Estonia after one referendum it was too early to say, but the UK case was again an outlier. Having just one referendum in the UK was necessary to mobilise some twenty-four EPMs. There was an important condition to this in that while only one referendum was held in the UK, EU-related referendums were *promised* by the ruling government party on the Euro and the EU constitutional treaty. This shows that even the suggestion of referendums was enough to mobilise EPMs. **EF4** again shows Denmark and Ireland to have had a similar experience with an explanatory factor, this time in relation to the importance of the openness of the policy process in facilitating EPM formation, which it most certainly did in both cases. Rather differently in Estonia the government actively encouraged EPMs to join the policy making process, which, while not directly leading to formation, helped to facilitate it. Yet again the UK was the outlier, as the explanatory factor was not useful in understating EPM formation there. The UK policy process was very much closed, relative to the other case studies but this did not deter EPM formation. **EF5** was found to be unimportant in all of the case studies. There were however, the specific examples of *Libertas* in Ireland and *Business for Sterling* in the UK which were formed due to the availability of resources of certain individuals. Finally, **EF1**, the more pro-European the media are, was the one explanatory factor that was relevant across all the case studies. It was influential across different case studies with it being highly relevant in Denmark and the UK, but less so in Estonia and Ireland.

6.4 Interaction Between the Explanatory Factors

This chapter has shown the relevance of the explanatory factors in an individual binary relationship to EPM formation. Over the course of the study it was noted how several explanatory factors interacted with each other to impact upon EPM formation. These were: (i) referendums and the party system, (ii) referendums and the open policy process and (iii) media and the party system. These relationships reveal much about the nature of national level relationships and discourse on European integration. Firstly, that the origin and holding of referendums on European integration were strongly influenced by the level of Euroscepticism in the party system. Secondly, that an open policy process also strongly influenced the holding of EU referendums. And thirdly, that Eurosceptics

perceived the media and the party system to be pro-EU and, moreover, as part of a wider national EU supporting elite, which encouraged EPM formation.

6.4.1 Referendums and the Party system

In the cases of both Ireland and Denmark referendums and the party system interacted to significant degrees in a manner that greatly facilitated EPM formation. This was especially the case with regard to the referendums explanatory factor, which on its own would not have had the significant effect on EPM formation it did have. Due to issues within the party system, referendums were held which otherwise would not have been, which allowed the formation, and in several cases victory, of EPMs that in turn spurred further EPM formation. Similar, though less obvious, interaction of these explanatory factors was witnessed in the UK and Estonia. In the UK the inability of the party system to deal with the issue of a referendum on Europe caused EPMs to be formed, while in Estonia it was the unwillingness of any established political party to challenge the accession referendum that caused individuals from political parties to form an EPM.

Throughout this study understanding the impact of referendums on EPM formation was closely linked to the party system. This connection was obvious, as it became clear from the case studies that referendums were held more on the basis of political expediency than on the basis of constitutional need. Though the origin of national referendums on European integration has been superficially thought to be rooted in the constitutional law of individual member states, the holding of them is in the grip of the political system.⁵⁶⁰ The Irish, Danish and UK case studies provided strong evidence of this. These findings call into question the use of referendums on European integration as a true measure of public support for the EU given the level of political interference in them. Such interference was very much more concerned with the domestic political situation than the EU level. Eurosceptics in Ireland and Denmark were acutely conscious of this interaction of party politics and formed EPMs to exploit it successfully.

⁵⁶⁰ Hobolt, *Choosing Europe*, p. 16.

6.4.2 Referendums and Open Policy Process

In Ireland and Denmark specific references to foreign policy in the constitution of each state allowed EPMs to be formed in both states to challenge an EU Treaty on the basis that it was against the national constitution and therefore necessitated a change to the constitution, which could only be done via a referendum. It would have been pointless for EPMs to form just to contest on the basis of the constitution if a successful outcome would lead to another vote in parliament that would be comfortably won by pro-Treaty political parties. Constitutional legal challenges were made on the explicit belief that a favourable verdict would lead to a referendum and a rare opportunity to communicate Eurosceptic arguments to the public in a national campaign with the possibility of defeating the Treaty. In Ireland the constitutional challenge took the form of an EPM being formed to launch a court action. In Denmark, an EPM was formed to formulate dissent within the Social Democratic party over the SEA. Party MPs refused to vote in favour of the Treaty on the grounds that it was against the Danish Constitution and that if a referendum was not held, a legal challenge to force the holding of one would be forthcoming.

There was a conscious appreciation of the interaction between these two propositions by EPM activists. EPMs were formed to take specific action based on interpretations of national constitutions with the goal being the holding of a referendum. One of the key findings of this study was that referendums were vital to the formation of EPMs but that this importance was largely predicated on their interaction with the level of Euroscepticism in the party system and the openness of the policy-making process.

6.4.3 Media as Pro-EU and Level of Euroscepticism in the Party System

Across all the case studies it was noted how EPM activists viewed the media as pro-EU and that EPMs were formed in part to put forward what they believed was “the truth” about the negative impact of European integration on their country.⁵⁶¹ The media and the party system were grouped together by EPM activists as being part of a pro-EU elite. In essence the perceived failure of the media to criticise the EU was included with

⁵⁶¹ Interview with Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May 2008.

the perceived failure of the party system to adequately challenge European integration by EPMs. In Denmark the media was believed to have “done a deal with the parties” to put forward the same arguments as each other in favour of EU referendums.⁵⁶² In Estonia and Ireland this negative sentiment against the media was not as strong as in Denmark, as they had more access to the media, but there was still a wide perception of the media and political parties cooperating together to undermine them and their arguments.

How did the media and political parties become seen as two heads of the same pro-EU beast by EPM activists? There was a strong belief amongst EPMs of a wider pro-EU elite that stretched across the political, media, business and civil society spheres to actively damage them. This led them to associate the media with the pro-EU arguments of mainstream pro-EU political parties. Such a perceived atmosphere of pervasive pro-European integration arguments in the media and political arenas caused many EPMs to form in order to put forward Eurosceptic arguments that were not being discussed at any level.

6.5 An ‘Ideal Type’ Case Study

From the case studies what can be distilled to hypothesise as to an ideal type of case that would particularly encourage EPM formation? What are the explanatory factors that if present would drive the formation of EPMs? This section takes the propositions of this study and adapts them to create an environment that would ensure EPM formation, thus:

1. A high number of referendums on European integration.
2. A low level of perceived effective Euroscepticism in the party system.
3. A split media with some elements putting forward an uncritical stance on European integration and others providing space for EPM arguments (an example would be the UK where the broadcast media were perceived as pro-EU and the print media as more open to criticism of the EU by EPMs).

⁵⁶² Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 2nd September 2009.

4. A policy process with weak party discipline, low executive dominance of parliament, strong constitutional provisions in relation to foreign policy, and an independent judiciary.
5. Resources available from large institutions, which would encourage right-wing EPM formation, and resources available from NGOs which would encourage left-wing EPM formations, not just through finance, but also through transfer of human resources.

1.) Referendums. While it was shown in both the Estonian and UK cases that only one referendum was needed to promote EPM formation, the evidence from the Danish and Irish cases showed that referendums on the EU were vital to EPM formation. EPMs rally to referendums, as they provide two elements that are in short supply for them, publicity and political opportunity. The more referendums that are held, the more possibilities there are for EPMs to make the public aware of their arguments and to challenge mainstream pro-EU political parties and civil society actors.

2.) Euroscepticism in the party system. All of the case studies had evidence of Euroscepticism in the party system but it was either deemed to be ineffective or ideologically incompatible by those individuals who formed EPMs. All of the EPMs had activists who were also members of political parties. Had their political parties taken the action that their members desired against European integration, then they would not have formed EPMs to take such action through civil society. This was most explicit in the cases of Denmark and the UK.

3.) The media. The Irish and Estonian cases showed that EPMs were mobilised to disseminate what they believed to be the true negative impact of European integration against a perceived pro-EU bias in the media. They were also encouraged by the space the same media provided for their arguments in the name of balance despite “editorialising” against them⁵⁶³. This provided EPMs with the justification for forming, firstly, to challenge the pro-EU media and secondly, with the knowledge that they could disseminate their arguments. Estonian and Irish EPMs, and to a lesser extent UK EPMs experienced such a relationship with the media.

⁵⁶³ Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December 2007.

4.) Open Policy Process. The Danish and Irish examples provided evidence of each of the issues related to an open policy process being present. EPMs formed in both of these examples to exploit the openness of the judiciary, the weakness of the executive and the weakness of party discipline. Given that their issue was not one based on domestic policy but of an international dimension rooted in international treaties, there were more avenues of policy process approach for EPMs to exploit. The supranational element of EU membership and the giving up of national sovereignty to the EU institutions were exploited by EPMs, in particular either through the judiciary on constitutional grounds or through the difficulty of party elites in achieving party unity to support the ceding of national sovereignty.

5.) Resources. This takes the form of financial resources as seen with *Libertas* in Ireland and *Business for Sterling* in the UK. Resources available from NGOs and other civil society organisations provide mostly human and knowledge resources that benefit left-wing EPMs. The respective *Peoples' Movements* in both Denmark and Ireland drew substantially on such resources for their anti-EU referendum campaigns. The example of *Cóir*, though, shows that in isolated examples right wing EPMs can benefit also, as *Cóir* benefitted from the financial and human resources of Catholic organisations.

Other possible explanatory factors that emerged through the course of the thesis were (i) national foreign policy, (ii) length of membership and (iii) agency. National foreign policy is a nebulous issue and would take considerable theoretical exertion to frame as an explanatory factor, but the evidence from the Danish and UK cases shows that it should be considered. In both cases a specific foreign policy meant that the issue environment was different from the other member states. In Denmark, it was its position as a Nordic state with a lengthy history of pushing specific issues into the international area through involvement in the UN. In the UK, it was its separate relationships with the Commonwealth and the USA. Both of these offered alternatives to European integration for EPMs to form on and campaign on.

Following closely from this, not being an original member presented itself as another factor potentially causing EPM formation. There is clearly a different issue framing environment between an original member state and one that joined later, in that EPMs could point to a time when the state was not involved in European integration and

that returning to that position was a legitimate option. The fact that accession to the EU had to be debated and held to a referendum gave further issue legitimacy to EPMs in non-original member states. In original member states participation in European integration was never a widely debated public issue held to a plebiscite so there was no precedence of a discourse on EU membership for an EPM to claim and form around.

Through a majority of the case studies a pattern emerged of individuals whose personal organisational capacity and ideological opposition to the EU was an important element of EPM formation. An analysis of such individuals would have been in line with existing approaches in the social movements literature but would have proven to have been too narrative-driven and would have reduced the opportunity for an in-depth comparative analysis to be made.

All of these potential explanatory factors were touched on throughout the case studies but they presented significant challenges in their operationalisation for a comparative analysis. A single case study analysis could comfortably include them but this would have proved far too ambitious for this thesis.

6.6 A Non-Example of EPM Formation

While this thesis has discussed cases that have seen EPM formation, what of those countries listed in *Table 1.2* in Chapter One that do not have examples of EPM formation? Spain is an example of such a country, where all the propositions are present (though where resources are limited) and yet there has been no evidence of EPM formation. What has prevented EPM formation in Spain? And are these factors case specific or more widely applicable?

Spain represented an ideal candidate for negative testing of EPM formation. A referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty was held in 2005; there was a relatively low level of Euroskepticism in the party system; the media was perceived as being pro-EU; and the policy process was relatively open (with regard to the pluralist style of decision making, coalition formation, and independence of the judiciary but not in regard to the openness of the government).⁵⁶⁴ The only proposition that was missing was the widespread availability of resources but, as was shown in the other case studies, it was no

⁵⁶⁴ Magone, José María (2009). *Contemporary Spanish Politics*, Oxford: Routledge, pp. 105-26.

great barrier to EPM formation. Yet, still there were no EPMs in Spain. Moreover, public opinion was not a barrier, as Spain had lower rates of support for European integration than in Denmark or Ireland (59% having a positive view of Spanish membership of the EU in 2010, as against 66% in Denmark and 68% in Ireland).⁵⁶⁵

Why then the lack of EPMs? Euroscepticism in Spain was dominated by those on the radical left, where opposition to a perceived neo-liberal EU was based on strong ideological principles⁵⁶⁶. For these parties and their activists the main political issue was further autonomy for their respective regions. Due to the highly devolved nature of Spanish political institutions, these parties achieved regional office frequently and so their efforts became focused on attacking the Spanish state more than the EU. As this issue was continuous and pressing, Euroscepticism while present in Spanish politics, became subsumed beneath this contested relationship between the Spanish state and its regions. Those activists that would be most liable to form an EPM had an outlet in Eurosceptic political parties that achieved office, but only at the regional level. Given the dominance in Spanish politics by the only parties with a nationwide presence, the Partido Popular and Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), both of whom were ostensibly pro-European, such parties did not have the organisational capacity or national profile to challenge national EU policy effectively. Spain's EU policy was viewed as an extension of the competition between the two national parties. Critiques from regional parties were seen in terms of their regional status and as not representative of a national policy alternative, regardless of the validity of their arguments.⁵⁶⁷

Radical left Eurosceptic parties had the ideological and office-holding background to attract those most likely to form EPMs. The spread of radical-left Eurosceptic parties across the Spanish regions meant that alliance formation between them was difficult in the development of a No campaign in the referendum on the European Constitution in 2005. It would have been extremely difficult for EPMs to form, as there was no national structure in a highly devolved system that they could form through. Campaigns were regionally based and rooted in Eurosceptic political parties and

⁵⁶⁵ Eurobarometer, Standard (2010). *Eurobarometer 73*, Brussels: European Commission.

⁵⁶⁶ Gómez-Reino, Marga et. al. (2008). 'Euroscepticism and Political Parties in Spain', Paul Taggart et. al. (eds.) *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 146.

⁵⁶⁷ Llamazares and Gramacho, 'Eurosceptics Among Euroenthusiasts', p. 229.

trade unions. There was simply no political or institutional space for EPMs to form. This leads to the assumption that EPMs are less likely to form in states where the system of government is highly devolved. All of the case studies discussed are examples of centralised governments and political systems (with Ireland being the most centralised state in the EU). The Spanish example shows that perhaps the greatest obstacle for EPM formation to overcome is a highly devolved system of government. Understanding whether Spain is an isolated example of the national institutional structure preventing EPM formation would be a fascinating potential comparative case study, and could form the basis of a future research proposal.

6.7 Conclusion on the Explanatory Factors

Table 6.1 outlines the strong degree of variance on the explanatory factors across the case studies. As was theorized in the preceding paragraph, this variance revealed plenty of insights in relation to how the nature of national-EU relationships are perceived by actors in civil society and how the latter take collective action in response to this differs across several cases.

Table 6.1 Conclusion on the explanatory factors relative to the case studies

	Media	Parties	Referendums	Open Policy Process	Resources	EPM Presence
Ireland	Pro	Low	High	Open	Mixed	Low
UK	Anti	High	Low	Closed	Mixed	High
Denmark	Pro	Low	High	Open	Low	Low
Estonia	Pro	Low	Low	Closed	Low	Low

An important element of this was the close relationship between referendums and the party system in combining together to influence EPM formation. From a wider perspective it represents the rejection of elite political party leadership on the EU issue and the (in some cases) successful challenging on this issue by campaigns to reject referendums on the EU. While concrete evidence of EPM formation based on the

presence of referendums and level of Euroscepticism in the party system may vary across the case studies, these propositions, together with the pervasive conception by EPMs of the media as pro-EU, bring a new perspective on EPM formation that *is* widely applicable. This is the view that EPMs can be seen as a reaction against the perceived collective participation of the party system, media and upper echelons of civil society in general in the negative domestic impact of European integration. A clear narrative emerges from the analysis of the explanatory factors, that EPMs do not conceive of European integration as a single entity in itself but as part of a process which has co-opted the entire societal elite to participation in the EU project to the detriment of what they believe to be the national interest.

The distinctiveness of Euroscepticism as an issue also emerges from the propositions in significant contrast to that of other social movements. Coalitions between political parties and EPMs have been weak and ephemeral. This is in stark contrast to ‘classic’ social movements such as ecology, feminism and global justice, which typically develop strong and long lasting relations with related political parties. Even in states with an open policy process there was no engagement on the EU issue between government and EPMs. Across the case studies, despite varying degrees of access, the media was seen as editorialising against Eurosceptic arguments. What best explains this difference of EPMs from other social movements on these issues? It would appear that it was the engagement of EPMs in national level protest to deal with the supranational issue of European integration. From previous chapters the reluctance of EPMs to organise at a European level was noted and again contrasted to the social movement norm which was to engage enthusiastically in international cooperation.

In the body of literature on civil society engagement with European integration,⁵⁶⁸ specific issue groups, such as trade unions, business associations, religious organisations and various civic groups which lobby EU institutions directly were identified as being representative of a Europeanized civil society. The empirical evidence of EPM formation discussed in this thesis shows that this body of literature needs to include Euroscepticism as an element of a Europeanised civil society. Going forward, the extensive body of

⁵⁶⁸ Greenwood, *Representing Interests in the European Union*; Kohler-Koch, ‘Civil society and EU democracy’; Trenz, ‘European civil society: between participation, representation and discourse’.

research on political party based Euroscepticism and public opinion towards European integration needs to acknowledge that Euroscepticism also exists and is active in civil society, and most importantly that the three are intimately linked in the wider process of the contestation of European integration.

General Conclusions

and Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis sought to locate the factors that caused the formation of EPMs. While the literature on Euroscepticism has coalesced around party politics and public opinion towards European integration, this thesis sought to extend the understanding of the phenomenon of Euroscepticism by examining social movements that form solely to contest European integration. This was achieved by examining in-depth case studies of EPM formation in Ireland, the UK, Estonia and Denmark. The previous chapter synthesised the factors that led to EPM formation from the evidence of the case studies. This conclusion progresses on from Chapter Six to articulate the overarching theme from the thesis as a whole, that of the emergence of contestation of European integration in the face of significant formal and informal constraints. This theme has further relevance for the literature on social movements, in particular to how EPMs affect our understanding of EU political opportunity structures. Perhaps the main findings of this thesis are most relevant toward the body of work on contestation and representation in European integration. The emergence and relative success of EPMs represents a direct challenge to existing concepts of how the EU issue is represented at the national level by different established actors.

In relation to the social movement element of this thesis the conclusion was that European integration has become an issue of collective action. The EU has therefore become an issue similar to gender equality and ecology, which are also the focus of protest movement formation. This finding clearly contradicts existing theories of how protest movements and civil society engage with European integration. The assumption has been that collective action against European integration by civil society will only happen at the European level and strictly in terms of the European dimension of the core issue of the group in question. The classic example of this from Tarrow and Imig is that of Belgian and French autoworker trade unions mobilising to contest single market

regulations which prohibited state support to save their jobs.⁵⁶⁹ In that case the trade union was the vehicle of protest and Euroscepticism was framed specifically on how European integration directly affected workers at those factories. This study has shown that EPMs have emerged alongside existing civil society groups and social movements to contest European integration as a stand-alone issue *at the national level*. EPMs have been formed and supported by members of existing civil society groups: from this study, these included trade unions, religious organisations, business lobby groups and global justice groups amongst others, but also both ordinary and elected members of political parties. From the case studies a clear picture emerged of EPMs forming to contest European integration at the national level. In seeking to explain this phenomenon the thesis isolated two widely applicable explanatory factors.

The issue of elite ‘capture’ by the processes of European integration was a continuous theme across all the case studies. Members of trade unions in Denmark and Ireland joined with the respective *People’s Movements* of both countries to oppose European referendums, as they believed that their trade union leaders were not contesting the perceived anti-worker bias of the EU Treaties under consideration. The literature on civil society and the EU needs to take into account the evidence of this thesis where supposedly “represented peoples” have been shown to have actively formed civil society protest movements to oppose European integration, when they were supposedly “represented” at the EU level.⁵⁷⁰ This same pattern of a perception of elite level capture by the institutions of European integration was shown across other interests such as Catholicism (*Cóir*) and business (*Business for Sterling*). Contestation of European integration based on the European dimension of these civil society groups at the European level was not possible for those who held Eurosceptic positions, as the perception was that civil society elites had been ‘captured’ by the EU institutions and had become dogmatically pro-European to the detriment of their group’s interest. EPMs were therefore formed to contest European integration by ordinary members and officials of established civil-society groups.

⁵⁶⁹ Imig and Tarrow, ‘Political contention in a Europeanising polity’.

⁵⁷⁰ Kohler-Koch, ‘Civil society and EU democracy’, p. 101.

In the cases of Denmark and Ireland EPM contestation of European treaties and of government EU policy in the court system, saw them achieve significant outcomes. In Denmark, the *People's Movement* No campaigning against the Maastricht Treaty laid the groundwork for Danish opt-outs from the final round of EMU and a common European citizenship amongst other policies. In Ireland, *No-to-Nice* secured explicit guarantees that Irish neutrality would not be affected by ratification of the Nice Treaty after they acted as an umbrella group for the successful campaign to reject the Treaty in 2001. Also in Ireland *Libertas* ensured that their issue of retaining a guaranteed Commissioner for each member state was included in legal declarations following the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. EPMs formed to contest European referendums because it allowed them to effect change on EU policy at both the national and European level that other civil society groups had failed to achieve.

Referendums emerged as the key access point of EPMs to the policy-making process. In this regard EPMs stand out from the literature on social movements as the relationship between collective action and referendums has not been the subject of any significant amount of scholarly study. This is the case for the simple reason that so few referendums have been held on issues relevant to social movements outside of exceptional one off events. Evidence from this thesis, however, found that referendums have a powerful formation effect on EPMs of, firstly, allowing them access to the policy-making process and, secondly, of allowing them potentially to effect significant policy change in a quick and decisive manner. The media has long been highlighted as an important arena of contestation for social movements but this thesis has shown that the referendum campaign can be a far more important platform to raise public awareness of the issues they use to challenge European integration. Referendums compressed many of the most important elements of the policy making process into a specific timeframe that proved beneficial for EPMs. By far the most beneficial element of referendums was that it made the EU issue salient for EPMs. Referendums gave legitimacy to the actions of EPMs by pushing European integration to the top of the national political agenda, which in turn provided access to the media. From the case studies it was shown that media outlets were keen to show both sides of the argument during referendum campaigns and thus EPMs were allowed a national media platform for their arguments. Referendums

represented an opportunity for EPMs to engage directly with the policy-making process and effect real policy change as Danish and Irish EPMs were able to do. Few, if any, other elements of the policy making process can encompass such a range of potential benefits for collective action from civil society. With a general increase in, and wider calls for the use of, direct democracy to resolve social issues a study of how social movements interact with referendums based on the evidence of this thesis will greatly add to the literature on the ‘political opportunity structure’ approach to social movement activity.

While this thesis adds a new dimension to the study of political opportunity structures in the body of work on social movements, it also plugs directly into the important debate on political parties and their role in European integration. Mair and Thomassen have shown that political parties are meant to act as interlocutors between the EU and national electorates.⁵⁷¹ This thesis found that this specific role of political parties has been allowed to go fallow, with the consequence that they were identified as key factors causing EPM formation. The pattern that emerged across all the case studies, including the supposedly outlier UK case, was one of political elite withdrawal on the EU issue. Following on from the belief of members of specific civil society groups that their leadership had become dogmatically pro-EU and stifled all debate on European integration, political parties across the case studies either removed the party from the EU debate or stifled discussion on party support for European integration. Most explicitly in the Danish, Estonian and UK cases, individual members of political parties, frustrated with their party’s EU policy, formed EPMs to contest European integration, where these parties refused or failed to do so (in the Irish example party members joined existing EPMs).

The conclusions of this thesis in relation to the importance of both the low level of Euroscepticism in the party system *and* the disengagement of both mainstream and extremist political parties on the European issue in EPM formation highlight several important points. Firstly, the comparative literature on party based Euroscepticism needs to take into account that ostensibly pro-European parties have both memberships and elected officials who are actively engaged in contesting the EU through EPMs.

⁵⁷¹ Mair, and Thomassen, ‘Political representation and government in the European Union’, pp. 27-30.

Secondly, the evidence of the case studies found that simplistic government-opposition dynamics could not fully explain the anti-EU voting behaviour of pro-European electorates at times of referendums on European integration.⁵⁷² The evidence from EPMs shows that pro-EU political parties found it difficult to deal with contestation of the EU from outside the party system. Bartolini has highlighted this problem of “political support mobilisation” that national political parties face when seeking legitimisation for their participation in sovereignty pooling at the supranational level.⁵⁷³ He saw this issue arising principally with public opinion but EPMs show that it can be expanded to include civil society based protest movements as well.

Sartori lists one of the functions of political parties as being “integration [that] involves ... the party as the agency that performs a ‘cohesive’ function”.⁵⁷⁴ Transferring this concept to parties’ roles in European integration, their cohesive function has been to provide legitimacy and democratic accountability for a process that has been conducted far out of view of the electorate. The day to day running of the EU has moved far beyond the occasional, perfunctory role national political parties perform in the EU system, leaving them significantly removed from developments that are dominated by interest groups and elites. This has had the effect of reducing the original democratic function of parties in the EU and reducing their exposure and therefore interest in the EU. Parties were not entirely blameless in this respect, as their focus on national government office seeking has meant that their representative function at the EU level have been willingly sacrificed for domestic electoral gain.⁵⁷⁵ When the EU became salient, such as in referendum votes, pro-EU political parties were so distant from the process of European integration that they were unable to engage with voters in a meaningful way on the European issue, either by providing cues to or processing cues from voters. The consequence of the reduction of this function was to lead to the erosion of political parties as a fundamental part of democratic accountability and legitimacy in the EU.

⁵⁷² Steenbergen, Marco, et. al. (2007). ‘Who’s Cueing Whom?: Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration’, *European Union Politics*, 8: 1, p. 30.

⁵⁷³ Bartolini, Stefano (2007). ‘Politics: The Right or the Wrong Sort of Medicine for the EU?’, *Notre Europe*, Policy Paper No. 19.

⁵⁷⁴ Sartori, Giovanni (2005). ‘Party Types, Organisation and Functions’, *West European Politics*, 28: 1, p. 23.

⁵⁷⁵ Mair, and Thomassen, ‘Political representation and government in the European Union’, pp. 27-30.

The evidence from this thesis strongly corroborated Mair and Thomassen's hypothesis, where even in pro-EU countries, such as Ireland and Estonia, members of political parties grew frustrated with what they saw as the withdrawal of discussion on the EU issue. In Ireland this had the effect of causing disorganised and divided campaigns in favour of EU referendums, as members of ostensibly pro-EU parties joined EPMs and campaigned against party cues. In the UK even the supposedly Eurosceptic Conservatives marginalised the EU issue within the party, thereby strengthening UK EPMs that continued to exist so as to force the Conservative party elite to hold an EU related referendum (*Campaign for a Referendum, I want a Referendum*). This disconnection between party and membership was at its most extreme in the Danish case, where the Social Democrat leadership funded and condoned their membership's participation in firstly the *People's Movement* and latterly the *June Movement*. Such was their desire to avoid a party split over the EU issue that they enabled and supported EPM formation. Only when the party engaged explicitly and publicly with its membership on the EU issue did support from Social Democrat members for these two EPMs collapse.

This area has been emphasised by Mair as one that will be of increasing concern for European comparativist political scientists in the immediate future, as the viability of sustaining the political will for European integration is coming under considerable pressure.⁵⁷⁶ One logical progression of this thesis for further research is to expand upon the evidence from the case studies to engage directly with this debate on the democratic deficit in European integration. The European Commission has signalled its interest in engaging with civil society to address this deficit and any future research project will seek to inform this by showing that grass roots civil society movements and groups are willing to engage on European integration.⁵⁷⁷ This thesis focused on civil society engagement with the EU that formed at the national level. This is in contrast to the focus in previous studies, which has been on the European level. As the conclusions of this research have show, the European-level representation of civil society, in addition to that by political parties, has come to be increasingly contested by members and officials of

⁵⁷⁶ Mair, Peter (2007). 'Political Opposition and the European Union', *Government and Opposition*, 42:1, pp. 1-17.

⁵⁷⁷ European Commission, (2001). *European Governance: A White Paper*, COM (2001) 428 Final, Brussels 25 July.

these civil society groups. The case studies highlighted examples of particular groups, such as political parties, trade unions and religious organisations, whose members had the perception that their group's leadership had been 'captured' by the EU. While Mair has discussed the consequences of the withdrawal of political parties on the EU issue, the evidence of the thesis can be greatly expanded in a future study to detail the extent to which the role has not been fulfilled by civil-society groups. Inherent in such a study is developing a framework for understanding what role civil society performs in representing citizen interests at the EU level. Kohler-Koch has shown that civil-society groups have the potential to emerge as a "grass-roots level" representative between citizens and the EU.⁵⁷⁸ This study has the potential to build on her work with both empirical findings and a theoretical framework.

Testing the framework used in the thesis against additional cases can also help to broaden the main conclusions from this research. As discussed in Section 6.6, Spain is an example of a state without the occurrence of EPMs. A much deeper analysis of the reasons why EPMs failed to form there could corroborate the initial findings of the thesis in relation to Spain. Specifically such a study could focus on how a highly devolved system of government can play a substantive role in negating the emergence of Euroscepticism in civil society despite the presence of the explanatory factors used in the thesis. Likewise, an analysis of the failure of EPM formation in Spain may identify other points that have not been considered across the literature on Euroscepticism and social movements as a whole.

The explanatory factors developed for this thesis also show significant potential for further research. In particular, the conclusion that referendums were a key component of EPM formation can be the subject of a study that explores how referendums and social movements in general interact. Such a study would plug directly into the social movement literature on political opportunity structures. A future research project that looks at the relationship between referendums and social movements across several different countries and different issues would have several potential benefits. Firstly, it would allow for a concentrated understanding of political opportunity structures across a diverse range of states with a single common access point to the policy-making process:

⁵⁷⁸ Kohler-Koch, 'Civil society and EU democracy', p. 106.

namely, referendums. Secondly, it would make measuring the effectiveness of social movement activities more explicit and more easily comparable, as it would be based on the referendum result. Research into social movements that use referendums to attain a particular goal is typically conducted in a case specific manner and has not been pursued systematically in either a comparative or large N context. Such a study would prove fascinating, as it could expand on the work of this research project and potentially extend it into non-European countries, in particular the United States, that have seen an increase in social movements affecting policy outcomes through the use of referendums.

Finally, the expert survey conducted in Chapter One provided some interesting findings that could be expanded into a larger study. With greater space to analyse the findings of the survey far more conclusions could be drawn from it. Additional questions could be introduced to the questionnaire to see how relevant the explanatory factors discussed in this survey, are across Europe as a whole. Ray has used a similar survey to locate the extent of Euroscepticism in mainstream parties.⁵⁷⁹ This proposed study would seek to achieve something similar by possibly looking beyond EPMs into civil society as a whole and locating all those non-party Eurosceptic actors who have played a role in contesting European integration across Europe.

⁵⁷⁹ Ray, 'Mainstream Euroskepticism'.

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Appendix I:

List of respondents to pan-European EPM questionnaire.

Country	Presence of EPMs Yes/No	Number	Effectiveness	Expert	Institution
Austria	Y	2	1	Franz Fallend	Uni. of Manchester
Belgium	N			Nathalie Brack	Uni. Libre Bruxelles
Bulgaria	N			Lyubka Savkova	Sussex European Institute
Croatia	Y	1	1	Marko Stojic	Sussex European Institute
Cyprus	N			George Charalambous	Uni. of Manchester
Czech Republic	Y	2	1	Sean Hanley	SSEES/UCL
Denmark	Y	1	2	John FitzGibbon	Sussex European Institute
Estonia	Y	3	2	John FitzGibbon	Sussex European Institute
Finland	Y	2	1	Katri Vallaste	Helsinki Uni.
France	N			Sally Marthaler	Sussex European Institute
Germany	N			Kai Oppermann	Uni. of Köln
Greece	N			Susannah Verney	Univ. of Athens
Hungary	N			Agnes Batory	CEU
Iceland	Y	2	2	Jo Saglie	Institute for Social Research, Norway
Ireland	Y	3	4	John FitzGibbon	Sussex European Institute
Italy	N			Simona Guerra	Uni. of L'borough

Latvia	N			Daunis Auers	Uni. of Latvia
Lithuania	N			Liudas Mazylis	Kaunas Uni.
Luxembourg	N			Martine Huberty	Sussex European Institute
Malta	Y	1	1	Roderick Pace	Uni. of Malta
Montenegro	N			Marko Stojic	Sussex European Institute
Netherlands	Y	1	1	Robert Harmsen	Uni. of Luxembourg
Norway	Y	1	5	Jo Saglie	Institute for Social Research, Norway
Poland	N	1	1	Simona Guerra	Uni. Of L'borough
Portugal	N			Madalena Meyer Resende	Uni. Nova de Lisboa
Romania	Y	1	1	Sergiu Ghergina	Uni. of Leiden
Serbia	Y	4	2	Marko Stojic	Sussex European Institute
Slovakia	N			Karen Henderson	Uni. of Leicester
Slovenia	N	2	1	Alenka Krasovec	Uni. of Ljubljana
Spain	N			Luiz Bouza García	College of Europe, Bruges
Sweden	Y	7	3	Nicholas Aylott	Sodertorn Uni. College
Switzerland	Y	2	4	Clive H Church	Uni. of Kent
UK	Y	25	4	John FitzGibbon	Sussex European Institute

Experts were drawn from the EPERN network of scholars. The European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN) is a network of scholars researching the impact of European integration on parties, elections and public opinion. It was set up in

August 2003, has a 100-strong international email membership list, organises research seminars and publishes a working paper series. The Network produces an ongoing series of briefings on the impact of European integration on election campaigns. EPERN also produced a special briefing series on the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections.

Appendix II

Irish national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of parties who failed to win a seat are not displayed.

	Fianna Fáil	Fine Gael	Labour	Sinn Féin	Greens	Progressive Democrats	Socialist Party
2011	17.4%/20	36.1%/76	19.4%/37	9.9%/14			1%/2
2007	41.6%/71	27.3%/51	10.1%/20	6.9%/4	4.7%/6	2.7%/2	1%/0
2002	42%/81	23%/31	11%/21	7%/5	4%/6	4%/8	1%/1
1997	40%/77	28%/54	10%/17	3%/1	3%/2	5%/4	1%/1
1992	39%/68	25%/45	19%/33		1%/1	5%/10	
1989	44%/77	29%/55	10%/15		2%/1	6%/6	
1987	44%/81	27%/50	7%/12			12%/14	
1982 (Nov.)	45%/75	39%/70	10%/16				
1982 (Feb.)	47%/81	37%/63	9%/15				
1981	45%/77	37%/65	10%/15				
1977	51%/84	31%/43	12%/16				
1973	46%/68	35%/54	14%/19				
	Workers' Party	Democratic Left	People Before Profit	Democratic Socialist Party	Independents	Anti-H Block	Socialist Labour Party
2011			1%/2		12%/14		
2007			N/A		3%/5		
2002					8%/13		
1997		3%/4			7%/6		
1992		3%/4			6%/4		
1989	5%/7				3.4%/3		
1987	4%/4			0.4%/1	4%/3		
1982 (Nov.)	3%/2				2%/2		
1982 (Feb.)	2%/3				3%/3		
1981	2%/1				4%/4	3%/2	.4%/1
1977					6%/4		
1973					3%/2		

Source: European elections database -

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/ireland/ - accessed 25th April, 2011.

Appendix III

Selected European Parliamentary results for England, Scotland and Wales only, by % vote and seat number. Those parties not winning seats are not counted and so total % vote does not equal 100%.

	Conservatives	Labour	Liberal Democrats	UKIP	Others
2009	28%/25	16%/13	14%/11	17%/13	17%/7
2004	27%/27	23%/19	15%/12	16%/12	9%/5
1999	36%/36	28%/29	13%/10	7%/3	11%/6
1994	28%/18	44%/62	17%/2		3%/2
1989	35%/32	37%/45			3%/1
1984	39%/45	35%/32			3%/1
1979	51%/60	33%/17			2%/1

Source: European Parliamentary election results from -
www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive - accessed 15th April 2011.

Appendix IV

General elections results for three main parties and Eurosceptic parties in % vote and seat numbers.

	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Referendum Party
2010	36%/306	29%/258	23%/57	3%/0	
2005	32%/198	35%/355	22%/62	2.2%/0	
2001	32%/166	41%/412	18%/52	1.5%/0	
1997	31%/165	43%/418	17%/46	0.3%/0	2.6%/0
1992	42%/336	34%/271	18%/20		
1987	42%/376	31%/229	23%/22		
1983	42%/397	28%/209	25%/23		
1979	44%/339	37%/269	14%/11		
1974 (October)	39%/319	36%/277	18%/13		
1974 (February)	37%/301	38%/334	19%/6		
1970	46.4%/330	43.1%/288	7.5%/6		

Source: European elections database-

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/uk/-accessed 25th April, 2011.

Appendix V

Estonian national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of parties who failed to win a seat are not displayed. The threshold for entering the Riigikogu is 5% for party lists but candidates can be elected if they receive more votes than the quota.

	Reform Party	Centre Party	Res Publica	Pro Patria Res Publica Union	Pro Patria Union	Moderates	Social Dems	Greens	People's Union	Coalition Party	Estonian Country People's Party
2011	29%/33	23%/26		21%/23			17%/19	4%/0	2%/0		
2007	28%/31	26%/29		18%/19			11%/10	7%/6	7%/6		
2003	18%/19	25%/28	25%/28		7%/7	7%/6			13%/13		
1999	16%/18	23%/28			16%/18	15%/17				8%/7	7%/7
1995	16%/19	14%/16			8%/8	6%/6					
1992					22%/ 29	10%/12		3%/1			
	Estonian United People's Party	Russian Party in Estonia	Coalition Party and Rural Union	Our Home is Estonia	Republican and Conservative People's Party	Secure Home	Estonian Popular Front	Estonian Nationalist Independence Party	Estonian Royalist Party	Estonian Citizen	Estonian Entrepreneur's Party
2011											
2007											
2003											
1999	6%/6	2%/0									
1995			32%/41	6%/6	5%/5						
1992						14%/17	12%/15	9%/10	7%/8	7%/8	2%/1

Source: European elections database -

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/estonia - accessed 25th April, 2011.

Appendix VI

Danish national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of parties who failed to enter parliament are not displayed. The threshold to enter the Folketing is 2% of the national vote.

	Social Dem's	Liberals	Con. People's Party	Socialist People's Party	Social Liberals	Centre Dem's	Progress Party	Danish People's Party	Red/ Green	New Alliance	Christian Dem's	Common Course	Left Socialist Party	Comm. Party of Denmark	Justice Party
2007	26%/45	26%/46	10%/18	13%/23	5%/9			14%/20	2%/4	3%/5					
2005	26%/47	29%/52	10%/18	6%/11	9%/17			13%/24	3%6						
2001	29%/52	31%/56	9%/16	6%/12	5%/9			12%/22	2%/4		2%/4				
1998	36%/63	24%/42	9%/16	8%/13	4%/7	4%/8	2%/4	7%/13	3%/5		3%/5				
1994	35%/62	23%/42	15%/27	7%/13	5%/8	3%/5	6%/11		3%/6		2%/0				
1990	37%/69	16%/29	16%/30	8%/15	4%/7	5%/9	6%/12				2%/4				
1988	30%/55	12%/22	19%/35	13%/24	6%/10	5%/9	9%/16				2%/4				
1987	29%/54	11%/19	21%/38	15%/27	6%/11	5%/9	5%/9				2%/4	2%/4			
1984	32%/56	12%/22	23%/42	12%/21	6%/10	5%/8	4%/6				3%/5		3%/5		
1981	33%/59	11%/20	15%/26	11%/21	5%/9	8%/15	9%/16				3%/5		3%/5		
1979	38%/68	13%/22	13%/22	6%/11	5%/10	3%/6	11%/20				3%/5		4%/6		3%/5
1977	37%/65	12%/21	9%/15	4%/7	4%/6	6%/11	15%/26				3%/6		3%/5	4%/7	3%/6
1975	30%/53	23%/42	6%/10	5%/9	7%/13	2%/4	14%/24				5%/9		2%/4	4%/7	
1973	26%/46	12%/22	9%/16	6%/11	11%/20	8%/14	16%/28				4%/7			4%/6	3%/5
1971	37%/70	16%/30	17%/31	9%/17	14%/27										

Source: European elections database -

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/denmark - accessed 25th April 2011.

Appendix VII

List of Author Interviews.

Ireland:

- Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December, 2007.
- Roger Cole, Chairman PANA, 10th December, 2007.
- Mary-Lou McDonald MEP, Sinn Féin, 31st March, 2008.
- Joe Higgins MEP, former TD and leader Socialist Party, 31st March 2008.
- Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman Libertas, 14th August, 2008.
- Sen. Deirdre de Burca, Green Party spokesperson on Europe, 20th August, 2008.
- Frank Keoghane, Chairman People's Movement, 31st March, 2008.
- Naoise Nunn, Libertas campaign manager, 14th August, 2008.
- Dr. Paul Gillespie, former international editor of The Irish Times, 29th September, 2010.

UK:

- Nick Herbert MP, former executive director of Business for Sterling, 18th May, 2008.
- Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June, 2010.
- Simon Buckby, former Chief Executive of Britain for Europe, 21st June, 2010.
- Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution, 21st May, 2008.

Estonia:

- Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with Postimees newspaper, 7th November, 2008.
- Prof. Igor Gräzin, co-director UKVE and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008.
- Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, director of the Estonian foreign policy institute, 11th October, 2008.
- Prof. Ivar Raig, founder and Chairman UKVE, 13th October, 2008.
- Uno Silberg, founder and chairman No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.

Denmark:

- Margarethe Auken, MEP for the Socialist People's Party, 13th September, 2009.
- Lave Broch, campaign manager People's Movement No to the EU, 12th September, 2009.
- Drude Dahlerup, Senior June Movement activist, leader No 2 Euro Alliance, 2nd September, 2009.
- Rune Kristensen interview, former leader of the Young Conservatives, 14th September, 2009.
- Mogens Lykketoft, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 2000–2001 and leader of the Social Democrats 2002–5, 15th September, 2009.
- Holger Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People's Party 1991–2005, 15th September, 2009.